Visible to the public Biblio

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C
Borgolte, Kevin, Fiebig, Tobias, Hao, Shuang, Kruegel, Christopher, Vigna, Giovanni.  2018.  Cloud Strife: Mitigating the Security Risks of Domain-Validated Certificates. Proceedings of the Applied Networking Research Workshop. :4-4.

Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), more generally the "cloud," changed the landscape of system operations on the Internet. Clouds' elasticity allow operators to rapidly allocate and use resources as needed, from virtual machines, to storage, to IP addresses, which is what made clouds popular. We show that the dynamic component paired with developments in trust-based ecosystems (e.g., TLS certificates) creates so far unknown attacks. We demonstrate that it is practical to allocate IP addresses to which stale DNS records point. Considering the ubiquity of domain validation in trust ecosystems, like TLS, an attacker can then obtain a valid and trusted certificate. The attacker can then impersonate the service, exploit residual trust for phishing, or might even distribute malicious code. Even worse, an aggressive attacker could succeed in less than 70 seconds, well below common time-to-live (TTL) for DNS. In turn, she could exploit normal service migrations to obtain a valid certificate, and, worse, she might not be bound by DNS records being (temporarily) stale. We introduce a new authentication method for trust-based domain validation, like IETF's automated certificate management environment (ACME), that mitigates staleness issues without incurring additional certificate requester effort by incorporating the existing trust of a name into the validation process. Based on previously published work [1]. [1] Kevin Borgolte, Tobias Fiebig, Shuang Hao, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna. February 2018. Cloud Strife: Mitigating the Security Risks of Domain-Validated Certificates. In Proceedings of the 25th Network and Distributed Systems Security Symposium (NDSS '18). Internet Society (ISOC). DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2018.23327. URL: https://doi.org/10.14722/nd

D
Corina, Jake, Machiry, Aravind, Salls, Christopher, Shoshitaishvili, Yan, Hao, Shuang, Kruegel, Christopher, Vigna, Giovanni.  2017.  DIFUZE: Interface Aware Fuzzing for Kernel Drivers. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :2123–2138.

Device drivers are an essential part in modern Unix-like systems to handle operations on physical devices, from hard disks and printers to digital cameras and Bluetooth speakers. The surge of new hardware, particularly on mobile devices, introduces an explosive growth of device drivers in system kernels. Many such drivers are provided by third-party developers, which are susceptible to security vulnerabilities and lack proper vetting. Unfortunately, the complex input data structures for device drivers render traditional analysis tools, such as fuzz testing, less effective, and so far, research on kernel driver security is comparatively sparse. In this paper, we present DIFUZE, an interface-aware fuzzing tool to automatically generate valid inputs and trigger the execution of the kernel drivers. We leverage static analysis to compose correctly-structured input in the userspace to explore kernel drivers. DIFUZE is fully automatic, ranging from identifying driver handlers, to mapping to device file names, to constructing complex argument instances. We evaluate our approach on seven modern Android smartphones. The results show that DIFUZE can effectively identify kernel driver bugs, and reports 32 previously unknown vulnerabilities, including flaws that lead to arbitrary code execution.

E
Borgolte, Kevin, Hao, Shuang, Fiebig, Tobias, Vigna, Giovanni.  2018.  Enumerating Active IPv6 Hosts for Large-Scale Security Scans via DNSSEC-Signed Reverse Zones. 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). :770-784.

Security research has made extensive use of exhaustive Internet-wide scans over the recent years, as they can provide significant insights into the overall state of security of the Internet, and ZMap made scanning the entire IPv4 address space practical. However, the IPv4 address space is exhausted, and a switch to IPv6, the only accepted long-term solution, is inevitable. In turn, to better understand the security of devices connected to the Internet, including in particular Internet of Things devices, it is imperative to include IPv6 addresses in security evaluations and scans. Unfortunately, it is practically infeasible to iterate through the entire IPv6 address space, as it is 2ˆ96 times larger than the IPv4 address space. Therefore, enumeration of active hosts prior to scanning is necessary. Without it, we will be unable to investigate the overall security of Internet-connected devices in the future. In this paper, we introduce a novel technique to enumerate an active part of the IPv6 address space by walking DNSSEC-signed IPv6 reverse zones. Subsequently, by scanning the enumerated addresses, we uncover significant security problems: the exposure of sensitive data, and incorrectly controlled access to hosts, such as access to routing infrastructure via administrative interfaces, all of which were accessible via IPv6. Furthermore, from our analysis of the differences between accessing dual-stack hosts via IPv6 and IPv4, we hypothesize that the root cause is that machines automatically and by default take on globally routable IPv6 addresses. This is a practice that the affected system administrators appear unaware of, as the respective services are almost always properly protected from unauthorized access via IPv4. Our findings indicate (i) that enumerating active IPv6 hosts is practical without a preferential network position contrary to common belief, (ii) that the security of active IPv6 hosts is currently still lagging behind the security state of IPv4 hosts, and (iii) that unintended IPv6 connectivity is a major security issue for unaware system administrators.

L
Liao, Xiaojing, Alrwais, Sumayah, Yuan, Kan, Xing, Luyi, Wang, XiaoFeng, Hao, Shuang, Beyah, Raheem.  2016.  Lurking Malice in the Cloud: Understanding and Detecting Cloud Repository As a Malicious Service. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :1541–1552.

The popularity of cloud hosting services also brings in new security challenges: it has been reported that these services are increasingly utilized by miscreants for their malicious online activities. Mitigating this emerging threat, posed by such "bad repositories" (simply Bar), is challenging due to the different hosting strategy to traditional hosting service, the lack of direct observations of the repositories by those outside the cloud, the reluctance of the cloud provider to scan its customers' repositories without their consent, and the unique evasion strategies employed by the adversary. In this paper, we took the first step toward understanding and detecting this emerging threat. Using a small set of "seeds" (i.e., confirmed Bars), we identified a set of collective features from the websites they serve (e.g., attempts to hide Bars), which uniquely characterize the Bars. These features were utilized to build a scanner that detected over 600 Bars on leading cloud platforms like Amazon, Google, and 150K sites, including popular ones like groupon.com, using them. Highlights of our study include the pivotal roles played by these repositories on malicious infrastructures and other important discoveries include how the adversary exploited legitimate cloud repositories and why the adversary uses Bars in the first place that has never been reported. These findings bring such malicious services to the spotlight and contribute to a better understanding and ultimately eliminating this new threat.