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2021-09-21
Ilavendhan, A., Saruladha, K..  2020.  Comparative Analysis of Various Approaches for DoS Attack Detection in VANETs. 2020 International Conference on Electronics and Sustainable Communication Systems (ICESC). :821–825.
VANET plays a vital role to optimize the journey between source and destination in the growth of smart cities worldwide. The crucial information shared between vehicles is concerned primarily with safety. VANET is a MANET sub-class network that provides a free movement and communication between the RSU and vehicles. The self organized with high mobility in VANET makes any vehicle can transmit malicious messages to some other vehicle in the network. In the defense horizon of VANETs this is a matter of concern. It is the duty of RSU to ensure the safe transmission of sensitive information across the Network to each node. For this, network access exists as the key safety prerequisite, and several risks or attacks can be experienced. The VANETs is vulnerable to a range of security attacks including masquerading, selfish node attack, Sybil attack etc. One of the main threats to network access is this Denial of Service attack. The most important research in the literature on the prevention of Denial of Service Attack in VANETs was explored in this paper. The limitations of each reviewed paper are also presented and Game theory based security model is defined in this paper.
2021-08-11
Lau, Pikkin, Wei, Wei, Wang, Lingfeng, Liu, Zhaoxi, Ten, Chee-Wooi.  2020.  A Cybersecurity Insurance Model for Power System Reliability Considering Optimal Defense Resource Allocation. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. 11:4403–4414.
With the increasing application of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), cyberattacks have become more prevalent against Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) such as the modern power grids. Various methods have been proposed to model the cybersecurity threats, but so far limited studies have been focused on the defensive strategies subject to the limited security budget. In this paper, the power supply reliability is evaluated considering the strategic allocation of defense resources. Specifically, the optimal mixed strategies are formulated by the Stackelberg Security Game (SSG) to allocate the defense resources on multiple targets subject to cyberattacks. The cyberattacks against the intrusion-tolerant Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system are mathematically modeled by Semi-Markov Process (SMP) kernel. The intrusion tolerance capability of the SCADA system provides buffered residence time before the substation failure to enhance the network robustness against cyberattacks. Case studies of the cyberattack scenarios are carried out to demonstrate the intrusion tolerance capability. Depending on the defense resource allocation scheme, the intrusion-tolerant SCADA system possesses varying degrees of self-healing capability to restore to the good state and prevent the substations from failure. If more defense resources are invested on the substations, the intrusion tolerant capability can be further enhanced for protecting the substations. Finally, the actuarial insurance principle is designed to estimate transmission companies' individual premiums considering correlated cybersecurity risks. The proposed insurance premium principle is designed to provide incentive for investments on enhancing the intrusion tolerance capability, which is verified by the results of case studies.
2021-08-02
Zhou, Zan, Xu, Changqiao, Ma, Tengchao, Kuang, Xiaohui.  2020.  Multi-vNIC Intelligent Mutation: A Moving Target Defense to thwart Client-side DNS Cache Attack. ICC 2020 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC). :1—6.
As massive research efforts are poured into server-side DNS security enhancement in online cloud service platforms, sophisticated APTs tend to develop client-side DNS attacks, where defenders only have limited resources and abilities. The collaborative DNS attack is a representative newest client-side paradigm to stealthily undermine user cache by falsifying DNS responses. Different from existing static methods, in this paper, we propose a moving target defense solution named multi-vNIC intelligent mutation to free defenders from arduous work and thwart elusive client-side DNS attack in the meantime. Multiple virtual network interface cards are created and switched in a mutating manner. Thus attackers have to blindly guess the actual NIC with a high risk of exposure. Firstly, we construct a dynamic game-theoretic model to capture the main characteristics of both attacker and defender. Secondly, a reinforcement learning mechanism is developed to generate adaptive optimal defense strategy. Experiment results also highlight the security performance of our defense method compared to several state-of-the-art technologies.
2021-07-08
Chiariotti, Federico, Signori, Alberto, Campagnaro, Filippo, Zorzi, Michele.  2020.  Underwater Jamming Attacks as Incomplete Information Games. IEEE INFOCOM 2020 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS). :1033—1038.
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) have several fundamental civilian and military applications, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against their communications are a serious threat. In this work, we analyze such an attack using game theory in an asymmetric scenario, in which the node under attack does not know the position of the jammer that blocks its signals. The jammer has a dual objective, namely, disrupting communications and forcing the legitimate transmitter to spend more energy protecting its own transmissions. Our model shows that, if both nodes act rationally, the transmitter is able to quickly reduce its disadvantage, estimating the location of the jammer and responding optimally to the attack.
2021-06-02
Das, Sima, Panda, Ganapati.  2020.  An Initiative Towards Privacy Risk Mitigation Over IoT Enabled Smart Grid Architecture. 2020 International Conference on Renewable Energy Integration into Smart Grids: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Technology Modelling and Simulation (ICREISG). :168—173.
The Internet of Things (IoT) has transformed many application domains with realtime, continuous, automated control and information transmission. The smart grid is one such futuristic application domain in execution, with a large-scale IoT network as its backbone. By leveraging the functionalities and characteristics of IoT, the smart grid infrastructure benefits not only consumers, but also service providers and power generation organizations. The confluence of IoT and smart grid comes with its own set of challenges. The underlying cyberspace of IoT, though facilitates communication (information propagation) among devices of smart grid infrastructure, it undermines the privacy at the same time. In this paper we propose a new measure for quantifying the probability of privacy leakage based on the behaviors of the devices involved in the communication process. We construct a privacy stochastic game model based on the information shared by the device, and the access to the compromised device. The existence of Nash Equilibrium strategy of the game is proved theoretically. We experimentally validate the effectiveness of the privacy stochastic game model.
2021-06-01
Xing, Hang, Zhou, Chunjie, Ye, Xinhao, Zhu, Meipan.  2020.  An Edge-Cloud Synergy Integrated Security Decision-Making Method for Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems. 2020 IEEE 9th Data Driven Control and Learning Systems Conference (DDCLS). :989–995.
With the introduction of new technologies such as cloud computing and big data, the security issues of industrial cyber-physical systems (ICPSs) have become more complicated. Meanwhile, a lot of current security research lacks adaptation to industrial system upgrades. In this paper, an edge-cloud synergy framework for security decision-making is proposed, which takes advantage of the huge convenience and advantages brought by cloud computing and edge computing, and can make security decisions on a global perspective. Under this framework, a combination of Bayesian network-based risk assessment and stochastic game model-based security decision-making is proposed to generate an optimal defense strategy to minimize system losses. This method trains models in the clouds and infers at the edge computing nodes to achieve rapid defense strategy generation. Finally, a case study on the hardware-in-the-loop simulation platform proves the feasibility of the approach.
2021-05-05
Zheng, Tian, Hong, Qiao, Xi, Li, Yizheng, Sun, Jie, Deng.  2020.  A Security Defense Model for SCADA System Based on Game Theory. 2020 12th International Conference on Measuring Technology and Mechatronics Automation (ICMTMA). :253—258.

With the increase of the information level of SCADA system in recent years, the attacks against SCADA system are also increasing. Therefore, more and more scholars are beginning to study the safety of SCADA systems. Game theory is a balanced decision involving the main body of all parties. In recent years, domestic and foreign scholars have applied game theory to SCADA systems to achieve active defense. However, their research often focuses on the entire SCADA system, and the game theory is solved for the entire SCADA system, which is not flexible enough, and the calculation cost is also high. In this paper, a dynamic local game model (DLGM) for power SCADA system is proposed. This model first obtains normal data to form a whitelist, then dynamically detects each attack of the attacker's SCADA system, and through white list to determine the node location of the SCADA system attacked by the attacker, then obtains the smallest system attacked by SCADA system, and finally performs a local dynamic game algorithm to find the best defense path. Experiments show that DLGM model can find the best defense path more effectively than other game strategies.

2021-04-08
Jin, R., He, X., Dai, H..  2019.  On the Security-Privacy Tradeoff in Collaborative Security: A Quantitative Information Flow Game Perspective. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. 14:3273–3286.
To contest the rapidly developing cyber-attacks, numerous collaborative security schemes, in which multiple security entities can exchange their observations and other relevant data to achieve more effective security decisions, are proposed and developed in the literature. However, the security-related information shared among the security entities may contain some sensitive information and such information exchange can raise privacy concerns, especially when these entities belong to different organizations. With such consideration, the interplay between the attacker and the collaborative entities is formulated as Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) games, in which the QIF theory is adapted to measure the collaboration gain and the privacy loss of the entities in the information sharing process. In particular, three games are considered, each corresponding to one possible scenario of interest in practice. Based on the game-theoretic analysis, the expected behaviors of both the attacker and the security entities are obtained. In addition, the simulation results are presented to validate the analysis.
2021-03-29
Das, T., Eldosouky, A. R., Sengupta, S..  2020.  Think Smart, Play Dumb: Analyzing Deception in Hardware Trojan Detection Using Game Theory. 2020 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security). :1–8.
In recent years, integrated circuits (ICs) have become significant for various industries and their security has been given greater priority, specifically in the supply chain. Budgetary constraints have compelled IC designers to offshore manufacturing to third-party companies. When the designer gets the manufactured ICs back, it is imperative to test for potential threats like hardware trojans (HT). In this paper, a novel multi-level game-theoretic framework is introduced to analyze the interactions between a malicious IC manufacturer and the tester. In particular, the game is formulated as a non-cooperative, zero-sum, repeated game using prospect theory (PT) that captures different players' rationalities under uncertainty. The repeated game is separated into a learning stage, in which the defender learns about the attacker's tendencies, and an actual game stage, where this learning is used. Experiments show great incentive for the attacker to deceive the defender about their actual rationality by "playing dumb" in the learning stage (deception). This scenario is captured using hypergame theory to model the attacker's view of the game. The optimal deception rationality of the attacker is analytically derived to maximize utility gain. For the defender, a first-step deception mitigation process is proposed to thwart the effects of deception. Simulation results show that the attacker can profit from the deception as it can successfully insert HTs in the manufactured ICs without being detected.
Kotra, A., Eldosouky, A., Sengupta, S..  2020.  Every Anonymization Begins with k: A Game-Theoretic Approach for Optimized k Selection in k-Anonymization. 2020 International Conference on Advances in Computing and Communication Engineering (ICACCE). :1–6.
Privacy preservation is one of the greatest concerns when data is shared between different organizations. On the one hand, releasing data for research purposes is inevitable. On the other hand, sharing this data can jeopardize users' privacy. An effective solution, for the sharing organizations, is to use anonymization techniques to hide the users' sensitive information. One of the most popular anonymization techniques is k-Anonymization in which any data record is indistinguishable from at least k-1 other records. However, one of the fundamental challenges in choosing the value of k is the trade-off between achieving a higher privacy and the information loss associated with the anonymization. In this paper, the problem of choosing the optimal anonymization level for k-anonymization, under possible attacks, is studied when multiple organizations share their data to a common platform. In particular, two common types of attacks are considered that can target the k-anonymization technique. To this end, a novel game-theoretic framework is proposed to model the interactions between the sharing organizations and the attacker. The problem is formulated as a static game and its different Nash equilibria solutions are analytically derived. Simulation results show that the proposed framework can significantly improve the utility of the sharing organizations through optimizing the choice of k value.
Xu, Z., Easwaran, A..  2020.  A Game-Theoretic Approach to Secure Estimation and Control for Cyber-Physical Systems with a Digital Twin. 2020 ACM/IEEE 11th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS). :20–29.
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) play an increasingly significant role in many critical applications. These valuable applications attract various sophisticated attacks. This paper considers a stealthy estimation attack, which aims to modify the state estimation of the CPSs. The intelligent attackers can learn defense strategies and use clandestine attack strategies to avoid detection. To address the issue, we design a Chi-square detector in a Digital Twin (DT), which is an online digital model of the physical system. We use a Signaling Game with Evidence (SGE) to find the optimal attack and defense strategies. Our analytical results show that the proposed defense strategies can mitigate the impact of the attack on the physical estimation and guarantee the stability of the CPSs. Finally, we use an illustrative application to evaluate the performance of the proposed framework.
Liao, S., Wu, J., Li, J., Bashir, A. K..  2020.  Proof-of-Balance: Game-Theoretic Consensus for Controller Load Balancing of SDN. IEEE INFOCOM 2020 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS). :231–236.
Software Defined Networking (SDN) focus on the isolation of control plane and data plane, greatly enhancing the network's support for heterogeneity and flexibility. However, although the programmable network greatly improves the performance of all aspects of the network, flexible load balancing across controllers still challenges the current SDN architecture. Complex application scenarios lead to flexible and changeable communication requirements, making it difficult to guarantee the Quality of Service (QoS) for SDN users. To address this issue, this paper proposes a paradigm that uses blockchain to incentive safe load balancing for multiple controllers. We proposed a controller consortium blockchain for secure and efficient load balancing of multi-controllers, which includes a new cryptographic currency balance coin and a novel consensus mechanism Proof-of-Balance (PoB). In addition, we have designed a novel game theory-based incentive mechanism to incentive controllers with tight communication resources to offload tasks to idle controllers. The security analysis and performance simulation results indicate the superiority and effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Solovey, R., Lavrova, D..  2020.  Game-Theoretic Approach to Self-Regulation of Dynamic Network Infrastructure to Protect Against Cyber Attacks. 2020 International Scientific and Technical Conference Modern Computer Network Technologies (MoNeTeC). :1–7.
The paper presents the concept of applying a game theory approach in infrastructure of wireless dynamic networks to counter computer attacks. The applying of this approach will allow to create mechanism for adaptive reconfiguration of network structure in the context of implementation various types of computer attacks and to provide continuous operation of network even in conditions of destructive information impacts.
Lakhdhar, Y., Rekhis, S., Sabir, E..  2020.  A Game Theoretic Approach For Deploying Forensic Ready Systems. 2020 International Conference on Software, Telecommunications and Computer Networks (SoftCOM). :1–6.
Cyber incidents are occurring every day using various attack strategies. Deploying security solutions with strong configurations will reduce the attack surface and improve the forensic readiness, but will increase the security overhead and cost. In contrast, using moderate or low security configurations will reduce that overhead, but will inevitably decrease the investigation readiness. To avoid the use of cost-prohibitive approaches in developing forensic-ready systems, we present in this paper a game theoretic approach for deploying an investigation-ready infrastructure. The proposed game is a non-cooperative two-player game between an adaptive cyber defender that uses a cognitive security solution to increase the investigation readiness and reduce the attackers' untraceability, and a cyber attacker that wants to execute non-provable attacks with a low cost. The cognitive security solution takes its strategic decision, mainly based on its ability to make forensic experts able to differentiate between provable identifiable, provable non-identifiable, and non-provable attack scenarios, starting from the expected evidences to be generated. We study the behavior of the two strategic players, looking for a mixed Nash equilibrium during competition and computing the probabilities of attacking and defending. A simulation is conducted to prove the efficiency of the proposed model in terms of the mean percentage of gained security cost, the number of stepping stones that an attacker creates and the rate of defender false decisions compared to two different approaches.
Halabi, T., Wahab, O. A., Zulkernine, M..  2020.  A Game-Theoretic Approach for Distributed Attack Mitigation in Intelligent Transportation Systems. NOMS 2020 - 2020 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium. :1–6.
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) play a vital role in the development of smart cities. They enable various road safety and efficiency applications such as optimized traffic management, collision avoidance, and pollution control through the collection and evaluation of traffic data from Road Side Units (RSUs) and connected vehicles in real time. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to data corruption attacks which can seriously influence their decision-making abilities. Traditional attack detection schemes do not account for attackers' sophisticated and evolving strategies and ignore the ITS's constraints on security resources. In this paper, we devise a security game model that allows the defense mechanism deployed in the ITS to optimize the distribution of available resources for attack detection while considering mixed attack strategies, according to which the attacker targets multiple RSUs in a distributed fashion. In our security game, the utility of the ITS is quantified in terms of detection rate, attack damage, and the relevance of the information transmitted by the RSUs. The proposed approach will enable the ITS to mitigate the impact of attacks and increase its resiliency. The results show that our approach reduces the attack impact by at least 20% compared to the one that fairly allocates security resources to RSUs indifferently to attackers' strategies.
Dai, Q., Shi, L..  2020.  A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cyber Attack-Mitigation in Centralized Feeder Automation System. 2020 IEEE Power Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM). :1–5.
The intelligent electronic devices widely deployed across the distribution network are inevitably making the feeder automation (FA) system more vulnerable to cyber-attacks, which would lead to disastrous socio-economic impacts. This paper proposes a three-stage game-theoretic framework that the defender allocates limited security resources to minimize the economic impacts on FA system while the attacker deploys limited attack resources to maximize the corresponding impacts. Meanwhile, the probability of successful attack is calculated based on the Bayesian attack graph, and a fault-tolerant location technique for centralized FA system is elaborately considered during analysis. The proposed game-theoretic framework is converted into a two-level zero-sum game model and solved by the particle swarm optimization (PSO) combined with a generalized reduced gradient algorithm. Finally, the proposed model is validated on distribution network for RBTS bus 2.
2021-02-16
Khoury, J., Nassar, M..  2020.  A Hybrid Game Theory and Reinforcement Learning Approach for Cyber-Physical Systems Security. NOMS 2020 - 2020 IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium. :1—9.
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are monitored and controlled by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems that use advanced computing, sensors, control systems, and communication networks. At first, CPS and SCADA systems were protected and secured by isolation. However, with recent industrial technology advances, the increased connectivity of CPSs and SCADA systems to enterprise networks has uncovered them to new cybersecurity threats and made them a primary target for cyber-attacks with the potential of causing catastrophic economic, social, and environmental damage. Recent research focuses on new methodologies for risk modeling and assessment using game theory and reinforcement learning. This paperwork proposes to frame CPS security on two different levels, strategic and battlefield, by meeting ideas from game theory and Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). The strategic level is modeled as imperfect information, extensive form game. Here, the human administrator and the malware author decide on the strategies of defense and attack, respectively. At the battlefield level, strategies are implemented by machine learning agents that derive optimal policies for run-time decisions. The outcomes of these policies manifest as the utility at a higher level, where we aim to reach a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in favor of the defender. We simulate the scenario of a virus spreading in the context of a CPS network. We present experiments using the MiniCPS simulator and the OpenAI Gym toolkit and discuss the results.
2021-02-03
Mou, W., Ruocco, M., Zanatto, D., Cangelosi, A..  2020.  When Would You Trust a Robot? A Study on Trust and Theory of Mind in Human-Robot Interactions 2020 29th IEEE International Conference on Robot and Human Interactive Communication (RO-MAN). :956—962.

Trust is a critical issue in human-robot interactions (HRI) as it is the core of human desire to accept and use a non-human agent. Theory of Mind (ToM) has been defined as the ability to understand the beliefs and intentions of others that may differ from one's own. Evidences in psychology and HRI suggest that trust and ToM are interconnected and interdependent concepts, as the decision to trust another agent must depend on our own representation of this entity's actions, beliefs and intentions. However, very few works take ToM of the robot into consideration while studying trust in HRI. In this paper, we investigated whether the exposure to the ToM abilities of a robot could affect humans' trust towards the robot. To this end, participants played a Price Game with a humanoid robot (Pepper) that was presented having either low-level ToM or high-level ToM. Specifically, the participants were asked to accept the price evaluations on common objects presented by the robot. The willingness of the participants to change their own price judgement of the objects (i.e., accept the price the robot suggested) was used as the main measurement of the trust towards the robot. Our experimental results showed that robots possessing a high-level of ToM abilities were trusted more than the robots presented with low-level ToM skills.

Gao, L., Sun, J., Li, J..  2020.  Security of Networked Control Systems with Incomplete Information Based on Game Theory. 2020 39th Chinese Control Conference (CCC). :6701—6706.

The security problem of networked control systems (NCSs) suffering denial of service(DoS) attacks with incomplete information is investigated in this paper. Data transmission among different components in NCSs may be blocked due to DoS attacks. We use the concept of security level to describe the degree of security of different components in an NCS. Intrusion detection system (IDS) is used to monitor the invalid data generated by DoS attacks. At each time slot, the defender considers which component to monitor while the attacker considers which place for invasion. A one-shot game between attacker and defender is built and both the complete information case and the incomplete information case are considered. Furthermore, a repeated game model with updating beliefs is also established based on the Bayes' rule. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

2021-01-28
Collins, B. C., Brown, P. N..  2020.  Exploiting an Adversary’s Intentions in Graphical Coordination Games. 2020 American Control Conference (ACC). :4638—4643.

How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of agents by modifying their payoffs. We study a situation in which a system operator must select a graph topology in anticipation of the action of an unknown adversary. The designer can limit her worst-case losses by playing a security strategy, effectively planning for an adversary which intends maximum harm. However, fine-grained information regarding the adversary's intention may help the system operator to fine-tune the defenses and obtain better system performance. In a simple model of adversarial behavior, this paper asks how much a system operator can gain by fine-tuning a defense for known adversarial intent. We find that if the adversary is weak, a security strategy is approximately optimal for any adversary type; however, for moderately-strong adversaries, security strategies are far from optimal.

2021-01-22
Sahabandu, D., Allen, J., Moothedath, S., Bushnell, L., Lee, W., Poovendran, R..  2020.  Quickest Detection of Advanced Persistent Threats: A Semi-Markov Game Approach. 2020 ACM/IEEE 11th International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems (ICCPS). :9—19.
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are stealthy, sophisticated, long-term, multi-stage attacks that threaten the security of sensitive information. Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) has been proposed as a promising mechanism to detect and prevent various cyber attacks in computer systems. DIFT tracks suspicious information flows in the system and generates security analysis when anomalous behavior is detected. The number of information flows in a system is typically large and the amount of resources (such as memory, processing power and storage) required for analyzing different flows at different system locations varies. Hence, efficient use of resources is essential to maintain an acceptable level of system performance when using DIFT. On the other hand, the quickest detection of APTs is crucial as APTs are persistent and the damage caused to the system is more when the attacker spends more time in the system. We address the problem of detecting APTs and model the trade-off between resource efficiency and quickest detection of APTs. We propose a game model that captures the interaction of APT and a DIFT-based defender as a two-player, multi-stage, zero-sum, Stackelberg semi-Markov game. Our game considers the performance parameters such as false-negatives generated by DIFT and the time required for executing various operations in the system. We propose a two-time scale Q-learning algorithm that converges to a Stackelberg equilibrium under infinite horizon, limiting average payoff criteria. We validate our model and algorithm on a real-word attack dataset obtained using Refinable Attack INvestigation (RAIN) framework.
Zhang, H., Liu, H., Liang, J., Li, T., Geng, L., Liu, Y., Chen, S..  2020.  Defense Against Advanced Persistent Threats: Optimal Network Security Hardening Using Multi-stage Maze Network Game. 2020 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC). :1—6.

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a stealthy, continuous and sophisticated method of network attacks, which can cause serious privacy leakage and millions of dollars losses. In this paper, we introduce a new game-theoretic framework of the interaction between a defender who uses limited Security Resources(SRs) to harden network and an attacker who adopts a multi-stage plan to attack the network. The game model is derived from Stackelberg games called a Multi-stage Maze Network Game (M2NG) in which the characteristics of APT are fully considered. The possible plans of the attacker are compactly represented using attack graphs(AGs), but the compact representation of the attacker's strategies presents a computational challenge and reaching the Nash Equilibrium(NE) is NP-hard. We present a method that first translates AGs into Markov Decision Process(MDP) and then achieves the optimal SRs allocation using the policy hill-climbing(PHC) algorithm. Finally, we present an empirical evaluation of the model and analyze the scalability and sensitivity of the algorithm. Simulation results exhibit that our proposed reinforcement learning-based SRs allocation is feasible and efficient.

2020-12-21
Jithish, J., Sankaran, S., Achuthan, K..  2020.  Towards Ensuring Trustworthiness in Cyber-Physical Systems: A Game-Theoretic Approach. 2020 International Conference on COMmunication Systems NETworkS (COMSNETS). :626–629.

The emergence of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is a potential paradigm shift for the usage of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). From predominantly a facilitator of information and communication services, the role of ICT in the present age has expanded to the management of objects and resources in the physical world. Thus, it is imperative to devise mechanisms to ensure the trustworthiness of data to secure vulnerable devices against security threats. This work presents an analytical framework based on non-cooperative game theory to evaluate the trustworthiness of individual sensor nodes that constitute the CPS. The proposed game-theoretic model captures the factors impacting the trustworthiness of CPS sensor nodes. Further, the model is used to estimate the Nash equilibrium solution of the game, to derive a trust threshold criterion. The trust threshold represents the minimum trust score required to be maintained by individual sensor nodes during CPS operation. Sensor nodes with trust scores below the threshold are potentially malicious and may be removed or isolated to ensure the secure operation of CPS.

2020-12-17
Lu, W., Shu, S., Shi, H., Li, R., Dong, W..  2020.  Synthesizing Secure Reactive Controller for Unmanned Aerial System. 2019 6th International Conference on Dependable Systems and Their Applications (DSA). :419—424.

Complex CPS such as UAS got rapid development these years, but also became vulnerable to GPS spoofing, packets injection, buffer-overflow and other malicious attacks. Ensuring the behaviors of UAS always keeping secure no matter how the environment changes, would be a prospective direction for UAS security. This paper aims at presenting a reactive synthesis-based approach to implement the automatic generation of secure UAS controller. First, we study the operating mechanism of UAS and construct a high-Ievel model consisting of actuator and monitor. Besides, we analyze the security threats of UAS from the perspective of hardware, software and data transmission, and then extract the corresponding specifications of security properties with LTL formulas. Based on the UAS model and security specifications, the controller can be constructed by GR(1) synthesis algorithm, which is a two-player game process between UAV and Environment. Finally, we expand the function of LTLMoP platform to construct the automatons for controller in multi-robots system, which provides secure behavior strategies under several typical UAS attack scenarios.

2020-12-14
Arjoune, Y., Salahdine, F., Islam, M. S., Ghribi, E., Kaabouch, N..  2020.  A Novel Jamming Attacks Detection Approach Based on Machine Learning for Wireless Communication. 2020 International Conference on Information Networking (ICOIN). :459–464.
Jamming attacks target a wireless network creating an unwanted denial of service. 5G is vulnerable to these attacks despite its resilience prompted by the use of millimeter wave bands. Over the last decade, several types of jamming detection techniques have been proposed, including fuzzy logic, game theory, channel surfing, and time series. Most of these techniques are inefficient in detecting smart jammers. Thus, there is a great need for efficient and fast jamming detection techniques with high accuracy. In this paper, we compare the efficiency of several machine learning models in detecting jamming signals. We investigated the types of signal features that identify jamming signals, and generated a large dataset using these parameters. Using this dataset, the machine learning algorithms were trained, evaluated, and tested. These algorithms are random forest, support vector machine, and neural network. The performance of these algorithms was evaluated and compared using the probability of detection, probability of false alarm, probability of miss detection, and accuracy. The simulation results show that jamming detection based random forest algorithm can detect jammers with a high accuracy, high detection probability and low probability of false alarm.