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2021-05-13
Suriano, Antonio, Striccoli, Domenico, Piro, Giuseppe, Bolla, Raffele, Boggia, Gennaro.  2020.  Attestation of Trusted and Reliable Service Function Chains in the ETSI-NFV Framework. 2020 6th IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft). :479—486.

The new generation of digital services are natively conceived as an ordered set of Virtual Network Functions, deployed across boundaries and organizations. In this context, security threats, variable network conditions, computational and memory capabilities and software vulnerabilities may significantly weaken the whole service chain, thus making very difficult to combat the newest kinds of attacks. It is thus extremely important to conceive a flexible (and standard-compliant) framework able to attest the trustworthiness and the reliability of each single function of a Service Function Chain. At the time of this writing, and to the best of authors knowledge, the scientific literature addressed all of these problems almost separately. To bridge this gap, this paper proposes a novel methodology, properly tailored within the ETSI-NFV framework. From one side, Software-Defined Controllers continuously monitor the properties and the performance indicators taken from networking domains of each single Virtual Network Function available in the architecture. From another side, a high-level orchestrator combines, on demand, the suitable Virtual Network Functions into a Service Function Chain, based on the user requests, targeted security requirements, and measured reliability levels. The paper concludes by further explaining the functionalities of the proposed architecture through a use case.

Dave, Avani, Banerjee, Nilanjan, Patel, Chintan.  2020.  SRACARE: Secure Remote Attestation with Code Authentication and Resilience Engine. 2020 IEEE International Conference on Embedded Software and Systems (ICESS). :1—8.

Recent technological advancements have enabled proliferated use of small embedded and IoT devices for collecting, processing, and transferring the security-critical information and user data. This exponential use has acted as a catalyst in the recent growth of sophisticated attacks such as the replay, man-in-the-middle, and malicious code modification to slink, leak, tweak or exploit the security-critical information in malevolent activities. Therefore, secure communication and software state assurance (at run-time and boot-time) of the device has emerged as open security problems. Furthermore, these devices need to have an appropriate recovery mechanism to bring them back to the known-good operational state. Previous researchers have demonstrated independent methods for attack detection and safeguard. However, the majority of them lack in providing onboard system recovery and secure communication techniques. To bridge this gap, this manuscript proposes SRACARE - a framework that utilizes the custom lightweight, secure communication protocol that performs remote/local attestation, and secure boot with an onboard resilience recovery mechanism to protect the devices from the above-mentioned attacks. The prototype employs an efficient lightweight, low-power 32-bit RISC-V processor, secure communication protocol, code authentication, and resilience engine running on the Artix 7 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) board. This work presents the performance evaluation and state-of-the-art comparison results, which shows promising resilience to attacks and demonstrate the novel protection mechanism with onboard recovery. The framework achieves these with only 8% performance overhead and a very small increase in hardware-software footprint.

Sardar, Muhammad Usama, Quoc, Do Le, Fetzer, Christof.  2020.  Towards Formalization of Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)-based Remote Attestation in Intel SGX. 2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD). :604—607.

Vulnerabilities in privileged software layers have been exploited with severe consequences. Recently, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) based technologies have emerged as a promising approach since they claim strong confidentiality and integrity guarantees regardless of the trustworthiness of the underlying system software. In this paper, we consider one of the most prominent TEE technologies, referred to as Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). Despite many formal approaches, there is still a lack of formal proof of some critical processes of Intel SGX, such as remote attestation. To fill this gap, we propose a fully automated, rigorous, and sound formal approach to specify and verify the Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)-based remote attestation in Intel SGX under the assumption that there are no side-channel attacks and no vulnerabilities inside the enclave. The evaluation indicates that the confidentiality of attestation keys is preserved against a Dolev-Yao adversary in this technology. We also present a few of the many inconsistencies found in the existing literature on Intel SGX attestation during formal specification.

Jenkins, Ira Ray, Smith, Sean W..  2020.  Distributed IoT Attestation via Blockchain. 2020 20th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and Internet Computing (CCGRID). :798—801.

We propose a novel attestation architecture for the Internet of Things (IoT). Our distributed attestation network (DAN) utilizes blockchain technology to store and share device information. We present the design of this new attestation architecture as well as a prototype system chosen to emulate an IoT deployment with a network of Raspberry Pi, Infineon TPMs, and a Hyperledger Fabric blockchain.

2021-05-05
Chalkiadakis, Nikolaos, Deyannis, Dimitris, Karnikis, Dimitris, Vasiliadis, Giorgos, Ioannidis, Sotiris.  2020.  The Million Dollar Handshake: Secure and Attested Communications in the Cloud. 2020 IEEE 13th International Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD). :63—70.

The number of applications and services that are hosted on cloud platforms is constantly increasing. Nowadays, more and more applications are hosted as services on cloud platforms, co-existing with other services in a mutually untrusted environment. Facilities such as virtual machines, containers and encrypted communication channels aim to offer isolation between the various applications and protect sensitive user data. However, such techniques are not always able to provide a secure execution environment for sensitive applications nor they offer guarantees that data are not monitored by an honest but curious provider once they reach the cloud infrastructure. The recent advancements of trusted execution environments within commodity processors, such as Intel SGX, provide a secure reverse sandbox, where code and data are isolated even from the underlying operating system. Moreover, Intel SGX provides a remote attestation mechanism, allowing the communicating parties to verify their identity as well as prove that code is executed on hardware-assisted software enclaves. Many approaches try to ensure code and data integrity, as well as enforce channel encryption schemes such as TLS, however, these techniques are not enough to achieve complete isolation and secure communications without hardware assistance or are not efficient in terms of performance. In this work, we design and implement a practical attestation system that allows the service provider to offer a seamless attestation service between the hosted applications and the end clients. Furthermore, we implement a novel caching system that is capable to eliminate the latencies introduced by the remote attestation process. Our approach allows the parties to attest one another before each communication attempt, with improved performance when compared to a standard TLS handshake.

2021-02-23
Gaber, C., Vilchez, J. S., Gür, G., Chopin, M., Perrot, N., Grimault, J.-L., Wary, J.-P..  2020.  Liability-Aware Security Management for 5G. 2020 IEEE 3rd 5G World Forum (5GWF). :133—138.

Multi-party and multi-layer nature of 5G networks implies the inherent distribution of management and orchestration decisions across multiple entities. Therefore, responsibility for management decisions concerning end-to-end services become blurred if no efficient liability and accountability mechanism is used. In this paper, we present the design, building blocks and challenges of a Liability-Aware Security Management (LASM) system for 5G. We describe how existing security concepts such as manifests and Security-by-Contract, root cause analysis, remote attestation, proof of transit, and trust and reputation models can be composed and enhanced to take risk and responsibilities into account for security and liability management.

2020-08-17
Conti, Mauro, Dushku, Edlira, Mancini, Luigi V..  2019.  RADIS: Remote Attestation of Distributed IoT Services. 2019 Sixth International Conference on Software Defined Systems (SDS). :25–32.
Remote attestation is a security technique through which a remote trusted party (i.e., Verifier) checks the trust-worthiness of a potentially untrusted device (i.e., Prover). In the Internet of Things (IoT) systems, the existing remote attestation protocols propose various approaches to detect the modified software and physical tampering attacks. However, in an inter-operable IoT system, in which IoT devices interact autonomously among themselves, an additional problem arises: a compromised IoT service can influence the genuine operation of other invoked service, without changing the software of the latter. In this paper, we propose a protocol for Remote Attestation of Distributed IoT Services (RADIS), which verifies the trust-worthiness of distributed IoT services. Instead of attesting the complete memory content of the entire interoperable IoT devices, RADIS attests only the services involved in performing a certain functionality. RADIS relies on a control-flow attestation technique to detect IoT services that perform an unexpected operation due to their interactions with a malicious remote service. Our experiments show the effectiveness of our protocol in validating the integrity status of a distributed IoT service.
Kohnhäuser, Florian, Büscher, Niklas, Katzenbeisser, Stefan.  2019.  A Practical Attestation Protocol for Autonomous Embedded Systems. 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS P). :263–278.
With the recent advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), embedded devices increasingly operate collaboratively in autonomous networks. A key technique to guard the secure and safe operation of connected embedded devices is remote attestation. It allows a third party, the verifier, to ensure the integrity of a remote device, the prover. Unfortunately, existing attestation protocols are impractical when applied in autonomous networks of embedded systems due to their limited scalability, performance, robustness, and security guarantees. In this work, we propose PASTA, a novel attestation protocol that is particularly suited for autonomous embedded systems. PASTA is the first that (i) enables many low-end prover devices to attest their integrity towards many potentially untrustworthy low-end verifier devices, (ii) is fully decentralized, thus, able to withstand network disruptions and arbitrary device outages, and (iii) is in addition to software attacks capable of detecting physical attacks in a much more robust way than any existing protocol. We implemented our protocol, conducted measurements, and simulated large networks. The results show that PASTA is practical on low-end embedded devices, scales to large networks with millions of devices, and improves robustness by multiple orders of magnitude compared with the best existing protocols.
Hu, Jianxing, Huo, Dongdong, Wang, Meilin, Wang, Yazhe, Zhang, Yan, Li, Yu.  2019.  A Probability Prediction Based Mutable Control-Flow Attestation Scheme on Embedded Platforms. 2019 18th IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security And Privacy In Computing And Communications/13th IEEE International Conference On Big Data Science And Engineering (TrustCom/BigDataSE). :530–537.
Control-flow attacks cause powerful threats to the software integrity. Remote attestation for control flow is a crucial security service for ensuring the software integrity on embedded platforms. The fine-grained remote control-flow attestation with execution-profiling Control-Flow Graph (CFG) is applied to defend against control-flow attacks. It is a safe scheme but it may influence the runtime efficiency. In fact, we find out only the vulnerable parts of a program need being attested at costly fine-grained level to ensure the security, and the remaining normal parts just need a lightweight coarse-grained check to reduce the overhead. We propose Mutable Granularity Control-Flow Attestation (MGC-FA) scheme, which bases on a probabilistic model, to distinguish between the vulnerable and normal parts in the program and combine fine-grained and coarse-grained control-flow attestation schemes. MGC-FA employs the execution-profiling CFG to apply the remote control-flow attestation scheme on embedded devices. MGC-FA is implemented on Raspberry Pi with ARM TrustZone and the experimental results show its effect on balancing the relationship between runtime efficiency and control-flow security.
2020-02-10
Koutroumpouchos, Nikos, Ntantogian, Christoforos, Menesidou, Sofia-Anna, Liang, Kaitai, Gouvas, Panagiotis, Xenakis, Christos, Giannetsos, Thanassis.  2019.  Secure Edge Computing with Lightweight Control-Flow Property-based Attestation. 2019 IEEE Conference on Network Softwarization (NetSoft). :84–92.

The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly evolving, while introducing several new challenges regarding security, resilience and operational assurance. In the face of an increasing attack landscape, it is necessary to cater for the provision of efficient mechanisms to collectively verify software- and device-integrity in order to detect run-time modifications. Towards this direction, remote attestation has been proposed as a promising defense mechanism. It allows a third party, the verifier, to ensure the integrity of a remote device, the prover. However, this family of solutions do not capture the real-time requirements of industrial IoT applications and suffer from scalability and efficiency issues. In this paper, we present a lightweight dynamic control-flow property-based attestation architecture (CFPA) that can be applied on both resource-constrained edge and cloud devices and services. It is a first step towards a new line of security mechanisms that enables the provision of control-flow attestation of only those specific, critical software components that are comparatively small, simple and limited in function, thus, allowing for a much more efficient verification. Our goal is to enhance run-time software integrity and trustworthiness with a scalable and decentralized solution eliminating the need for federated infrastructure trust. Based on our findings, we posit open issues and challenges, and discuss possible ways to address them, so that security do not hinder the deployment of intelligent edge computing systems.

2019-05-01
Carpent, Xavier, ElDefrawy, Karim, Rattanavipanon, Norrathep, Tsudik, Gene.  2018.  Temporal Consistency of Integrity-Ensuring Computations and Applications to Embedded Systems Security. Proceedings of the 2018 on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :313–327.
Assuring integrity of information (e.g., data and/or software) is usually accomplished by cryptographic means, such as hash functions or message authentication codes (MACs). Computing such integrity-ensuring functions can be time-consuming if the amount of input data is large and/or the computing platform is weak. At the same time, in real-time or safety-critical settings, it is often impractical or even undesirable to guarantee atomicity of computing a time-consuming integrity-ensuring function. Meanwhile, standard correctness and security definitions of such functions assume that input data (regardless of its size) remains consistent throughout computation. However, temporal consistency may be lost if another process interrupts execution of an integrity-ensuring function and modifies portions of input that either or both: (1) were already processed, or (2) were not processed yet. Lack of temporal consistency might yield an integrity result that is non-sensical or simply incorrect. Such subtleties and discrepancies between (implicit) assumptions in definitions and implementations can be a source of inconsistenceies, which might lead to vulnerabilities. In this paper, we systematically explore the notion of temporal consistency of cryptographic integrity-ensuring functions. We show that its lack in implementations of such functions can lead to inconsistent results and security violations in protocols and systems using them, e.g., remote attestation, remote updates and secure resets. We consider several mechanisms that guarantee temporal consistency of implementations of integrity-ensuring functions in embedded systems with a focus on remote attestation. We also assess performance of proposed mechanisms on two commodity hardware platforms: I.MX6-SabreLite and ODROID-XU4.
2019-02-14
Birnstill, Pascal, Beyerer, Jürgen.  2018.  Building Blocks for Identity Management and Protection for Smart Environments and Interactive Assistance Systems. Proceedings of the 11th PErvasive Technologies Related to Assistive Environments Conference. :292-296.

Interactive environments are more and more entering our daily life. Our homes are becoming increasingly smart and so do our working environments. Aiming to provide assistance that is not only suitable to the current situation, but as well for the involved individuals usually comes along with an increased scale of personal data being collected/requested and processed. While this may not be exceptionally critical as long as data does not leave one's smart home, circumstances change dramatically once smart home data is processed by cloud services, and, all the more, as soon as an interactive assistance system is operated by our employer who may have interest in exploiting the data beyond its original purpose, e. g. for secretly evaluating the work performance of his personnel. In this paper we discuss how a federated identity management could be augmented with distributed usage control and trusted computing technology so as to reliably arrange and enforce privacy-related requirements in externally operated interactive environments.

2019-02-13
Ko, Ronny, Mickens, James.  2018.  DeadBolt: Securing IoT Deployments. Proceedings of the Applied Networking Research Workshop. :50–57.

In this paper, we introduce DeadBolt, a new security framework for managing IoT network access. DeadBolt hides all of the devices in an IoT deployment behind an access point that implements deny-by-default policies for both incoming and outgoing traffic. The DeadBolt AP also forces high-end IoT devices to use remote attestation to gain network access; attestation allows the devices to prove that they run up-to-date, trusted software. For lightweight IoT devices which lack the ability to attest, the DeadBolt AP uses virtual drivers (essentially, security-focused virtual network functions) to protect lightweight device traffic. For example, a virtual driver might provide network intrusion detection, or encrypt device traffic that is natively cleartext. Using these techniques, and several others, DeadBolt can prevent realistic attacks while imposing only modest performance costs.

Carpent, X., Tsudik, G., Rattanavipanon, N..  2018.  ERASMUS: Efficient remote attestation via self-measurement for unattended settings. 2018 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE). :1191–1194.
Remote attestation (RA) is a popular means of detecting malware in embedded and IoT devices. RA is usually realized as a protocol via which a trusted verifier measures software integrity of an untrusted remote device called prover. All prior RA techniques require on-demand operation. We identify two drawbacks of this approach in the context of unattended devices: First, it fails to detect mobile malware that enters and leaves the prover between successive RA instances. Second, it requires the prover to engage in a potentially expensive computation, which can negatively impact safety-critical or real-time devices. To this end, we introduce the concept of self-measurement whereby a prover periodically (and securely) measures and records its own software state. A verifier then collects and verifies these measurements. We demonstrate a concrete technique called ERASMUS, justify its features, and evaluate its performance. We show that ERASMUS is well-suited for safety-critical applications. We also define a new metric - Quality of Attestation (QoA).
Ammar, M., Washha, M., Crispo, B..  2018.  WISE: Lightweight Intelligent Swarm Attestation Scheme for IoT (The Verifier’s Perspective). 2018 14th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications (WiMob). :1–8.
The growing pervasiveness of Internet of Things (IoT) expands the attack surface by connecting more and more attractive attack targets, i.e. embedded devices, to the Internet. One key component in securing these devices is software integrity checking, which typically attained with Remote Attestation (RA). RA is realized as an interactive protocol, whereby a trusted party, verifier, verifies the software integrity of a potentially compromised remote device, prover. In the vast majority of IoT applications, smart devices operate in swarms, thus triggering the need for efficient swarm attestation schemes.In this paper, we present WISE, the first intelligent swarm attestation protocol that aims to minimize the communication overhead while preserving an adequate level of security. WISE depends on a resource-efficient smart broadcast authentication scheme where devices are organized in fine-grained multi-clusters, and whenever needed, the most likely compromised devices are attested. The candidate devices are selected intelligently taking into account the attestation history and the diverse characteristics (and constraints) of each device in the swarm. We show that WISE is very suitable for resource-constrained embedded devices, highly efficient and scalable in heterogenous IoT networks, and offers an adjustable level of security.
Ahmed, N., Talib, M. A., Nasir, Q..  2018.  Program-flow attestation of IoT systems software. 2018 15th Learning and Technology Conference (L T). :67–73.
Remote attestation is the process of measuring the integrity of a device over the network, by detecting modification of software or hardware from the original configuration. Several remote software-based attestation mechanisms have been introduced, that rely on strict time constraints and other impractical constraints that make them inconvenient for IoT systems. Although some research is done to address these issues, they integrated trusted hardware devices to the attested devices to accomplish their aim, which is costly and not convenient for many use cases. In this paper, we propose “Dual Attestation” that includes two stages: static and dynamic. The static attestation phase checks the memory of the attested device. The dynamic attestation technique checks the execution correctness of the application code and can detect the runtime attacks. The objectives are to minimize the overhead and detect these attacks, by developing an optimized dynamic technique that checks the application program flow. The optimization will be done in the prover and the verifier sides.
2018-06-11
Daniels, Wilfried, Hughes, Danny, Ammar, Mahmoud, Crispo, Bruno, Matthys, Nelson, Joosen, Wouter.  2017.  SΜV - the Security Microvisor: A Virtualisation-based Security Middleware for the Internet of Things. Proceedings of the 18th ACM/IFIP/USENIX Middleware Conference: Industrial Track. :36–42.
The Internet of Things (IoT) creates value by connecting digital processes to the physical world using embedded sensors, actuators and wireless networks. The IoT is increasingly intertwined with critical industrial processes, yet contemporary IoT devices offer limited security features, creating a large new attack surface and inhibiting the adoption of IoT technologies. Hardware security modules address this problem, however, their use increases the cost of embedded IoT devices. Furthermore, millions of IoT devices are already deployed without hardware security support. This paper addresses this problem by introducing a Security MicroVisor (SμV) middleware, which provides memory isolation and custom security operations using software virtualisation and assembly-level code verification. We showcase SμV by implementing a key security feature: remote attestation. Evaluation shows extremely low overhead in terms of memory, performance and battery lifetime for a representative IoT device.
2018-05-24
Genge, B., Duka, A. V., Haller, P., Crainicu, B., Sándor, H., Graur, F..  2017.  Design, Verification and Implementation of a Lightweight Remote Attestation Protocol for Process Control Systems. 2017 IEEE 15th International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN). :75–82.

Until recently, IT security received limited attention within the scope of Process Control Systems (PCS). In the past, PCS consisted of isolated, specialized components running closed process control applications, where hardware was placed in physically secured locations and connections to remote network infrastructures were forbidden. Nowadays, industrial communications are fully exploiting the plethora of features and novel capabilities deriving from the adoption of commodity off the shelf (COTS) hardware and software. Nonetheless, the reliance on COTS for remote monitoring, configuration and maintenance also exposed PCS to significant cyber threats. In light of these issues, this paper presents the steps for the design, verification and implementation of a lightweight remote attestation protocol. The protocol is aimed at providing a secure software integrity verification scheme that can be readily integrated into existing industrial applications. The main novelty of the designed protocol is that it encapsulates key elements for the protection of both participating parties (i.e., verifier and prover) against cyber attacks. The protocol is formally verified for correctness with the help of the Scyther model checking tool. The protocol implementation and experimental results are provided for a Phoenix-Contact industrial controller, which is widely used in the automation of gas transportation networks in Romania.

2018-02-21
Subramanyan, Pramod, Sinha, Rohit, Lebedev, Ilia, Devadas, Srinivas, Seshia, Sanjit A..  2017.  A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :2435–2450.

Recent proposals for trusted hardware platforms, such as Intel SGX and the MIT Sanctum processor, offer compelling security features but lack formal guarantees. We introduce a verification methodology based on a trusted abstract platform (TAP), a formalization of idealized enclave platforms along with a parameterized adversary. We also formalize the notion of secure remote execution and present machine-checked proofs showing that the TAP satisfies the three key security properties that entail secure remote execution: integrity, confidentiality and secure measurement. We then present machine-checked proofs showing that SGX and Sanctum are refinements of the TAP under certain parameterizations of the adversary, demonstrating that these systems implement secure enclaves for the stated adversary models.

2018-02-14
Wang, Frank, Joung, Yuna, Mickens, James.  2017.  Cobweb: Practical Remote Attestation Using Contextual Graphs. Proceedings of the 2Nd Workshop on System Software for Trusted Execution. :3:1–3:7.

In theory, remote attestation is a powerful primitive for building distributed systems atop untrusting peers. Unfortunately, the canonical attestation framework defined by the Trusted Computing Group is insufficient to express rich contextual relationships between client-side software components. Thus, attestors and verifiers must rely on ad-hoc mechanisms to handle real-world attestation challenges like attestors that load executables in nondeterministic orders, or verifiers that require attestors to track dynamic information flows between attestor-side components. In this paper, we survey these practical attestation challenges. We then describe a new attestation framework, named Cobweb, which handles these challenges. The key insight is that real-world attestation is a graph problem. An attestation message is a graph in which each vertex is a software component, and has one or more labels, e.g., the hash value of the component, or the raw file data, or a signature over that data. Each edge in an attestation graph is a contextual relationship, like the passage of time, or a parent/child fork() relationship, or a sender/receiver IPC relationship. Cobweb's verifier-side policies are graph predicates which analyze contextual relationships. Experiments with real, complex software stacks demonstrate that Cobweb's abstractions are generic and can support a variety of real-world policies.

2018-02-06
Camenisch, J., Chen, L., Drijvers, M., Lehmann, A., Novick, D., Urian, R..  2017.  One TPM to Bind Them All: Fixing TPM 2.0 for Provably Secure Anonymous Attestation. 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). :901–920.

The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an international standard for a security chip that can be used for the management of cryptographic keys and for remote attestation. The specification of the most recent TPM 2.0 interfaces for direct anonymous attestation unfortunately has a number of severe shortcomings. First of all, they do not allow for security proofs (indeed, the published proofs are incorrect). Second, they provide a Diffie-Hellman oracle w.r.t. the secret key of the TPM, weakening the security and preventing forward anonymity of attestations. Fixes to these problems have been proposed, but they create new issues: they enable a fraudulent TPM to encode information into an attestation signature, which could be used to break anonymity or to leak the secret key. Furthermore, all proposed ways to remove the Diffie-Hellman oracle either strongly limit the functionality of the TPM or would require significant changes to the TPM 2.0 interfaces. In this paper we provide a better specification of the TPM 2.0 interfaces that addresses these problems and requires only minimal changes to the current TPM 2.0 commands. We then show how to use the revised interfaces to build q-SDH-and LRSW-based anonymous attestation schemes, and prove their security. We finally discuss how to obtain other schemes addressing different use cases such as key-binding for U-Prove and e-cash.

2018-01-16
Huang, C., Hou, C., He, L., Dai, H., Ding, Y..  2017.  Policy-Customized: A New Abstraction for Building Security as a Service. 2017 14th International Symposium on Pervasive Systems, Algorithms and Networks 2017 11th International Conference on Frontier of Computer Science and Technology 2017 Third International Symposium of Creative Computing (ISPAN-FCST-ISCC). :203–210.

Just as cloud customers have different performance requirements, they also have different security requirements for their computations in the cloud. Researchers have suggested a "security on demand" service model for cloud computing, where secure computing environment are dynamically provisioned to cloud customers according to their specific security needs. The availability of secure computing platforms is a necessary but not a sufficient solution to convince cloud customers to move their sensitive data and code to the cloud. Cloud customers need further assurance to convince them that the security measures are indeed deployed, and are working correctly. In this paper, we present Policy-Customized Trusted Cloud Service architecture with a new remote attestation scheme and a virtual machine migration protocol, where cloud customer can custom security policy of computing environment and validate whether the current computing environment meets the security policy in the whole life cycle of the virtual machine. To prove the availability of proposed architecture, we realize a prototype that support customer-customized security policy and a VM migration protocol that support customer-customized migration policy and validation based on open source Xen Hypervisor.

2018-01-10
Zhang, Y., Wang, L., You, Y., Yi, L..  2017.  A Remote-Attestation-Based Extended Hash Algorithm for Privacy Protection. 2017 International Conference on Computer Network, Electronic and Automation (ICCNEA). :254–257.

Compared to other remote attestation methods, the binary-based approach is the most direct and complete one, but privacy protection has become an important problem. In this paper, we presented an Extended Hash Algorithm (EHA) for privacy protection based on remote attestation method. Based on the traditional Merkle Hash Tree, EHA altered the algorithm of node connection. The new algorithm could ensure the same result in any measure order. The security key is added when the node connection calculation is performed, which ensures the security of the value calculated by the Merkle node. By the final analysis, we can see that the remote attestation using EHA has better privacy protection and execution performance compared to other methods.

2017-10-10
Abera, Tigist, Asokan, N., Davi, Lucas, Ekberg, Jan-Erik, Nyman, Thomas, Paverd, Andrew, Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza, Tsudik, Gene.  2016.  C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :743–754.

Remote attestation is a crucial security service particularly relevant to increasingly popular IoT (and other embedded) devices. It allows a trusted party (verifier) to learn the state of a remote, and potentially malware-infected, device (prover). Most existing approaches are static in nature and only check whether benign software is initially loaded on the prover. However, they are vulnerable to runtime attacks that hijack the application's control or data flow, e.g., via return-oriented programming or data-oriented exploits. As a concrete step towards more comprehensive runtime remote attestation, we present the design and implementation of Control-FLow ATtestation (C-FLAT) that enables remote attestation of an application's control-flow path, without requiring the source code. We describe a full prototype implementation of C-FLAT on Raspberry Pi using its ARM TrustZone hardware security extensions. We evaluate C-FLAT's performance using a real-world embedded (cyber-physical) application, and demonstrate its efficacy against control-flow hijacking attacks.

2017-04-20
Moon, Y. H., Jeon, Y. S..  2016.  Cooperative remote attestation for IoT swarms. 2016 International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC). :1233–1235.
Prior remote attestation may not be suitable to scale to the proliferation of IoT device swarms. To this end, we propose a cooperative remote attestation scheme, which validates the security state and verifies the system integrity with the cooperation of neighbor devices. The efficiency of the proposed mechanism is analyzed as a cryptographic protocol and then discussed in terms of security and scalability.