Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Keyword is integrated circuits  [Clear All Filters]
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z   [Show ALL]
A
Vávra, J., Hromada, M..  2017.  Anomaly Detection System Based on Classifier Fusion in ICS Environment. 2017 International Conference on Soft Computing, Intelligent System and Information Technology (ICSIIT). :32–38.

The detection of cyber-attacks has become a crucial task for highly sophisticated systems like industrial control systems (ICS). These systems are an essential part of critical information infrastructure. Therefore, we can highlight their vital role in contemporary society. The effective and reliable ICS cyber defense is a significant challenge for the cyber security community. Thus, intrusion detection is one of the demanding tasks for the cyber security researchers. In this article, we examine classification problem. The proposed detection system is based on supervised anomaly detection techniques. Moreover, we utilized classifiers algorithms in order to increase intrusion detection capabilities. The fusion of the classifiers is the way how to achieve the predefined goal.

Chongxi Bao, Forte, D., Srivastava, A..  2014.  On application of one-class SVM to reverse engineering-based hardware Trojan detection. Quality Electronic Design (ISQED), 2014 15th International Symposium on. :47-54.

Due to design and fabrication outsourcing to foundries, the problem of malicious modifications to integrated circuits known as hardware Trojans has attracted attention in academia as well as industry. To reduce the risks associated with Trojans, researchers have proposed different approaches to detect them. Among these approaches, test-time detection approaches have drawn the greatest attention and most approaches assume the existence of a “golden model”. Prior works suggest using reverse-engineering to identify such Trojan-free ICs for the golden model but they did not state how to do this efficiently. In this paper, we propose an innovative and robust reverseengineering approach to identify the Trojan-free ICs. We adapt a well-studied machine learning method, one-class support vector machine, to solve our problem. Simulation results using state-of-the-art tools on several publicly available circuits show that our approach can detect hardware Trojans with high accuracy rate across different modeling and algorithm parameters.

Rathmair, M., Schupfer, F., Krieg, C..  2014.  Applied formal methods for hardware Trojan detection. Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on. :169-172.

This paper addresses the potential danger using integrated circuits which contain malicious hardware modifications hidden in the silicon structure. A so called hardware Trojan may be added at several stages of the chip development process. This work concentrates on formal hardware Trojan detection during the design phase and highlights applied verification techniques. Selected methods are discussed and their combination used to increase an introduced “Trojan Assurance Level”.
 

Gonzalez, D., Alhenaki, F., Mirakhorli, M..  2019.  Architectural Security Weaknesses in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) an Empirical Study Based on Disclosed Software Vulnerabilities. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Software Architecture (ICSA). :31–40.

Industrial control systems (ICS) are systems used in critical infrastructures for supervisory control, data acquisition, and industrial automation. ICS systems have complex, component-based architectures with many different hardware, software, and human factors interacting in real time. Despite the importance of security concerns in industrial control systems, there has not been a comprehensive study that examined common security architectural weaknesses in this domain. Therefore, this paper presents the first in-depth analysis of 988 vulnerability advisory reports for Industrial Control Systems developed by 277 vendors. We performed a detailed analysis of the vulnerability reports to measure which components of ICS have been affected the most by known vulnerabilities, which security tactics were affected most often in ICS and what are the common architectural security weaknesses in these systems. Our key findings were: (1) Human-Machine Interfaces, SCADA configurations, and PLCs were the most affected components, (2) 62.86% of vulnerability disclosures in ICS had an architectural root cause, (3) the most common architectural weaknesses were “Improper Input Validation”, followed by “Im-proper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation” and “Improper Authentication”, and (4) most tactic-related vulnerabilities were related to the tactics “Validate Inputs”, “Authenticate Actors” and “Authorize Actors”.

B
Khalid, F., Hasan, S. R., Hasan, O., Awwadl, F..  2017.  Behavior Profiling of Power Distribution Networks for Runtime Hardware Trojan Detection. 2017 IEEE 60th International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS). :1316–1319.

Runtime hardware Trojan detection techniques are required in third party IP based SoCs as a last line of defense. Traditional techniques rely on golden data model or exotic signal processing techniques such as utilizing Choas theory or machine learning. Due to cumbersome implementation of such techniques, it is highly impractical to embed them on the hardware, which is a requirement in some mission critical applications. In this paper, we propose a methodology that generates a digital power profile during the manufacturing test phase of the circuit under test. A simple processing mechanism, which requires minimal computation of measured power signals, is proposed. For the proof of concept, we have applied the proposed methodology on a classical Advanced Encryption Standard circuit with 21 available Trojans. The experimental results show that the proposed methodology is able to detect 75% of the intrusions with the potential of implementing the detection mechanism on-chip with minimal overhead compared to the state-of-the-art techniques.

Hossain, M., Hasan, R..  2017.  Boot-IoT: A Privacy-Aware Authentication Scheme for Secure Bootstrapping of IoT Nodes. 2017 IEEE International Congress on Internet of Things (ICIOT). :1–8.

The Internet of Things (IoT) devices perform security-critical operations and deal with sensitive information in the IoT-based systems. Therefore, the increased deployment of smart devices will make them targets for cyber attacks. Adversaries can perform malicious actions, leak private information, and track devices' and their owners' location by gaining unauthorized access to IoT devices and networks. However, conventional security protocols are not primarily designed for resource constrained devices and therefore cannot be applied directly to IoT systems. In this paper, we propose Boot-IoT - a privacy-preserving, lightweight, and scalable security scheme for limited resource devices. Boot-IoT prevents a malicious device from joining an IoT network. Boot-IoT enables a device to compute a unique identity for authentication each time the device enters a network. Moreover, during device to device communication, Boot-IoT provides a lightweight mutual authentication scheme that ensures privacy-preserving identity usages. We present a detailed analysis of the security strength of BootIoT. We implemented a prototype of Boot-IoT on IoT devices powered by Contiki OS and provided an extensive comparative analysis of Boot-IoT with contemporary authentication methods. Our results show that Boot-IoT is resource efficient and provides better scalability compared to current solutions.

C
Ferres, E., Immler, V., Utz, A., Stanitzki, A., Lerch, R., Kokozinski, R..  2018.  Capacitive Multi-Channel Security Sensor IC for Tamper-Resistant Enclosures. 2018 IEEE SENSORS. :1–4.
Physical attacks are a serious threat for embedded devices. Since these attacks are based on physical interaction, sensing technology is a key aspect in detecting them. For highest security levels devices in need of protection are placed into tamper-resistant enclosures. In this paper we present a capacitive multi-channel security sensor IC in a 350 nm CMOS technology. This IC measures more than 128 capacitive sensor nodes of such an enclosure with an SNR of 94.6 dB across a 16×16 electrode matrix in just 19.7 ms. The theoretical sensitivity is 35 aF which is practically limited by noise to 460 aF. While this is similar to capacitive touch technology, it outperforms available solutions of this domain with respect to precision and speed.
Sabaliauskaite, G., Mathur, A.P..  2014.  Countermeasures to Enhance Cyber-physical System Security and Safety. Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops (COMPSACW), 2014 IEEE 38th International. :13-18.

An application of two Cyber-Physical System (CPS) security countermeasures - Intelligent Checker (IC) and Cross-correlator - for enhancing CPS safety and achieving required CPS safety integrity level is presented. ICs are smart sensors aimed at detecting attacks in CPS and alerting the human operators. Cross-correlator is an anomaly detection technique for detecting deception attacks. We show how ICs could be implemented at three different CPS safety protection layers to maintain CPS in a safe state. In addition, we combine ICs with the cross-correlator technique to assure high probability of failure detection. Performance simulations show that a combination of these two security countermeasures is effective in detecting and mitigating CPS failures, including catastrophic failures.
 

Cioranesco, J.-M., Danger, J.-L., Graba, T., Guilley, S., Mathieu, Y., Naccache, D., Xuan Thuy Ngo.  2014.  Cryptographically secure shields. Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on. :25-31.

Probing attacks are serious threats on integrated circuits. Security products often include a protective layer called shield that acts like a digital fence. In this article, we demonstrate a new shield structure that is cryptographically secure. This shield is based on the newly proposed SIMON lightweight block cipher and independent mesh lines to ensure the security against probing attacks of the hardware located behind the shield. Such structure can be proven secure against state-of-the-art invasive attacks. For the first time in the open literature, we describe a chip designed with a digital shield, and give an extensive report of its cost, in terms of power, metal layer(s) to sacrifice and of logic (including the logic to connect it to the CPU). Also, we explain how “Through Silicon Vias” (TSV) technology can be used for the protection against both frontside and backside probing.

Su, W., Antoniou, A., Eagle, C..  2017.  Cyber Security of Industrial Communication Protocols. 2017 22nd IEEE International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA). :1–4.

In this paper, an industrial testbed is proposed utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf equipment, and it is used to study the weakness of industrial Ethernet, i.e., PROFINET. The investigation is based on observation of the principles of operation of PROFINET and the functionality of industrial control systems.

Terai, A., Abe, S., Kojima, S., Takano, Y., Koshijima, I..  2017.  Cyber-Attack Detection for Industrial Control System Monitoring with Support Vector Machine Based on Communication Profile. 2017 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS PW). :132–138.

Industrial control systems (ICS) used in industrial plants are vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can cause fatal damage to the plants. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) monitor ICS network traffic and detect suspicious activities. However, many IDSs overlook sophisticated cyber-attacks because it is hard to make a complete database of cyber-attacks and distinguish operational anomalies when compared to an established baseline. In this paper, a discriminant model between normal and anomalous packets was constructed with a support vector machine (SVM) based on an ICS communication profile, which represents only packet intervals and length, and an IDS with the applied model is proposed. Furthermore, the proposed IDS was evaluated using penetration tests on our cyber security test bed. Although the IDS was constructed by the limited features (intervals and length) of packets, the IDS successfully detected cyber-attacks by monitoring the rate of predicted attacking packets.

Kim, C..  2016.  Cyber-resilient industrial control system with diversified architecture and bus monitoring. 2016 World Congress on Industrial Control Systems Security (WCICSS). :1–6.

This paper focuses on exploitable cyber vulnerabilities in industrial control systems (ICS) and on a new approach of resiliency against them. Even with numerous metrics and methods for intrusion detection and mitigation strategy, a complete detection and deterrence of cyber-attacks for ICS is impossible. Countering the impact and consequence of possible malfunctions caused by such attacks in the safety-critical ICS's, this paper proposes new controller architecture to fail-operate even under compromised situations. The proposed new ICS is realized with diversification of hardware/software and unidirectional communication in alerting suspicious infiltration to upper-level management. Equipped with control bus monitoring, this operation-basis approach of infiltration detection would become a truly cyber-resilient ICS. The proposed system is tested in a lab hardware experimentation setup and on a cybersecurity test bed, DeterLab, for validation.

D
Shila, D.M., Venugopal, V..  2014.  Design, implementation and security analysis of Hardware Trojan Threats in FPGA. Communications (ICC), 2014 IEEE International Conference on. :719-724.

Hardware Trojan Threats (HTTs) are stealthy components embedded inside integrated circuits (ICs) with an intention to attack and cripple the IC similar to viruses infecting the human body. Previous efforts have focused essentially on systems being compromised using HTTs and the effectiveness of physical parameters including power consumption, timing variation and utilization for detecting HTTs. We propose a novel metric for hardware Trojan detection coined as HTT detectability metric (HDM) that uses a weighted combination of normalized physical parameters. HTTs are identified by comparing the HDM with an optimal detection threshold; if the monitored HDM exceeds the estimated optimal detection threshold, the IC will be tagged as malicious. As opposed to existing efforts, this work investigates a system model from a designer perspective in increasing the security of the device and an adversary model from an attacker perspective exposing and exploiting the vulnerabilities in the device. Using existing Trojan implementations and Trojan taxonomy as a baseline, seven HTTs were designed and implemented on a FPGA testbed; these Trojans perform a variety of threats ranging from sensitive information leak, denial of service to beat the Root of Trust (RoT). Security analysis on the implemented Trojans showed that existing detection techniques based on physical characteristics such as power consumption, timing variation or utilization alone does not necessarily capture the existence of HTTs and only a maximum of 57% of designed HTTs were detected. On the other hand, 86% of the implemented Trojans were detected with HDM. We further carry out analytical studies to determine the optimal detection threshold that minimizes the summation of false alarm and missed detection probabilities.

Kannan, S., Karimi, N., Karri, R., Sinanoglu, O..  2014.  Detection, diagnosis, and repair of faults in memristor-based memories. VLSI Test Symposium (VTS), 2014 IEEE 32nd. :1-6.

Memristors are an attractive option for use in future memory architectures due to their non-volatility, high density and low power operation. Notwithstanding these advantages, memristors and memristor-based memories are prone to high defect densities due to the non-deterministic nature of nanoscale fabrication. The typical approach to fault detection and diagnosis in memories entails testing one memory cell at a time. This is time consuming and does not scale for the dense, memristor-based memories. In this paper, we integrate solutions for detecting and locating faults in memristors, and ensure post-silicon recovery from memristor failures. We propose a hybrid diagnosis scheme that exploits sneak-paths inherent in crossbar memories, and uses March testing to test and diagnose multiple memory cells simultaneously, thereby reducing test time. We also provide a repair mechanism that prevents faults in the memory from being activated. The proposed schemes enable and leverage sneak paths during fault detection and diagnosis modes, while still maintaining a sneak-path free crossbar during normal operation. The proposed hybrid scheme reduces fault detection and diagnosis time by ~44%, compared to traditional March tests, and repairs the faulty cell with minimal overhead.
 

Koch, R., Kühn, T., Odenwald, M., Rodosek, G. Dreo.  2016.  Dr. WATTson: Lightweight current-based Intrusion Detection (CBID). 2016 14th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST). :170–177.

Intrusion detection has been an active field of research for more than 35 years. Numerous systems had been built based on the two fundamental detection principles, knowledge-based and behavior-based detection. Anyway, having a look at day-to-day news about data breaches and successful attacks, detection effectiveness is still limited. Even more, heavy-weight intrusion detection systems cannot be installed in every endangered environment. For example, Industrial Control Systems are typically utilized for decades, charging off huge investments of companies. Thus, some of these systems have been in operation for years, but were designed afore without security in mind. Even worse, as systems often have connections to other networks and even the Internet nowadays, an adequate protection is mandatory, but integrating intrusion detection can be extremely difficult - or even impossible to date. We propose a new lightweight current-based IDS which is using a difficult to manipulate measurement base and verifiable ground truth. Focus of our system is providing intrusion detection for ICS and SCADA on a low-priced base, easy to integrate. Dr. WATTson, a prototype implemented based on our concept provides high detection and low false alarm rates.

Zhang, Dongrong, He, Miao, Wang, Xiaoxiao, Tehranipoor, M..  2017.  Dynamically obfuscated scan for protecting IPs against scan-based attacks throughout supply chain. 2017 IEEE 35th VLSI Test Symposium (VTS). :1–6.
Scan-based test is commonly used to increase testability and fault coverage, however, it is also known to be a liability for chip security. Research has shown that intellectual property (IP) or secret keys can be leaked through scan-based attacks. In this paper, we propose a dynamically-obfuscated scan design for protecting IPs against scan-based attacks. By perturbing all test patterns/responses and protecting the obfuscation key, the proposed architecture is proven to be robust against existing non-invasive scan attacks, and can protect all scan data from attackers in foundry, assembly, and system developers (i.e., OEMs) without compromising the testability. Furthermore, the proposed architecture can be easily plugged into EDA generated scan chains without having a noticeable impact on conventional integrated circuit (IC) design, manufacturing, and test flow. Finally, detailed security and experimental analyses have been performed on several benchmarks. The results demonstrate that the proposed method can protect chips from existing brute force, differential, and other scan-based attacks that target the obfuscation key. The proposed design is of low overhead on area, power consumption, and pattern generation time, and there is no impact on test time.
E
Xiao, K., Forte, D., Tehranipoor, M. M..  2015.  Efficient and secure split manufacturing via obfuscated built-in self-authentication. 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). :14–19.

The threats of reverse-engineering, IP piracy, and hardware Trojan insertion in the semiconductor supply chain are greater today than ever before. Split manufacturing has emerged as a viable approach to protect integrated circuits (ICs) fabricated in untrusted foundries, but has high cost and/or high performance overhead. Furthermore, split manufacturing cannot fully prevent untargeted hardware Trojan insertions. In this paper, we propose to insert additional functional circuitry called obfuscated built-in self-authentication (OBISA) in the chip layout with split manufacturing process, in order to prevent reverse-engineering and further prevent hardware Trojan insertion. Self-tests are performed to authenticate the trustworthiness of the OBISA circuitry. The OBISA circuit is connected to original design in order to increase the strength of obfuscation, thereby allowing a higher layer split and lower overall cost. Additional fan-outs are created in OBISA circuitry to improve obfuscation without losing testability. Our proposed gating mechanism and net selection method can ensure negligible overhead in terms of area, timing, and dynamic power. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique in several benchmark circuits.

Yasin, M., Sinanoglu, O..  2017.  Evolution of logic locking. 2017 IFIP/IEEE International Conference on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI-SoC). :1–6.
The globalization of integrated circuit (IC) supply chain and the emergence of threats, such as intellectual property (IP) piracy, reverse engineering, and hardware Trojans, have forced semiconductor companies to revisit the trust in the supply chain. Logic locking is emerging as a popular and effective countermeasure against these threats. Over the years, multiple logic techniques have been developed. Moreover, a number of attacks have been proposed that expose the security vulnerabilities of these techniques. This paper highlights the key developments in the logic locking research and presents a comprehensive literature review of logic locking.
Cozzi, M., Galliere, J., Maurine, P..  2018.  Exploiting Phase Information in Thermal Scans for Stealthy Trojan Detection. 2018 21st Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD). :573-576.
Infrared thermography has been recognized for its ability to investigate integrated circuits in a non destructive way. Coupled to lock-in correlation it has proven efficient in detecting thermal hot spots. Most of the state of the Art measurement systems are based on amplitude analysis. In this paper we propose to investigate weak thermal hot spots using the phase of infrared signals. We demonstrate that phase analysis is a formidable alternative to amplitude to detect small heat signatures. Finally, we apply our measurement platform and its detection method to the identification of stealthy hardware Trojans.
F
Urias, V. E., Stout, M. S. William, Leeuwen, B. V..  2018.  On the Feasibility of Generating Deception Environments for Industrial Control Systems. 2018 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST). :1–6.

The cyber threat landscape is a constantly morphing surface; the need for cyber defenders to develop and create proactive threat intelligence is on the rise, especially on critical infrastructure environments. It is commonly voiced that Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to the same classes of threats as other networked computer systems. However, cyber defense in operational ICS is difficult, often introducing unacceptable risks of disruption to critical physical processes. This is exacerbated by the notion that hardware used in ICS is often expensive, making full-scale mock-up systems for testing and/or cyber defense impractical. New paradigms in cyber security have focused heavily on using deception to not only protect assets, but also gather insight into adversary motives and tools. Much of the work that we see in today's literature is focused on creating deception environments for traditional IT enterprise networks; however, leveraging our prior work in the domain, we explore the opportunities, challenges and feasibility of doing deception in ICS networks.

Armknecht, F., Maes, R., Sadeghi, A, Standaert, O.-X., Wachsmann, C..  2011.  A Formalization of the Security Features of Physical Functions. Security and Privacy (SP), 2011 IEEE Symposium on. :397-412.

Physical attacks against cryptographic devices typically take advantage of information leakage (e.g., side-channels attacks) or erroneous computations (e.g., fault injection attacks). Preventing or detecting these attacks has become a challenging task in modern cryptographic research. In this context intrinsic physical properties of integrated circuits, such as Physical(ly) Unclonable Functions (PUFs), can be used to complement classical cryptographic constructions, and to enhance the security of cryptographic devices. PUFs have recently been proposed for various applications, including anti-counterfeiting schemes, key generation algorithms, and in the design of block ciphers. However, currently only rudimentary security models for PUFs exist, limiting the confidence in the security claims of PUF-based security primitives. A useful model should at the same time (i) define the security properties of PUFs abstractly and naturally, allowing to design and formally analyze PUF-based security solutions, and (ii) provide practical quantification tools allowing engineers to evaluate PUF instantiations. In this paper, we present a formal foundation for security primitives based on PUFs. Our approach requires as little as possible from the physics and focuses more on the main properties at the heart of most published works on PUFs: robustness (generation of stable answers), unclonability (not provided by algorithmic solutions), and unpredictability. We first formally define these properties and then show that they can be achieved by previously introduced PUF instantiations. We stress that such a consolidating work allows for a meaningful security analysis of security primitives taking advantage of physical properties, becoming increasingly important in the development of the next generation secure information systems.

H
Liu, B., Jin, Y., Qu, G..  2015.  Hardware Design and Verification Techniques for Supply Chain Risk Mitigation. 2015 14th International Conference on Computer-Aided Design and Computer Graphics (CAD/Graphics). :238–239.

We present a brief survey on the state-of-the-art design and verification techniques: IC obfuscation, watermarking, fingerprinting, metering, concurrent checking and verification, for mitigating supply chain security risks such as IC misusing, counterfeiting and overbuilding.

Bhunia, S., Hsiao, M.S., Banga, M., Narasimhan, S..  2014.  Hardware Trojan Attacks: Threat Analysis and Countermeasures. Proceedings of the IEEE. 102:1229-1247.

Security of a computer system has been traditionally related to the security of the software or the information being processed. The underlying hardware used for information processing has been considered trusted. The emergence of hardware Trojan attacks violates this root of trust. These attacks, in the form of malicious modifications of electronic hardware at different stages of its life cycle, pose major security concerns in the electronics industry. An adversary can mount such an attack with an objective to cause operational failure or to leak secret information from inside a chip-e.g., the key in a cryptographic chip, during field operation. Global economic trend that encourages increased reliance on untrusted entities in the hardware design and fabrication process is rapidly enhancing the vulnerability to such attacks. In this paper, we analyze the threat of hardware Trojan attacks; present attack models, types, and scenarios; discuss different forms of protection approaches, both proactive and reactive; and describe emerging attack modes, defenses, and future research pathways.
 

Yoshimizu, N..  2014.  Hardware trojan detection by symmetry breaking in path delays. Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2014 IEEE International Symposium on. :107-111.

This paper discusses the detection of hardware Trojans (HTs) by their breaking of symmetries within integrated circuits (ICs), as measured by path delays. Typically, path delay or side channel methods rely on comparisons to a golden, or trusted, sample. However, golden standards are affected by inter-and intra-die variations which limit the confidence in such comparisons. Symmetry is a way to detect modifications to an IC with increased confidence by confirming subcircuit consistencies within as it was originally designed. The difference in delays from a given path to a set of symmetric paths will be the same unless an inserted HT breaks symmetry. Symmetry can naturally exist in ICs or be artificially added. We describe methods to find and measure path delays against symmetric paths, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of this method. We discuss results of examples from benchmark circuits demonstrating the detection of hardware Trojans.
 

Arafin, M. T., Stanley, A., Sharma, P..  2017.  Hardware-Based Anti-Counterfeiting Techniques for Safeguarding Supply Chain Integrity. 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS). :1–4.
Counterfeit integrated circuits (ICs) and systems have emerged as a menace to the supply chain of electronic goods and products. Simple physical inspection for counterfeit detection, basic intellectual property (IP) laws, and simple protection measures are becoming ineffective against advanced reverse engineering and counterfeiting practices. As a result, hardware security-based techniques have emerged as promising solutions for combating counterfeiting, reverse engineering, and IP theft. However, these solutions have their own merits and shortcomings, and therefore, these options must be carefully studied. In this work, we present a comparative overview of available hardware security solutions to fight against IC counterfeiting. We provide a detailed comparison of the techniques in terms of integration effort, deployability, and security matrices that would assist a system designer to adopt any one of these security measures for safeguarding the product supply chain against counterfeiting and IP theft.