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2020-06-26
Puccetti, Armand.  2019.  The European H2020 project VESSEDIA (Verification Engineering of Safety and SEcurity critical Dynamic Industrial Applications). 2019 22nd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD). :588—591.
This paper presents an overview of the H2020 project VESSEDIA [9] aimed at verifying the security and safety of modern connected systems also called IoT. The originality relies in using Formal Methods inherited from high-criticality applications domains to analyze the source code at different levels of intensity, to gather possible faults and weaknesses. The analysis methods are mostly exhaustive an guarantee that, after analysis, the source code of the application is error-free. This paper is structured as follows: after an introductory section 1 giving some factual data, section 2 presents the aims and the problems addressed; section 3 describes the project's use-cases and section 4 describes the proposed approach for solving these problems and the results achieved until now; finally, section 5 discusses some remaining future work.
2020-06-19
Cha, Suhyun, Ulbrich, Mattias, Weigl, Alexander, Beckert, Bernhard, Land, Kathrin, Vogel-Heuser, Birgit.  2019.  On the Preservation of the Trust by Regression Verification of PLC software for Cyber-Physical Systems of Systems. 2019 IEEE 17th International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN). 1:413—418.

Modern large scale technical systems often face iterative changes on their behaviours with the requirement of validated quality which is not easy to achieve completely with traditional testing. Regression verification is a powerful tool for the formal correctness analysis of software-driven systems. By proving that a new revision of the software behaves similarly as the original version of the software, some of the trust that the old software and system had earned during the validation processes or operation histories can be inherited to the new revision. This trust inheritance by the formal analysis relies on a number of implicit assumptions which are not self-evident but easy to miss, and may lead to a false sense of safety induced by a misunderstood regression verification processes. This paper aims at pointing out hidden, implicit assumptions of regression verification in the context of cyber-physical systems by making them explicit using practical examples. The explicit trust inheritance analysis would clarify for the engineers to understand the extent of the trust that regression verification provides and consequently facilitate them to utilize this formal technique for the system validation.

2020-04-24
Emeka, Busalire Onesmus, Liu, Shaoying.  2018.  Assessing and extracting software security vulnerabilities in SOFL formal specifications. 2018 International Conference on Electronics, Information, and Communication (ICEIC). :1—4.

The growth of the internet has brought along positive gains such as the emergence of a highly interconnected world. However, on the flip side, there has been a growing concern on how secure distributed systems can be built effectively and tested for security vulnerabilities prior to deployment. Developing a secure software product calls for a deep technical understanding of some complex issues with regards to the software and its operating environment, as well as embracing a systematic approach of analyzing the software. This paper proposes a method for identifying software security vulnerabilities from software requirement specifications written in Structured Object-oriented Formal Language (SOFL). Our proposed methodology leverages on the concept of providing an early focus on security by identifying potential security vulnerabilities at the requirement analysis and verification phase of the software development life cycle.

Vazquez Sandoval, Itzel, Lenzini, Gabriele.  2018.  Experience Report: How to Extract Security Protocols' Specifications from C Libraries. 2018 IEEE 42nd Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC). 02:719—724.

Often, analysts have to face a challenging situation when formally verifying the implementation of a security protocol: they need to build a model of the protocol from only poorly or not documented code, and with little or no help from the developers to better understand it. Security protocols implementations frequently use services provided by libraries coded in the C programming language; automatic tools for codelevel reverse engineering offer good support to comprehend the behavior of code in object-oriented languages but are ineffective to deal with libraries in C. Here we propose a systematic, yet human-dependent approach, which combines the capabilities of state-of-the-art tools in order to help the analyst to retrieve, step by step, the security protocol specifications from a library in C. Those specifications can then be used to create the formal model needed to carry out the analysis.

2020-04-06
Patsonakis, Christos, Samari, Katerina, Kiayiasy, Aggelos, Roussopoulos, Mema.  2019.  On the Practicality of a Smart Contract PKI. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Decentralized Applications and Infrastructures (DAPPCON). :109–118.
Public key infrastructures (PKIs) are one of the main building blocks for securing communications over the Internet. Currently, PKIs are under the control of centralized authorities, which is problematic as evidenced by numerous incidents where they have been compromised. The distributed, fault tolerant log of transactions provided by blockchains and more recently, smart contract platforms, constitutes a powerful tool for the decentralization of PKIs. To verify the validity of identity records, blockchain-based identity systems store on chain either all identity records, or, a small (or even constant) sized amount of data for verifying identity records stored off chain. However, as most of these systems have never been implemented, there is little information regarding the practical implications of each design's tradeoffs. In this work, we first implement and evaluate the only provably secure, smart contract based PKI of Patsonakis et al. on top of Ethereum. This construction incurs constant-sized storage at the expense of computational complexity. To explore this tradeoff, we propose and implement a second construction which, eliminates the need for trusted setup, preserves the security properties of Patsonakis et al. and, as illustrated through our evaluation, is the only version with constant-sized state that can be deployed on the live chain of Ethereum. Furthermore, we compare these two systems with the simple approach of most prior works, e.g., the Ethereum Name Service, where all identity records are stored on the smart contract's state, to illustrate several shortcomings of Ethereum and its cost model. We propose several modifications for fine tuning the model, which would be useful to be considered for any smart contract platform like Ethereum so that it reaches its full potential to support arbitrary distributed applications.
2020-04-03
Aires Urquiza, Abraão, AlTurki, Musab A., Kanovich, Max, Ban Kirigin, Tajana, Nigam, Vivek, Scedrov, Andre, Talcott, Carolyn.  2019.  Resource-Bounded Intruders in Denial of Service Attacks. 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). :382—38214.

Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have been a serious security concern, as no service is, in principle, protected against them. Although a Dolev-Yao intruder with unlimited resources can trivially render any service unavailable, DoS attacks do not necessarily have to be carried out by such (extremely) powerful intruders. It is useful in practice and more challenging for formal protocol verification to determine whether a service is vulnerable even to resource-bounded intruders that cannot generate or intercept arbitrary large volumes of traffic. This paper proposes a novel, more refined intruder model where the intruder can only consume at most some specified amount of resources in any given time window. Additionally, we propose protocol theories that may contain timeouts and specify service resource usage during protocol execution. In contrast to the existing resource-conscious protocol verification models, our model allows finer and more subtle analysis of DoS problems. We illustrate the power of our approach by representing a number of classes of DoS attacks, such as, Slow, Asymmetric and Amplification DoS attacks, exhausting different types of resources of the target, such as, number of workers, processing power, memory, and network bandwidth. We show that the proposed DoS problem is undecidable in general and is PSPACE-complete for the class of resource-bounded, balanced systems. Finally, we implemented our formal verification model in the rewriting logic tool Maude and analyzed a number of DoS attacks in Maude using Rewriting Modulo SMT in an automated fashion.

Gerking, Christopher, Schubert, David.  2019.  Component-Based Refinement and Verification of Information-Flow Security Policies for Cyber-Physical Microservice Architectures. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Software Architecture (ICSA). :61—70.

Since cyber-physical systems are inherently vulnerable to information leaks, software architects need to reason about security policies to define desired and undesired information flow through a system. The microservice architectural style requires the architects to refine a macro-level security policy into micro-level policies for individual microservices. However, when policies are refined in an ill-formed way, information leaks can emerge on composition of microservices. Related approaches to prevent such leaks do not take into account characteristics of cyber-physical systems like real-time behavior or message passing communication. In this paper, we enable the refinement and verification of information-flow security policies for cyber-physical microservice architectures. We provide architects with a set of well-formedness rules for refining a macro-level policy in a way that enforces its security restrictions. Based on the resulting micro-level policies, we present a verification technique to check if the real-time message passing of microservices is secure. In combination, our contributions prevent information leaks from emerging on composition. We evaluate the accuracy of our approach using an extension of the CoCoME case study.

2020-03-16
Tahat, Amer, Joshi, Sarang, Goswami, Pronnoy, Ravindran, Binoy.  2019.  Scalable Translation Validation of Unverified Legacy OS Code. 2019 Formal Methods in Computer Aided Design (FMCAD). :1–9.
Formally verifying functional and security properties of a large-scale production operating system is highly desirable. However, it is challenging as such OSes are often written in multiple source languages that have no formal semantics - a prerequisite for formal reasoning. To avoid expensive formalization of the semantics of multiple high-level source languages, we present a lightweight and rigorous verification toolchain that verifies OS code at the binary level, targeting ARM machines. To reason about ARM instructions, we first translate the ARM Specification Language that describes the semantics of the ARMv8 ISA into the PVS7 theorem prover and verify the translation. We leverage the radare2 reverse engineering tool to decode ARM binaries into PVS7 and verify the translation. Our translation verification methodology is a lightweight formal validation technique that generates large-scale instruction emulation test lemmas whose proof obligations are automatically discharged. To demonstrate our verification methodology, we apply the technique on two OSes: Google's Zircon and a subset of Linux. We extract a set of 370 functions from these OSes, translate them into PVS7, and verify the correctness of the translation by automatically discharging hundreds of thousands of proof obligations and tests. This took 27.5 person-months to develop.
Goli, Mehran, Drechsler, Rolf.  2019.  Scalable Simulation-Based Verification of SystemC-Based Virtual Prototypes. 2019 22nd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD). :522–529.
Virtual Prototypes (VPs) at the Electronic System Level (ESL) written in SystemC language using its Transaction Level Modeling (TLM) framework are increasingly adopted by the semiconductor industry. The main reason is that VPs are much earlier available, and their simulation is orders of magnitude faster in comparison to the hardware models implemented at lower levels of abstraction (e.g. RTL). This leads designers to use VPs as reference models for an early design verification. Hence, the correctness assurance of these reference models (VPs) is critical as undetected faults may propagate to less abstract levels in the design process, increasing the fixing cost and effort. In this paper, we propose a novel simulation-based verification approach to automatically validate the simulation behavior of a given SystemC VP against both the TLM-2.0 rules and its specifications (i.e. functional and timing behavior of communications in the VP). The scalability and the efficiency of the proposed approach are demonstrated using an extensive set of experiments including a real-word VP.
2020-02-17
Letychevskyi, Oleksandr.  2019.  Two-Level Algebraic Method for Detection of Vulnerabilities in Binary Code. 2019 10th IEEE International Conference on Intelligent Data Acquisition and Advanced Computing Systems: Technology and Applications (IDAACS). 2:1074–1077.
This study introduces formal methods for detection of vulnerabilities in binary code. It considers the transformation of binary code into behavior algebra expressions and formalization of vulnerabilities. The detection method has two levels: behavior matching and symbolic execution with vulnerability pattern matching. This enables more efficient performance.
2020-02-10
Todorov, Vassil, Taha, Safouan, Boulanger, Frédéric, Hernandez, Armando.  2019.  Improved Invariant Generation for Industrial Software Model Checking of Time Properties. 2019 IEEE 19th International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security (QRS). :334–341.
Modern automotive embedded software is mostly designed using model-based design tools such as Simulink or SCADE, and source code is generated automatically from the models. Formal proof using symbolic model checking has been integrated in these tools and can provide a higher assurance by proving safety-critical properties. Our experience shows that proving properties involving time is rather challenging when they involve long durations and timers. These properties are generally not inductive and even advanced techniques such as PDR/IC3 are unable to handle them on production models in reasonable time. In this paper, we first present our industrial use case and comment on the results obtained with the existing model checkers. Then we present our invariant generator and methodology for selecting invariants according to physical dimensions. They enable the proof of properties with long-running timers. Finally, we discuss their implementation and benchmarks.
2019-11-12
Padon, Oded.  2018.  Deductive Verification of Distributed Protocols in First-Order Logic. 2018 Formal Methods in Computer Aided Design (FMCAD). :1-1.

Formal verification of infinite-state systems, and distributed systems in particular, is a long standing research goal. In the deductive verification approach, the programmer provides inductive invariants and pre/post specifications of procedures, reducing the verification problem to checking validity of logical verification conditions. This check is often performed by automated theorem provers and SMT solvers, substantially increasing productivity in the verification of complex systems. However, the unpredictability of automated provers presents a major hurdle to usability of these tools. This problem is particularly acute in case of provers that handle undecidable logics, for example, first-order logic with quantifiers and theories such as arithmetic. The resulting extreme sensitivity to minor changes has a strong negative impact on the convergence of the overall proof effort.

2019-11-11
Martiny, Karsten, Elenius, Daniel, Denker, Grit.  2018.  Protecting Privacy with a Declarative Policy Framework. 2018 IEEE 12th International Conference on Semantic Computing (ICSC). :227–234.
This article describes a privacy policy framework that can represent and reason about complex privacy policies. By using a Common Data Model together with a formal shareability theory, this framework enables the specification of expressive policies in a concise way without burdening the user with technical details of the underlying formalism. We also build a privacy policy decision engine that implements the framework and that has been deployed as the policy decision point in a novel enterprise privacy prototype system. Our policy decision engine supports two main uses: (1) interfacing with user interfaces for the creation, validation, and management of privacy policies; and (2) interfacing with systems that manage data requests and replies by coordinating privacy policy engine decisions and access to (encrypted) databases using various privacy enhancing technologies.
2019-10-02
Span, M. T., Mailloux, L. O., Grimaila, M. R., Young, W. B..  2018.  A Systems Security Approach for Requirements Analysis of Complex Cyber-Physical Systems. 2018 International Conference on Cyber Security and Protection of Digital Services (Cyber Security). :1–8.
Today's highly interconnected and technology reliant environment places greater emphasis on the need for dependably secure systems. This work addresses this problem by detailing a systems security analysis approach for understanding and eliciting security requirements for complex cyber-physical systems. First, a readily understandable description of key architectural analysis definitions and desirable characteristics is provided along with a survey of commonly used security architecture analysis approaches. Next, a tailored version of the System-Theoretic Process Analysis approach for Security (STPA-Sec) is detailed in three phases which supports the development of functional-level security requirements, architectural-level engineering considerations, and design-level security criteria. In particular, these three phases are aligned with the systems and software engineering processes defined in the security processes of NIST SP 800-160. Lastly, this work is important for advancing the science of systems security by providing a viable systems security analysis approach for eliciting, defining, and analyzing traceable security, safety, and resiliency requirements which support evaluation criteria that can be designed-for, built-to, and verified with confidence.
2019-09-26
Pfeffer, T., Herber, P., Druschke, L., Glesner, S..  2018.  Efficient and Safe Control Flow Recovery Using a Restricted Intermediate Language. 2018 IEEE 27th International Conference on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WETICE). :235-240.

Approaches for the automatic analysis of security policies on source code level cannot trivially be applied to binaries. This is due to the lacking high-level semantics of low-level object code, and the fundamental problem that control-flow recovery from binaries is difficult. We present a novel approach to recover the control-flow of binaries that is both safe and efficient. The key idea of our approach is to use the information contained in security mechanisms to approximate the targets of computed branches. To achieve this, we first define a restricted control transition intermediate language (RCTIL), which restricts the number of possible targets for each branch to a finite number of given targets. Based on this intermediate language, we demonstrate how a safe model of the control flow can be recovered without data-flow analyses. Our evaluation shows that that makes our solution more efficient than existing solutions.

2019-08-26
Sun, Haiyong, Lei, Hang, Qiao, Lei, Yang, Zheng.  2018.  Formal Verification of GP Specification Based Embedded Operating System. Proceedings of the 2Nd International Conference on Computer Science and Application Engineering. :188:1-188:5.

Global Platform (GP)1 specifications accepted as de facto industry standards are widely used for the development of embedded operating system running on secure chip devices. A promising approach to demonstrating the implementation of an OS meets its specification is formal verification. However, most previous work on operating system verification targets high-level source programs proving the correspondence between abstract specification and high-level implementation but ignoring the machine-code level implementation parts. Thus, this kind of correspondence proofs stay in a shallow level. In this paper, we present a novel methodology for formal specifying and certifying the implementation of an embedded operating system strictly follows the GP specification. We establish a multiple abstraction layers framework that has four layers, from up to down, which are Formal Global Platform Layer (FGPL), Formal Specification High Layer (FSHL), Formal Specification Low Layer (FSLL) and Formal Assembly Machine Layer (FAML). To demonstrate the effectiveness of our methodology, we take the communication module of our Trust-E operating system (running on an extended CompCert ARM assembly machine model) as a case study and have successfully constructed a multi-layered proof, fully formalized in the Coq proof assistant. Some parts of the module are written in C and some are written in assembly; we certify that all codes implementation follow Global Platform specification.

2019-05-01
Mili, S., Nguyen, N., Chelouah, R..  2018.  Attack Modeling and Verification for Connected System Security. 2018 13th Annual Conference on System of Systems Engineering (SoSE). :157–162.

In the development process of critical systems, one of the main challenges is to provide early system validation and verification against vulnerabilities in order to reduce cost caused by late error detection. We propose in this paper an approach that, firstly allows formally describe system security specifications, thanks to our suggested extended attack tree. Secondly, static and dynamic system modeling by using a SysML connectivity profile to model error propagation is introduced. Finally, a model checker has been used in order to validate system specifications.

2019-01-21
Leal, A. G., Teixeira, Í C..  2018.  Development of a suite of IPv6 vulnerability scanning tests using the TTCN-3 language. 2018 International Symposium on Networks, Computers and Communications (ISNCC). :1–6.

With the transition from IPv4 IPv6 protocol to improve network communications, there are concerns about devices and applications' security that must be dealt at the beginning of implementation or during its lifecycle. Automate the vulnerability assessment process reduces management overhead, enabling better management of risks and control of the vulnerabilities. Consequently, it reduces the effort needed for each test and it allows the increase of the frequency of application, improving time management to perform all the other complicated tasks necessary to support a secure network. There are several researchers involved in tests of vulnerability in IPv6 networks, exploiting addressing mechanisms, extension headers, fragmentation, tunnelling or dual-stack networks (using both IPv4 and IPv6 at the same time). Most existing tools use the programming languages C, Java, and Python instead of a language designed specifically to create a suite of tests, which reduces maintainability and extensibility of the tests. This paper presents a solution for IPv6 vulnerabilities scan tests, based on attack simulations, combining passive analysis (observing the manifestation of behaviours of the system under test) and an active one (stimulating the system to become symptomatic). Also, it describes a prototype that simulates and detects denial-of-service attacks on the ICMPv6 Protocol from IPv6. Also, a detailed report is created with the identified vulnerability and the possible existing solutions to mitigate such a gap, thus assisting the process of vulnerability management.

2018-06-20
Chakraborty, S., Stokes, J. W., Xiao, L., Zhou, D., Marinescu, M., Thomas, A..  2017.  Hierarchical learning for automated malware classification. MILCOM 2017 - 2017 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM). :23–28.

Despite widespread use of commercial anti-virus products, the number of malicious files detected on home and corporate computers continues to increase at a significant rate. Recently, anti-virus companies have started investing in machine learning solutions to augment signatures manually designed by analysts. A malicious file's determination is often represented as a hierarchical structure consisting of a type (e.g. Worm, Backdoor), a platform (e.g. Win32, Win64), a family (e.g. Rbot, Rugrat) and a family variant (e.g. A, B). While there has been substantial research in automated malware classification, the aforementioned hierarchical structure, which can provide additional information to the classification models, has been ignored. In this paper, we propose the novel idea and study the performance of employing hierarchical learning algorithms for automated classification of malicious files. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research effort which incorporates the hierarchical structure of the malware label in its automated classification and in the security domain, in general. It is important to note that our method does not require any additional effort by analysts because they typically assign these hierarchical labels today. Our empirical results on a real world, industrial-scale malware dataset of 3.6 million files demonstrate that incorporation of the label hierarchy achieves a significant reduction of 33.1% in the binary error rate as compared to a non-hierarchical classifier which is traditionally used in such problems.

2018-06-11
Maines, C. L., Zhou, B., Tang, S., Shi, Q..  2017.  Towards a Framework for the Extension and Visualisation of Cyber Security Requirements in Modelling Languages. 2017 10th International Conference on Developments in eSystems Engineering (DeSE). :71–76.
Every so often papers are published presenting a new extension for modelling cyber security requirements in Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN). The frequent production of new extensions by experts belies the need for a richer and more usable representation of security requirements in BPMN processes. In this paper, we present our work considering an analysis of existing extensions and identify the notational issues present within each of them. We discuss how there is yet no single extension which represents a comprehensive range of cyber security concepts. Consequently, there is no adequate solution for accurately specifying cyber security requirements within BPMN. In order to address this, we propose a new framework that can be used to extend, visualise and verify cyber security requirements in not only BPMN, but any other existing modelling language. The framework comprises of the three core roles necessary for the successful development of a security extension. With each of these being further subdivided into the respective components each role must complete.
2018-05-09
Barenghi, A., Mainardi, N., Pelosi, G..  2017.  A Security Audit of the OpenPGP Format. 2017 14th International Symposium on Pervasive Systems, Algorithms and Networks 2017 11th International Conference on Frontier of Computer Science and Technology 2017 Third International Symposium of Creative Computing (ISPAN-FCST-ISCC). :336–343.

For over two decades the OpenPGP format has provided the mainstay of email confidentiality and authenticity, and is currently being relied upon to provide authenticated package distributions in open source Unix systems. In this work, we provide the first language theoretical analysis of the OpenPGP format, classifying it as a deterministic context free language and establishing that an automatically generated parser can in principle be defined. However, we show that the number of rules required to describe it with a deterministic context free grammar is prohibitively high, and we identify security vulnerabilities in the OpenPGP format specification. We identify possible attacks aimed at tampering with messages and certificates while retaining their syntactical and semantical validity. We evaluate the effectiveness of these attacks against the two OpenPGP implementations covering the overwhelming majority of uses, i.e., the GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) and Symantec PGP. The results of the evaluation show that both implementations turn out not to be vulnerable due to conser- vative choices in dealing with malicious input data. Finally, we provide guidelines to improve the OpenPGP specification

2018-03-05
Schnepf, N., Badonnel, R., Lahmadi, A., Merz, S..  2017.  Automated Verification of Security Chains in Software-Defined Networks with Synaptic. 2017 IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft). :1–9.

Software-defined networks provide new facilities for deploying security mechanisms dynamically. In particular, it is possible to build and adjust security chains to protect the infrastructures, by combining different security functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and services for preventing data leakage. It is important to ensure that these security chains, in view of their complexity and dynamics, are consistent and do not include security violations. We propose in this paper an automated strategy for supporting the verification of security chains in software-defined networks. It relies on an architecture integrating formal verification methods for checking both the control and data planes of these chains, before their deployment. We describe algorithms for translating specifications of security chains into formal models that can then be verified by SMT1 solving or model checking. Our solution is prototyped as a package, named Synaptic, built as an extension of the Frenetic family of SDN programming languages. The performances of our approach are evaluated through extensive experimentations based on the CVC4, veriT, and nuXmv checkers.

Schnepf, N., Badonnel, R., Lahmadi, A., Merz, S..  2017.  Automated Verification of Security Chains in Software-Defined Networks with Synaptic. 2017 IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft). :1–9.
Software-defined networks provide new facilities for deploying security mechanisms dynamically. In particular, it is possible to build and adjust security chains to protect the infrastructures, by combining different security functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and services for preventing data leakage. It is important to ensure that these security chains, in view of their complexity and dynamics, are consistent and do not include security violations. We propose in this paper an automated strategy for supporting the verification of security chains in software-defined networks. It relies on an architecture integrating formal verification methods for checking both the control and data planes of these chains, before their deployment. We describe algorithms for translating specifications of security chains into formal models that can then be verified by SMT1 solving or model checking. Our solution is prototyped as a package, named Synaptic, built as an extension of the Frenetic family of SDN programming languages. The performances of our approach are evaluated through extensive experimentations based on the CVC4, veriT, and nuXmv checkers.
Wang, W., Hussein, N., Gupta, A., Wang, Y..  2017.  A Regression Model Based Approach for Identifying Security Requirements in Open Source Software Development. 2017 IEEE 25th International Requirements Engineering Conference Workshops (REW). :443–446.

There are several security requirements identification methods proposed by researchers in up-front requirements engineering (RE). However, in open source software (OSS) projects, developers use lightweight representation and refine requirements frequently by writing comments. They also tend to discuss security aspect in comments by providing code snippets, attachments, and external resource links. Since most security requirements identification methods in up-front RE are based on textual information retrieval techniques, these methods are not suitable for OSS projects or just-in-time RE. In our study, we propose a new model based on logistic regression to identify security requirements in OSS projects. We used five metrics to build security requirements identification models and tested the performance of these metrics by applying those models to three OSS projects. Our results show that four out of five metrics achieved high performance in intra-project testing.

2018-02-27
Ramadan, Q., Salnitriy, M., Strüber, D., Jürjens, J., Giorgini, P..  2017.  From Secure Business Process Modeling to Design-Level Security Verification. 2017 ACM/IEEE 20th International Conference on Model Driven Engineering Languages and Systems (MODELS). :123–133.

Tracing and integrating security requirements throughout the development process is a key challenge in security engineering. In socio-technical systems, security requirements for the organizational and technical aspects of a system are currently dealt with separately, giving rise to substantial misconceptions and errors. In this paper, we present a model-based security engineering framework for supporting the system design on the organizational and technical level. The key idea is to allow the involved experts to specify security requirements in the languages they are familiar with: business analysts use BPMN for procedural system descriptions; system developers use UML to design and implement the system architecture. Security requirements are captured via the language extensions SecBPMN2 and UMLsec. We provide a model transformation to bridge the conceptual gap between SecBPMN2 and UMLsec. Using UMLsec policies, various security properties of the resulting architecture can be verified. In a case study featuring an air traffic management system, we show how our framework can be practically applied.