Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Keyword is testbed-based performance evaluation  [Clear All Filters]
Nasir, N. A., Jeong, S.-H..  2020.  Testbed-based Performance Evaluation of the Information-Centric Network. 2020 International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC). :166–169.
Proliferation of the Internet usage is rapidly increasing, and it is necessary to support the performance requirements for multimedia applications, including lower latency, improved security, faster content retrieval, and adjustability to the traffic load. Nevertheless, because the current Internet architecture is a host-oriented one, it often fails to support the necessary demands such as fast content delivery. A promising networking paradigm called Information-Centric Networking (ICN) focuses on the name of the content itself rather than the location of that content. A distinguished alternative to this ICN concept is Content-Centric Networking (CCN) that exploits more of the performance requirements by using in-network caching and outperforms the current Internet in terms of content transfer time, traffic load control, mobility support, and efficient network management. In this paper, instead of using the saturated method of validating a theory by simulation, we present a testbed-based performance evaluation of the ICN network. We used several new functions of the proposed testbed to improve the performance of the basic CCN. In this paper, we also show that the proposed testbed architecture performs better in terms of content delivery time compared to the basic CCN architecture through graphical results.
Ashok, A., Sridhar, S., McKinnon, A. D., Wang, P., Govindarasu, M..  2016.  Testbed-based performance evaluation of Attack Resilient Control for AGC. 2016 Resilience Week (RWS). :125–129.

The modern electric power grid is a complex cyber-physical system whose reliable operation is enabled by a wide-area monitoring and control infrastructure. Recent events have shown that vulnerabilities in this infrastructure may be exploited to manipulate the data being exchanged. Such a scenario could cause the associated control applications to mis-operate, potentially causing system-wide instabilities. There is a growing emphasis on looking beyond traditional cybersecurity solutions to mitigate such threats. In this paper we perform a testbed-based validation of one such solution - Attack Resilient Control (ARC) - on Iowa State University's PowerCyber testbed. ARC is a cyber-physical security solution that combines domain-specific anomaly detection and model-based mitigation to detect stealthy attacks on Automatic Generation Control (AGC). In this paper, we first describe the implementation architecture of the experiment on the testbed. Next, we demonstrate the capability of stealthy attack templates to cause forced under-frequency load shedding in a 3-area test system. We then validate the performance of ARC by measuring its ability to detect and mitigate these attacks. Our results reveal that ARC is efficient in detecting stealthy attacks and enables AGC to maintain system operating frequency close to its nominal value during an attack. Our studies also highlight the importance of testbed-based experimentation for evaluating the performance of cyber-physical security and control applications.