Biblio
A rapid rise in cyber-attacks on Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) has been observed in the last decade. It becomes even more concerning that several of these attacks were on critical infrastructures that indeed succeeded and resulted into significant physical and financial damages. Experimental testbeds capable of providing flexible, scalable and interoperable platform for executing various cybersecurity experiments is highly in need by all stakeholders. A container-based SCADA testbed is presented in this work as a potential platform for executing cybersecurity experiments. Through this testbed, a network traffic containing ARP spoofing is generated that represents a Man in the middle (MITM) attack. While doing so, scanning of different systems within the network is performed which represents a reconnaissance attack. The network traffic generated by both ARP spoofing and network scanning are captured and further used for preparing a dataset. The dataset is utilized for training a network classification model through a machine learning algorithm. Performance of the trained model is evaluated through a series of tests where promising results are obtained.
Modern critical infrastructures are increasingly turning into distributed, complex Cyber-Physical systems that need proactive protection and fast restoration to mitigate physical or cyber incidents or attacks. Addressing the need for early stage threat detection against physical intrusion, the paper presents two physical security sensors developed within the DEFENDER project for detecting the intrusion of drones and humans using video analytics. The continuous stream of media data obtained from the region of vulnerability and proximity is processed using Region based Fully Connected Neural Network deep-learning model. The novelty of the pro-posed system relies in the processing of multi-threaded media input streams for achieving real-time threat identification. The video analytics solution has been validated using NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 for drone detection and NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2070 Max-Q Design for detecting human intruders. The experimental test bed for the validation of the proposed system has been constructed to include environments and situations that are commonly faced by critical infrastructure operators such as the area of protection, tradeoff between angle of coverage against distance of coverage.
Advancements in computing, communication, and sensing technologies are making it possible to embed, control, and gather vital information from tiny devices that are being deployed and utilized in practically every aspect of our modernized society. From smart home appliances to municipal water and electric industrial facilities to our everyday work environments, the next Internet frontier, dubbed IoT, is promising to revolutionize our lives and tackle some of our nations' most pressing challenges. While the seamless interconnection of IoT devices with the physical realm is envisioned to bring a plethora of critical improvements in many aspects and diverse domains, it will undoubtedly pave the way for attackers that will target and exploit such devices, threatening the integrity of their data and the reliability of critical infrastructure. Further, such compromised devices will undeniably be leveraged as the next generation of botnets, given their increased processing capabilities and abundant bandwidth. While several demonstrations exist in the literature describing the exploitation procedures of a number of IoT devices, the up-to-date inference, characterization, and analysis of unsolicited IoT devices that are currently deployed "in the wild" is still in its infancy. In this article, we address this imperative task by leveraging active and passive measurements to report on unsolicited Internet-scale IoT devices. This work describes a first step toward exploring the utilization of passive measurements in combination with the results of active measurements to shed light on the Internet-scale insecurities of the IoT paradigm. By correlating results of Internet-wide scanning with Internet background radiation traffic, we disclose close to 14,000 compromised IoT devices in diverse sectors, including critical infrastructure and smart home appliances. To this end, we also analyze their generated traffic to create effective mitigation signatures that could be deployed in local IoT realms. To support largescale empirical data analytics in the context of IoT, we make available the inferred and extracted IoT malicious raw data through an authenticated front-end service. The outcomes of this work confirm the existence of such compromised devices on an Internet scale, while the generated inferences and insights are postulated to be employed for inferring other similarly compromised IoT devices, in addition to contributing to IoT cyber security situational awareness.
Healthcare is a vital component of every nation's critical infrastructure, yet it is one of the most vulnerable sector for cyber-attacks. To enforce the knowledge on information security processes and data protection procedures, educational and training schemes should be establishedfor information technology (IT) staff working in healthcare settings. However, only training IT staff is not enough, as many of cybersecurity threats are caused by human errors or lack of awareness. Current awareness and training schemes are often implemented in silos, concentrating on one aspect of cybersecurity at a time. Proactive Resilience Educational Framework (Prosilience EF) provides a holistic cyber resilience and security framework for developing and delivering a multilateral educational and training scheme based on a proactive approach to cybersecurity. The framework is built on the principle that education and training must be interactive, guided, meaningful and directly relevant to the user' operational environment. The framework addresses capacity mapping, cyber resilience level measuring, utilizing available and mapping missing resources, adaptive learning technologies and dynamic content delivery. Prosilience EF launches an iterative process of awareness and training development with relevant stakeholders (end users - hospitals, healthcare authorities, cybersecurity training providers, industry members), evaluating the framework via joint exercises/workshops andfurther developing the framework.
Control systems for critical infrastructure are becoming increasingly interconnected while cyber threats against critical infrastructure are becoming more sophisticated and difficult to defend against. Historically, cyber security has emphasized building defenses to prevent loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability in digital information and systems, but in recent years cyber attacks have demonstrated that no system is impenetrable and that control system operation may be detrimentally impacted. Cyber resilience has emerged as a complementary priority that seeks to ensure that digital systems can maintain essential performance levels, even while capabilities are degraded by a cyber attack. This paper examines how cyber security and cyber resilience may be measured and quantified in a control system environment. Load Frequency Control is used as an illustrative example to demonstrate how cyber attacks may be represented within mathematical models of control systems, to demonstrate how these events may be quantitatively measured in terms of cyber security or cyber resilience, and the differences and similarities between the two mindsets. These results demonstrate how various metrics are applied, the extent of their usability, and how it is important to analyze cyber-physical systems in a comprehensive manner that accounts for all the various parts of the system.
The mass integration and deployment of intelligent technologies within critical commercial, industrial and public environments have a significant impact on business operations and society as a whole. Though integration of these critical intelligent technologies pose serious embedded security challenges for technology manufacturers which are required to be systematically approached, in-line with international security regulations.This paper establish security foundation for such intelligent technologies by deriving embedded security requirements to realise the core security functions laid out by international security authorities, and proposing microarchitectural characteristics to establish cyber resilience in embedded systems. To bridge the research gap between embedded and operational security domains, a detailed review of existing embedded security methods, microarchitectures and design practises is presented. The existing embedded security methods have been found ad-hoc, passive and strongly rely on building and maintaining trust. To the best of our knowledge to date, no existing embedded security microarchitecture or defence mechanism provides continuity of data stream or security once trust has broken. This functionality is critical for embedded technologies deployed in critical infrastructure to enhance and maintain security, and to gain evidence of the security breach to effectively evaluate, improve and deploy active response and mitigation strategies. To this end, the paper proposes three microarchitectural characteristics that shall be designed and integrated into embedded architectures to establish, maintain and improve cyber resilience in embedded systems for next-generation critical infrastructure.
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS)-Internet of Things (IoT) enabled healthcare services and infrastructures improve human life, but are vulnerable to a variety of emerging cyber-attacks. Cybersecurity specialists are finding it hard to keep pace of the increasingly sophisticated attack methods. There is a critical need for innovative cognitive cybersecurity for CPS-IoT enabled healthcare ecosystem. This paper presents a cognitive cybersecurity framework for simulating the human cognitive behaviour to anticipate and respond to new and emerging cybersecurity and privacy threats to CPS-IoT and critical infrastructure systems. It includes the conceptualisation and description of a layered architecture which combines Artificial Intelligence, cognitive methods and innovative security mechanisms.
The United States and European Union have an increasing number of projects that are engaging end-use devices for improved grid capabilities. Areas such as building-to-grid and vehicle-to-grid are simple examples of these advanced capabilities. In this paper, we present an innovative concept study for a ship-to-grid integration. The goal of this study is to simulate a two-way power flow between ship(s) and the grid with GridLAB-D for the port of Kyllini in Greece, where a ship-to-shore interconnection was recently implemented. Extending this further, we explore: (a) the ability of ships to meet their load demand needs, while at berth, by being supplied with energy from the electric grid and thus powering off their diesel engines; and (b) the ability of ships to provide power to critical loads onshore. As a result, the ship-to-grid integration helps (a) mitigate environmental pollutants from the ships' diesel engines and (b) provide resilience to nearby communities during a power disruption due to natural disasters or man-made threats.
Energy Distribution Grids are considered critical infrastructure, hence the Distribution System Operators (DSOs) have developed sophisticated engineering practices to improve their resilience. Over the last years, due to the "Smart Grid" evolution, this infrastructure has become a distributed system where prosumers (the consumers who produce and share surplus energy through the grid) can plug in distributed energy resources (DERs) and manage a bi-directional flow of data and power enabled by an advanced IT and control infrastructure. This introduces new challenges, as the prosumers possess neither the skills nor the knowledge to assess the risk or secure the environment from cyber-threats. We propose a simple and usable approach based on the Reference Model of Information Assurance & Security (RMIAS), to support the prosumers in the selection of cybesecurity measures. The purpose is to reduce the risk of being directly targeted and to establish collective responsibility among prosumers as grid gatekeepers. The framework moves from a simple risk analysis based on security goals to providing guidelines for the users for adoption of adequate security countermeasures. One of the greatest advantages of the approach is that it does not constrain the user to a specific threat model.
The increasing integration of information and communication technologies has undoubtedly boosted the efficiency of Critical Infrastructures (CI). However, the first wave of IoT devices, together with the management of enormous amount of data generated by modern CIs, has created serious architectural issues. While the emerging Fog and Multi-Access Edge Computing (FMEC) paradigms can provide a viable solution, they also bring inherent security issues, that can cause dire consequences in the context of CIs. In this paper, we analyze the applications of FMEC solutions in the context of CIs, with a specific focus on related security issues and threats for the specific while broad scenarios: a smart airport, a smart port, and a smart offshore oil and gas extraction field. Leveraging these scenarios, a set of general security requirements for FMEC is derived, together with crucial research challenges whose further investigation is cornerstone for a successful adoption of FMEC in CIs.
This paper presents a control strategy for Cyber-Physical System defense developed in the framework of the European Project ATENA, that concerns Critical Infrastructure (CI) protection. The aim of the controller is to find the optimal security configuration, in terms of countermeasures to implement, in order to address the system vulnerabilities. The attack/defense problem is modeled as a multi-agent general sum game, where the aim of the defender is to prevent the most damage possible by finding an optimal trade-off between prevention actions and their costs. The problem is solved utilizing Reinforcement Learning and simulation results provide a proof of the proposed concept, showing how the defender of the protected CI is able to minimize the damage caused by his her opponents by finding the Nash equilibrium of the game in the zero-sum variant, and, in a more general scenario, by driving the attacker in the position where the damage she/he can cause to the infrastructure is lower than the cost it has to sustain to enforce her/his attack strategy.