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2021-02-15
Karthikeyan, S. Paramasivam, El-Razouk, H..  2020.  Horizontal Correlation Analysis of Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman. 2020 3rd International Conference on Information and Computer Technologies (ICICT). :511–519.
The world is facing a new revolutionary technology transition, Internet of things (IoT). IoT systems requires secure connectivity of distributed entities, including in-field sensors. For such external devices, Side Channel Analysis poses a potential threat as it does not require complete knowledge about the crypto algorithm. In this work, we perform Horizontal Correlation Power Analysis (HCPA) which is a type of Side Channel Analysis (SCA) over the Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) key exchange protocol. ChipWhisperer (CW) by NewAE Technologies is an open source toolchain which is utilized to perform the HCPA by using CW toolchain. To best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to implemented ECDH on Artix-7 FPGA for HCPA. We compare our correlation results with the results from AES -128 bits provided by CW. Our point of attack is the Double and Add algorithm which is used to perform Scalar multiplication in ECC. We obtain a maximum correlation of 7% for the key guess using the HCPA. We also discuss about the possible cause for lower correlation and few potentials ways to improve it. In Addition to HCPA we also perform Simple Power Analysis (SPA) (visual) for ECDH, to guess the trailing zeros in the 128-bit secret key for different power traces.
2020-05-15
Wang, Jian, Guo, Shize, Chen, Zhe, Zhang, Tao.  2019.  A Benchmark Suite of Hardware Trojans for On-Chip Networks. IEEE Access. 7:102002—102009.
As recently studied, network-on-chip (NoC) suffers growing threats from hardware trojans (HTs), leading to performance degradation or information leakage when it provides communication service in many/multi-core systems. Therefore, defense techniques against NoC HTs experience rapid development in recent years. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are few standard benchmarks developed for the defense techniques evaluation. To address this issue, in this paper, we design a suite of benchmarks which involves multiple NoCs with different HTs, so that researchers can compare various HT defense methods fairly by making use of them. We first briefly introduce the features of target NoC and its infected modules in our benchmarks, and then, detail the design of our NoC HTs in a one-by-one manner. Finally, we evaluate our benchmarks through extensive simulations and report the circuit cost of NoC HTs in terms of area and power consumption, as well as their effects on NoC performance. Besides, comprehensive experiments, including functional testing and side channel analysis are performed to assess the stealthiness of our HTs.
2020-01-20
Chawla, Nikhil, Singh, Arvind, Rahman, Nael Mizanur, Kar, Monodeep, Mukhopadhyay, Saibal.  2019.  Extracting Side-Channel Leakage from Round Unrolled Implementations of Lightweight Ciphers. 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST). :31–40.

Energy efficiency and security is a critical requirement for computing at edge nodes. Unrolled architectures for lightweight cryptographic algorithms have been shown to be energy-efficient, providing higher performance while meeting resource constraints. Hardware implementations of unrolled datapaths have also been shown to be resistant to side channel analysis (SCA) attacks due to a reduction in signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and an increased complexity in the leakage model. This paper demonstrates optimal leakage models and an improved CFA attack which makes it feasible to extract first-order side-channel leakages from combinational logic in the initial rounds of unrolled datapaths. Several leakage models, targeting initial rounds, are explored and 1-bit hamming weight (HW) based leakage model is shown to be an optimal choice. Additionally, multi-band narrow bandpass filtering techniques in conjunction with correlation frequency analysis (CFA) is demonstrated to improve SNR by up to 4×, attributed to the removal of the misalignment effect in combinational logics and signal isolation. The improved CFA attack is performed on side channel signatures acquired for 7-round unrolled SIMON datapaths, implemented on Sakura-G (XILINX spartan 6, 45nm) based FPGA platform and a 24× reduction in minimum-traces-to-disclose (MTD) for revealing 80% of the key bits is demonstrated with respect to conventional time domain correlation power analysis (CPA). Finally, the proposed method is successfully applied to a fully-unrolled datapath for PRINCE and a parallel round-based datapath for Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm to demonstrate its general applicability.

2018-04-11
Esirci, F. N., Bayrakci, A. A..  2017.  Hardware Trojan Detection Based on Correlated Path Delays in Defiance of Variations with Spatial Correlations. Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE), 2017. :163–168.

Hardware Trojan (HT) detection methods based on the side channel analysis deeply suffer from the process variations. In order to suppress the effect of the variations, we devise a method that smartly selects two highly correlated paths for each interconnect (edge) that is suspected to have an HT on it. First path is the shortest one passing through the suspected edge and the second one is a path that is highly correlated with the first one. Delay ratio of these paths avails the detection of the HT inserted circuits. Test results reveal that the method enables the detection of even the minimally invasive Trojans in spite of both inter and intra die variations with the spatial correlations.

Hossain, F. S., Yoneda, T., Shintani, M., Inoue, M., Orailoglo, A..  2017.  Intra-Die-Variation-Aware Side Channel Analysis for Hardware Trojan Detection. 2017 IEEE 26th Asian Test Symposium (ATS). :52–57.

High detection sensitivity in the presence of process variation is a key challenge for hardware Trojan detection through side channel analysis. In this work, we present an efficient Trojan detection approach in the presence of elevated process variations. The detection sensitivity is sharpened by 1) comparing power levels from neighboring regions within the same chip so that the two measured values exhibit a common trend in terms of process variation, and 2) generating test patterns that toggle each cell multiple times to increase Trojan activation probability. Detection sensitivity is analyzed and its effectiveness demonstrated by means of RPD (relative power difference). We evaluate our approach on ISCAS'89 and ITC'99 benchmarks and the AES-128 circuit for both combinational and sequential type Trojans. High detection sensitivity is demonstrated by analysis on RPD under a variety of process variation levels and experiments for Trojan inserted circuits.

2018-02-21
Priya, S. R., Swetha, P., Srigayathri, D., Sumedha, N., Priyatharishini, M..  2017.  Hardware malicious circuit identification using self referencing approach. 2017 International conference on Microelectronic Devices, Circuits and Systems (ICMDCS). :1–5.

Robust Trojans are inserted in outsourced products resulting in security vulnerabilities. Post-silicon testing is done mandatorily to detect such malicious inclusions. Logic testing becomes obsolete for larger circuits with sequential Trojans. For such cases, side channel analysis is an effective approach. The major challenge with the side channel analysis is reduction in hardware Trojan detection sensitivity due to process variation (process variation could lead to false positives and false negatives and it is unavoidable during a manufacturing stage). In this paper Self Referencing method is proposed that measures leakage power of the circuit at four different time windows that hammers the Trojan into triggering and also help to identify/eliminate false positives/false negatives due to process variation.

2018-02-06
Han, Yi, Etigowni, Sriharsha, Liu, Hua, Zonouz, Saman, Petropulu, Athina.  2017.  Watch Me, but Don'T Touch Me! Contactless Control Flow Monitoring via Electromagnetic Emanations. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :1095–1108.

Trustworthy operation of industrial control systems depends on secure and real-time code execution on the embedded programmable logic controllers (PLCs). The controllers monitor and control the critical infrastructures, such as electric power grids and healthcare platforms, and continuously report back the system status to human operators. We present Zeus, a contactless embedded controller security monitor to ensure its execution control flow integrity. Zeus leverages the electromagnetic emission by the PLC circuitry during the execution of the controller programs. Zeus's contactless execution tracking enables non-intrusive monitoring of security-critical controllers with tight real-time constraints. Those devices often cannot tolerate the cost and performance overhead that comes with additional traditional hardware or software monitoring modules. Furthermore, Zeus provides an air-gap between the monitor (trusted computing base) and the target (potentially compromised) PLC. This eliminates the possibility of the monitor infection by the same attack vectors. Zeus monitors for control flow integrity of the PLC program execution. Zeus monitors the communications between the human machine interface and the PLC, and captures the control logic binary uploads to the PLC. Zeus exercises its feasible execution paths, and fingerprints their emissions using an external electromagnetic sensor. Zeus trains a neural network for legitimate PLC executions, and uses it at runtime to identify the control flow based on PLC's electromagnetic emissions. We implemented Zeus on a commercial Allen Bradley PLC, which is widely used in industry, and evaluated it on real-world control program executions. Zeus was able to distinguish between different legitimate and malicious executions with 98.9% accuracy and with zero overhead on PLC execution by design.