Visible to the public Biblio

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Reinbrecht, Cezar, Forlin, Bruno, Zankl, Andreas, Sepulveda, Johanna.  2018.  Earthquake — A NoC-based optimized differential cache-collision attack for MPSoCs. 2018 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE). :648—653.
Multi-Processor Systems-on-Chips (MPSoCs) are a platform for a wide variety of applications and use-cases. The high on-chip connectivity, the programming flexibility, and the reuse of IPs, however, also introduce security concerns. Problems arise when applications with different trust and protection levels share resources of the MPSoC, such as processing units, cache memories and the Network-on-Chip (NoC) communication structure. If a program gets compromised, an adversary can observe the use of these resources and infer (potentially secret) information from other applications. In this work, we explore the cache-based attack by Bogdanov et al., which infers the cache activity of a target program through timing measurements and exploits collisions that occur when the same cache location is accessed for different program inputs. We implement this differential cache-collision attack on the MPSoC Glass and introduce an optimized variant of it, the Earthquake Attack, which leverages the NoC-based communication to increase attack efficiency. Our results show that Earthquake performs well under different cache line and MPSoC configurations, illustrating that cache-collision attacks are considerable threats on MPSoCs.
Luo, Chao, Fei, Yunsi, Kaeli, David.  2019.  Side-Channel Timing Attack of RSA on a GPU. ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization (TACO). 16:32:1-32:18.
To increase computation throughput, general purpose Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) have been leveraged to accelerate computationally intensive workloads. GPUs have been used as cryptographic engines, improving encryption/decryption throughput and leveraging the GPU's Single Instruction Multiple Thread (SIMT) model. RSA is a widely used public-key cipher and has been ported onto GPUs for signing and decrypting large files. Although performance has been significantly improved, the security of RSA on GPUs is vulnerable to side-channel timing attacks and is an exposure overlooked in previous studies. GPUs tend to be naturally resilient to side-channel attacks, given that they execute a large number of concurrent threads, performing many RSA operations on different data in parallel. Given the degree of parallel execution on a GPU, there will be a significant amount of noise introduced into the timing channel given the thousands of concurrent threads executing concurrently. In this work, we build a timing model to capture the parallel characteristics of an RSA public-key cipher implemented on a GPU. We consider optimizations that include using Montgomery multiplication and sliding-window exponentiation to implement cryptographic operations. Our timing model considers the challenges of parallel execution, complications that do not occur in single-threaded computing platforms. Based on our timing model, we launch successful timing attacks on RSA running on a GPU, extracting the private key of RSA. We also present an effective error detection and correction mechanism. Our results demonstrate that GPU acceleration of RSA is vulnerable to side-channel timing attacks. We propose several countermeasures to defend against this class of attacks.
Alias, Yasin Fitri, Hashim, Habibah.  2018.  Timing Analysis for Diffie Hellman Key Exchange In U-BOOT Using Raspberry Pi. 2018 IEEE Symposium on Computer Applications Industrial Electronics (ISCAIE). :212-216.

In Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE), two parties need to communicate to each other by sharing their secret key (cipher text) over an unsecure communication channel. An adversary or cryptanalyst can easily get their secret keys but cannot get the information (plaintext). Brute force is one the common tools used to obtain the secret key, but when the key is too large (etc. 1024 bits and 2048 bits) this tool is no longer suitable. Thus timing attacks have become more attractive in the new cryptographic era where networked embedded systems security present several vulnerabilities such as lower processing power and high deployment scale. Experiments on timing attacks are useful in helping cryptographers make security schemes more resistant. In this work, we timed the computations of the Discrete Log Hard Problem of the Diffie Hellman Key Exchange (DHKE) protocol implemented on an embedded system network and analyzed the timing patterns of 1024-bit and 2048-bit keys that was obtained during the attacks. We have chosen to implement the protocol on the Raspberry-pi board over U-BOOT Bare Metal and we used the GMP bignum library to compute numbers greater than 64 bits on the embedded system.

Celosia, Guillaume, Cunche, Mathieu.  2018.  Detecting Smartphone State Changes Through a Bluetooth Based Timing Attack. Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Security & Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks. :154–159.
Bluetooth is a popular wireless communication technology that is available on most mobile devices. Although Bluetooth includes security and privacy preserving mechanisms, we show that a Bluetooth harmless inherent request-response mechanism can taint users privacy. More specifically, we introduce a timing attack that can be triggered by a remote attacker in order to infer information about a Bluetooth device state. By observing the L2CAP layer ping mechanism timing variations, it is possible to detect device state changes, for instance when the device goes in or out of the locked state. Our experimental results show that change point detection analysis of the timing allows to detect device state changes with a high accuracy. Finally, we discuss applications and countermeasures.