Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Meade, Travis  [Clear All Filters]
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
C
Shamsi, Kaveh, Li, Meng, Meade, Travis, Zhao, Zheng, Pan, David Z., Jin, Yier.  2017.  Circuit Obfuscation and Oracle-guided Attacks: Who Can Prevail? Proceedings of the on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI 2017. :357–362.
This paper provides a systematization of knowledge in the domain of integrated circuit protection through obfuscation with a focus on the recent Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attacks. The study systematically combines real-world IC reverse engineering reports, experimental results using the most recent oracle-guided attacks, and concepts in machine-learning and cryptography to draw a map of the state-of-the-art of IC obfuscation and future challenges and opportunities.
P
Li, Meng, Shamsi, Kaveh, Meade, Travis, Zhao, Zheng, Yu, Bei, Jin, Yier, Pan, David Z..  2016.  Provably Secure Camouflaging Strategy for IC Protection. Proceedings of the 35th International Conference on Computer-Aided Design. :28:1–28:8.

The advancing of reverse engineering techniques has complicated the efforts in intellectual property protection. Proactive methods have been developed recently, among which layout-level IC camouflaging is the leading example. However, existing camouflaging methods are rarely supported by provably secure criteria, which further leads to over-estimation of the security level when countering the latest de-camouflaging attacks, e.g., the SAT-based attack. In this paper, a quantitative security criterion is proposed for de-camouflaging complexity measurements and formally analyzed through the demonstration of the equivalence between the existing de-camouflaging strategy and the active learning scheme. Supported by the new security criterion, two novel camouflaging techniques are proposed, the low-overhead camouflaging cell library and the AND-tree structure, to help achieve exponentially increasing security levels at the cost of linearly increasing performance overhead on the circuit under protection. A provably secure camouflaging framework is then developed by combining these two techniques. Experimental results using the security criterion show that the camouflaged circuits with the proposed framework are of high resilience against the SAT-based attack with negligible performance overhead.