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Kumar Saha, Sujan, Bobda, Christophe.  2020.  FPGA Accelerated Embedded System Security Through Hardware Isolation. 2020 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST). :1–6.
Modern embedded systems include on-chip FPGA along with processors to meet the high computation demand by providing flexibility to users to add custom hardware accelerators. Any confidential or sensitive information may be processed by those custom accelerators or hardware Intellectual Properties (IPs). Existing accelerator usage models in embedded systems do not prevent illegal access to the IPs, which can be a severe security breach. In this paper, we present a hardware-software co-design approach for secured FPGA accelerated embedded system design. Our proposed security framework inherits Mandatory Access Control (MAC) based authentication policies running at software down to hardware accelerators in FPGA. It ensures secured processing of confidential data in the hardware to prevent software originated attacks at hardware IPs and information leaks. We have implemented a prototype of our proposed framework, which shows that it can be easily integrated while designing an embedded system with custom accelerator IPs. The experimental results show that the proposed framework establishes secured hardware execution with a negligible amount of area and performance overhead.
Englund, Håkan, Lindskog, Niklas.  2020.  Secure acceleration on cloud-based FPGAs – FPGA enclaves. 2020 IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium Workshops (IPDPSW). :119—122.
FPGAs are becoming a common sight in cloud environments and new usage paradigms, such as FPGA-as-a-Service, have emerged. This development poses a challenge to traditional FPGA security models, as these are assuming trust between the user and the hardware owner. Currently, the user cannot keep bitstream nor data protected from the hardware owner in an FPGA-as-a-service setting. This paper proposes a security model where the chip manufacturer takes the role of root-of-trust to remedy these security problems. We suggest that the chip manufacturer creates a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), used for user bitstream protection and data encryption, on each device. The chip manufacturer, rather than the hardware owner, also controls certain security-related peripherals. This allows the user to take control over a predefined part of the programmable logic and set up a protected enclave area. Hence, all user data can be provided in encrypted form and only be revealed inside the enclave area. In addition, our model enables secure and concurrent multi-tenant usage of remote FPGAs. To also consider the needs of the hardware owner, our solution includes bitstream certification and affirming that uploaded bitstreams have been vetted against maliciousness.
Meadows, B., Edwards, N., Chang, S.-Y..  2020.  On-Chip Randomization for Memory Protection Against Hardware Supply Chain Attacks to DRAM. 2020 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW). :171—180.

Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) is widely used for data storage and, when a computer system is in operation, the DRAM can contain sensitive information such as passwords and cryptographic keys. Therefore, the DRAM is a prime target for hardware-based cryptanalytic attacks. These attacks can be performed in the supply chain to capture default key mechanisms enabling a later cyber attack or predisposition the system to remote effects. Two prominent attack classes against memory are the Cold Boot attack which recovers the data from the DRAM even after a supposed power-down and Rowhammer attack which violates memory integrity by influencing the stored bits to flip. In this paper, we propose an on-chip technique that obfuscates the memory addresses and data and provides a fast detect-response to defend against these hardware-based security attacks on DRAM. We advance the prior hardware security research by making two contributions. First, the key material is detected and erased before the Cold Boot attacker can extract the memory data. Second, our solution is on-chip and does not require nor depend on additional hardware or software which are open to additional supply chain attack vectors. We analyze the efficacy of our scheme through circuit simulation and compare the results to the previous mitigation approaches based on DRAM write operations. Our simulation and analysis results show that purging key information used for address and data randomization can be achieved much faster and with lower power than with typical DRAM write techniques used for sanitizing memory content. We demonstrate through circuit simulation of the key register design a technique that clears key information within 2.4ns which is faster by more than two orders magnitude compared to typical DRAM write operations for 180nm technology, and with a power consumption of 0.15 picoWatts.

Dörr, T., Sandmann, T., Becker, J..  2020.  A Formal Model for the Automatic Configuration of Access Protection Units in MPSoC-Based Embedded Systems. 2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD). :596—603.

Heterogeneous system-on-chip platforms with multiple processing cores are becoming increasingly common in safety-and security-critical embedded systems. To facilitate a logical isolation of physically connected on-chip components, internal communication links of such platforms are often equipped with dedicated access protection units. When performed manually, however, the configuration of these units can be both time-consuming and error-prone. To resolve this issue, we present a formal model and a corresponding design methodology that allows developers to specify access permissions and information flow requirements for embedded systems in a mostly platform-independent manner. As part of the methodology, the consistency between the permissions and the requirements is automatically verified and an extensible generation framework is used to transform the abstract permission declarations into configuration code for individual access protection units. We present a prototypical implementation of this approach and validate it by generating configuration code for the access protection unit of a commercially available multiprocessor system-on-chip.

Silitonga, A., Gassoumi, H., Becker, J..  2020.  MiteS: Software-based Microarchitectural Attacks and Countermeasures in networked AP SoC Platforms. 2020 IEEE 14th International Conference on Anti-counterfeiting, Security, and Identification (ASID). :65—71.

The impact of microarchitectural attacks in Personal Computers (PCs) can be further adapted to and observed in internetworked All Programmable System-on-Chip (AP SoC) platforms. This effort involves the access control or execution of Intellectual Property cores in the FPGA of an AP SoC Victim internetworked with an AP SoC Attacker via Internet Protocol (IP). Three conceptions of attacks were implemented: buffer overflow attack at the stack, return-oriented programming attack, and command-injection-based attack for dynamic reconfiguration in the FPGA. Indeed, a specific preventive countermeasure for each attack is proposed. The functionality of the countermeasures mainly comprises adapted words addition (stack protection) for the first and second attacks and multiple encryption for the third attack. In conclusion, the recommended countermeasures are realizable to counteract the implemented attacks.

Benhani, E. M., Bossuet, L..  2018.  DVFS as a Security Failure of TrustZone-enabled Heterogeneous SoC. 2018 25th IEEE International Conference on Electronics, Circuits and Systems (ICECS). :489—492.
Today, most embedded systems use Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) to minimize energy consumption and maximize performance. The DVFS technique works by regulating the important parameters that govern the amount of energy consumed in a system, voltage and frequency. For the implementation of this technique, the operating system (OS) includes software applications that dynamically control a voltage regulator or a frequency regulator or both. In this paper, we demonstrate for the first time a malicious use of the frequency regulator against a TrustZone-enabled System-on-Chip (SoC). We demonstrate a use of frequency scaling to create covert channel in a TrustZone-enabled heterogeneous SoC. We present four proofs of concept to transfer sensitive data from a secure entity in the SoC to a non-secure one. The first proof of concept is from a secure ARM core to outside of SoC. The second is from a secure ARM core to a non-secure one. The third is from a non-trusted third party IP embedded in the programmable logic part of the SoC to a non-secure ARM core. And the last proof of concept is from a secure third party IP to a non-secure ARM core.
Sengupta, A., Ashraf, M., Nabeel, M., Sinanoglu, O..  2018.  Customized Locking of IP Blocks on a Multi-Million-Gate SoC. 2018 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD). :1–7.
Reliance on off-site untrusted fabrication facilities has given rise to several threats such as intellectual property (IP) piracy, overbuilding and hardware Trojans. Logic locking is a promising defense technique against such malicious activities that is effected at the silicon layer. Over the past decade, several logic locking defenses and attacks have been presented, thereby, enhancing the state-of-the-art. Nevertheless, there has been little research aiming to demonstrate the applicability of logic locking with large-scale multi-million-gate industrial designs consisting of multiple IP blocks with different security requirements. In this work, we take on this challenge to successfully lock a multi-million-gate system-on-chip (SoC) provided by DARPA by taking it all the way to GDSII layout. We analyze how specific features, constraints, and security requirements of an IP block can be leveraged to lock its functionality in the most appropriate way. We show that the blocks of an SoC can be locked in a customized manner at 0.5%, 15.3%, and 1.5% chip-level overhead in power, performance, and area, respectively.
Wang, Nan, Yao, Manting, Jiang, Dongxu, Chen, Song, Zhu, Yu.  2018.  Security-Driven Task Scheduling for Multiprocessor System-on-Chips with Performance Constraints. 2018 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). :545—550.

The high penetration of third-party intellectual property (3PIP) brings a high risk of malicious inclusions and data leakage in products due to the planted hardware Trojans, and system level security constraints have recently been proposed for MPSoCs protection against hardware Trojans. However, secret communication still can be established in the context of the proposed security constraints, and thus, another type of security constraints is also introduced to fully prevent such malicious inclusions. In addition, fulfilling the security constraints incurs serious overhead of schedule length, and a two-stage performance-constrained task scheduling algorithm is then proposed to maintain most of the security constraints. In the first stage, the schedule length is iteratively reduced by assigning sets of adjacent tasks into the same core after calculating the maximum weight independent set of a graph consisting of all timing critical paths. In the second stage, tasks are assigned to proper IP vendors and scheduled to time periods with a minimization of cores required. The experimental results show that our work reduces the schedule length of a task graph, while only a small number of security constraints are violated.

Sengupta, Anirban, Chandra, N. Prajwal, Kumar, E. Ranjith.  2019.  Robust Digital Signature to Protect IP Core against Fraudulent Ownership and Cloning. 2019 IEEE 9th International Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE-Berlin). :1—3.

Digital signal processing (DSP) and multimedia based reusable Intellectual property (IP) cores form key components of system-on-chips used in consumer electronic devices. They represent years of valuable investment and hence need protection against prevalent threats such as IP cloning and fraudulent claim of ownership. This paper presents a novel crypto digital signature approach which incorporates multiple security modules such as encryption, hashing and encoding for protection of digital signature processing cores. The proposed approach achieves higher robustness (and reliability), in terms of lower probability of coincidence, at lower design cost than existing watermarking approaches for IP cores. The proposed approach achieves stronger proof of authorship (on average by 39.7%) as well as requires lesser storage hardware compared to a recent similar work.

Sayed-Ahmed, Amr, Haj-Yahya, Jawad, Chattopadhyay, Anupam.  2019.  SoCINT: Resilient System-on-Chip via Dynamic Intrusion Detection. 2019 32nd International Conference on VLSI Design and 2019 18th International Conference on Embedded Systems (VLSID). :359—364.

Modern multicore System-on-Chips (SoCs) are regularly designed with third-party Intellectual Properties (IPs) and software tools to manage the complexity and development cost. This approach naturally introduces major security concerns, especially for those SoCs used in critical applications and cyberinfrastructure. Despite approaches like split manufacturing, security testing and hardware metering, this remains an open and challenging problem. In this work, we propose a dynamic intrusion detection approach to address the security challenge. The proposed runtime system (SoCINT) systematically gathers information about untrusted IPs and strictly enforces the access policies. SoCINT surpasses the-state-of-the-art monitoring systems by supporting hardware tracing, for more robust analysis, together with providing smart counterintelligence strategies. SoCINT is implemented in an open source processor running on a commercial FPGA platform. The evaluation results validate our claims by demonstrating resilience against attacks exploiting erroneous or malicious IPs.

Duncan, Adam, Rahman, Fahim, Lukefahr, Andrew, Farahmandi, Farimah, Tehranipoor, Mark.  2019.  FPGA Bitstream Security: A Day in the Life. 2019 IEEE International Test Conference (ITC). :1—10.

Security concerns for field-programmable gate array (FPGA) applications and hardware are evolving as FPGA designs grow in complexity, involve sophisticated intellectual properties (IPs), and pass through more entities in the design and implementation flow. FPGAs are now routinely found integrated into system-on-chip (SoC) platforms, cloud-based shared computing resources, and in commercial and government systems. The IPs included in FPGAs are sourced from multiple origins and passed through numerous entities (such as design house, system integrator, and users) through the lifecycle. This paper thoroughly examines the interaction of these entities from the perspective of the bitstream file responsible for the actual hardware configuration of the FPGA. Five stages of the bitstream lifecycle are introduced to analyze this interaction: 1) bitstream-generation, 2) bitstream-at-rest, 3) bitstream-loading, 4) bitstream-running, and 5) bitstream-end-of-life. Potential threats and vulnerabilities are discussed at each stage, and both vendor-offered and academic countermeasures are highlighted for a robust and comprehensive security assurance.

Das, Abhishek, Touba, Nur A..  2019.  A Graph Theory Approach towards IJTAG Security via Controlled Scan Chain Isolation. 2019 IEEE 37th VLSI Test Symposium (VTS). :1—6.

The IEEE Std. 1687 (IJTAG) was designed to provide on-chip access to the various embedded instruments (e.g. built-in self test, sensors, etc.) in complex system-on-chip designs. IJTAG facilitates access to on-chip instruments from third party intellectual property providers with hidden test-data registers. Although access to on-chip instruments provides valuable data specifically for debug and diagnosis, it can potentially expose the design to untrusted sources and instruments that can sniff and possibly manipulate the data that is being shifted through the IJTAG network. This paper provides a comprehensive protection scheme against data sniffing and data integrity attacks by selectively isolating the data flowing through the IJTAG network. The proposed scheme is modeled as a graph coloring problem to optimize the number of isolation signals required to protect the design. It is shown that combining the proposed approach with other existing schemes can also bolster the security against unauthorized user access as well. The proposed countermeasure is shown to add minimal overhead in terms of area and power consumption.

Karim, Hassan, Rawat, Danda.  2019.  A Trusted Bluetooth Performance Evaluation Model for Brain Computer Interfaces. 2019 IEEE 20th International Conference on Information Reuse and Integration for Data Science (IRI). :47—52.
Bluetooth enables excellent mobility in Brain Computer Interface (BCI) research and other use cases including ambulatory care, telemedicine, fitness tracking and mindfulness training. Although significant research exists for an all-encompassing BCI performance rating, almost all the literature addresses performance in terms of brain state or brain function classification accuracy. For the few published experiments that address BCI hardware performance, they too, focused on improving classification accuracy. This paper explores some of the more recent studies and proposes a trusted performance rating for BCI applications based on the enhanced privacy, yet reduced bandwidth needs of mobile EEG-based BCI applications. This paper proposes a set of Bluetooth operating parameters required to meet the performance, usability and privacy requirements of reliable and secure mobile neuro-feedback applications. It presents a rating model, "Trusted Mobile BCI", based on those operating parameters, and validated the model with studies that leveraged mobile BCI technology.
Elkanishy, Abdelrahman, Badawy, Abdel-Hameed A., Furth, Paul M., Boucheron, Laura E., Michael, Christopher P..  2019.  Machine Learning Bluetooth Profile Operation Verification via Monitoring the Transmission Pattern. 2019 53rd Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers. :2144—2148.
Manufacturers often buy and/or license communication ICs from third-party suppliers. These communication ICs are then integrated into a complex computational system, resulting in a wide range of potential hardware-software security issues. This work proposes a compact supervisory circuit to classify the Bluetooth profile operation of a Bluetooth System-on-Chip (SoC) at low frequencies by monitoring the radio frequency (RF) output power of the Bluetooth SoC. The idea is to inexpensively manufacture an RF envelope detector to monitor the RF output power and a profile classification algorithm on a custom low-frequency integrated circuit in a low-cost legacy technology. When the supervisory circuit observes unexpected behavior, it can shut off power to the Bluetooth SoC. In this preliminary work, we proto-type the supervisory circuit using off-the-shelf components to collect a sufficient data set to train 11 different Machine Learning models. We extract smart descriptive time-domain features from the envelope of the RF output signal. Then, we train the machine learning models to classify three different Bluetooth operation profiles: sensor, hands-free, and headset. Our results demonstrate 100% classification accuracy with low computational complexity.
León, Raquel, Domínguez, Adrián, Carballo, Pedro P., Núñez, Antonio.  2019.  Deep Packet Inspection Through Virtual Platforms using System-On-Chip FPGAs. 2019 XXXIV Conference on Design of Circuits and Integrated Systems (DCIS). :1—6.

Virtual platforms provide a full hardware/software platform to study device limitations in an early stages of the design flow and to develop software without requiring a physical implementation. This paper describes the development process of a virtual platform for Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) hardware accelerators by using Transaction Level Modeling (TLM). We propose two DPI architectures oriented to System-on-Chip FPGA. The first architecture, CPU-DMA based architecture, is a hybrid CPU/FPGA where the packets are filtered in the software domain. The second architecture, Hardware-IP based architecture, is mainly implemented in the hardware domain. We have created two virtual platforms and performed the simulation, the debugging and the analysis of the hardware/software features, in order to compare results for both architectures.

Wang, Jian, Guo, Shize, Chen, Zhe, Zhang, Tao.  2019.  A Benchmark Suite of Hardware Trojans for On-Chip Networks. IEEE Access. 7:102002—102009.
As recently studied, network-on-chip (NoC) suffers growing threats from hardware trojans (HTs), leading to performance degradation or information leakage when it provides communication service in many/multi-core systems. Therefore, defense techniques against NoC HTs experience rapid development in recent years. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are few standard benchmarks developed for the defense techniques evaluation. To address this issue, in this paper, we design a suite of benchmarks which involves multiple NoCs with different HTs, so that researchers can compare various HT defense methods fairly by making use of them. We first briefly introduce the features of target NoC and its infected modules in our benchmarks, and then, detail the design of our NoC HTs in a one-by-one manner. Finally, we evaluate our benchmarks through extensive simulations and report the circuit cost of NoC HTs in terms of area and power consumption, as well as their effects on NoC performance. Besides, comprehensive experiments, including functional testing and side channel analysis are performed to assess the stealthiness of our HTs.
Ascia, Giuseppe, Catania, Vincenzo, Monteleone, Salvatore, Palesi, Maurizio, Patti, Davide, Jose, John.  2019.  Networks-on-Chip based Deep Neural Networks Accelerators for IoT Edge Devices. 2019 Sixth International Conference on Internet of Things: Systems, Management and Security (IOTSMS). :227—234.
The need for performing deep neural network inferences on resource-constrained embedded devices (e.g., Internet of Things nodes) requires specialized architectures to achieve the best trade-off among performance, energy, and cost. One of the most promising architectures in this context is based on massive parallel and specialized cores interconnected by means of a Network-on-Chip (NoC). In this paper, we extensively evaluate NoC-based deep neural network accelerators by exploring the design space spanned by several architectural parameters including, network size, routing algorithm, local memory size, link width, and number of memory interfaces. We show how latency is mainly dominated by the on-chip communication whereas energy consumption is mainly accounted by memory (both on-chip and off-chip). The outcome of the analysis, thus, pushes toward a research line devoted to the optimization of the on-chip communication fabric and the memory subsystem for performance improvement and energy efficiency, respectively.
J.Y.V., Manoj Kumar, Swain, Ayas Kanta, Kumar, Sudeendra, Sahoo, Sauvagya Ranjan, Mahapatra, Kamalakanta.  2018.  Run Time Mitigation of Performance Degradation Hardware Trojan Attacks in Network on Chip. 2018 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). :738—743.
Globalization of semiconductor design and manufacturing has led to several hardware security issues. The problem of Hardware Trojans (HT) is one such security issue discussed widely in industry and academia. Adversary design engineer can insert the HT to leak confidential data, cause a denial of service attack or any other intention specific to the design. HT in cryptographic modules and processors are widely discussed. HT in Multi-Processor System on Chips (MPSoC) are also catastrophic, as most of the military applications use MPSoCs. Network on Chips (NoC) are standard communication infrastructure in modern day MPSoC. In this paper, we present a novel hardware Trojan which is capable of inducing performance degradation and denial of service attacks in a NoC. The presence of the Hardware Trojan in a NoC can compromise the crucial details of packets communicated through NoC. The proposed Trojan is triggered by a particular complex bit pattern from input messages and tries to mislead the packets away from the destined addresses. A mitigation method based on bit shuffling mechanism inside the router with a key directly extracted from input message is proposed to limit the adverse effects of the Trojan. The performance of a 4×4 NoC is evaluated under uniform traffic with the proposed Trojan and mitigation method. Simulation results show that the proposed mitigation scheme is useful in limiting the malicious effect of hardware Trojan.
Kornaros, Georgios, Tomoutzoglou, Othon, Coppola, Marcello.  2018.  Hardware-Assisted Security in Electronic Control Units: Secure Automotive Communications by Utilizing One-Time-Programmable Network on Chip and Firewalls. IEEE Micro. 38:63—74.
With emerging smart automotive technologies, vehicle-to-vehicle communications, and software-dominated enhancements for enjoyable driving and advanced driver assistance systems, the complexity of providing guarantees in terms of security, trust, and privacy in a modern cyber-enabled automotive system is significantly elevated. New threat models emerge that require efficient system-level countermeasures. This article introduces synergies between on- and off-chip networking techniques to ensure secure execution environments for electronic control units. The proposed mechanisms consist of hardware firewalling and on-chip network physical isolation, whose mechanisms are combined with system-wide cryptographic techniques in automotive controller area network (CAN)-bus communications to provide authentication and confidentiality.
Reinbrecht, Cezar, Forlin, Bruno, Zankl, Andreas, Sepulveda, Johanna.  2018.  Earthquake — A NoC-based optimized differential cache-collision attack for MPSoCs. 2018 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE). :648—653.
Multi-Processor Systems-on-Chips (MPSoCs) are a platform for a wide variety of applications and use-cases. The high on-chip connectivity, the programming flexibility, and the reuse of IPs, however, also introduce security concerns. Problems arise when applications with different trust and protection levels share resources of the MPSoC, such as processing units, cache memories and the Network-on-Chip (NoC) communication structure. If a program gets compromised, an adversary can observe the use of these resources and infer (potentially secret) information from other applications. In this work, we explore the cache-based attack by Bogdanov et al., which infers the cache activity of a target program through timing measurements and exploits collisions that occur when the same cache location is accessed for different program inputs. We implement this differential cache-collision attack on the MPSoC Glass and introduce an optimized variant of it, the Earthquake Attack, which leverages the NoC-based communication to increase attack efficiency. Our results show that Earthquake performs well under different cache line and MPSoC configurations, illustrating that cache-collision attacks are considerable threats on MPSoCs.
Vashist, Abhishek, Keats, Andrew, Pudukotai Dinakarrao, Sai Manoj, Ganguly, Amlan.  2019.  Securing a Wireless Network-on-Chip Against Jamming Based Denial-of-Service Attacks. 2019 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). :320–325.
Wireless Networks-on-Chips (NoCs) have emerged as a panacea to the non-scalable multi-hop data transmission paths in traditional wired NoC architectures. Using low-power transceivers in NoC switches, novel Wireless NoC (WiNoC) architectures have been shown to achieve higher energy efficiency with improved peak bandwidth and reduced on-chip data transfer latency. However, using wireless interconnects for data transfer within a chip makes the on-chip communications vulnerable to various security threats from either external attackers or internal hardware Trojans (HTs). In this work, we propose a mechanism to make the wireless communication in a WiNoC secure against persistent jamming based Denial-of-Service attacks from both external and internal attackers. Persistent jamming attacks on the on-chip wireless medium will cause interference in data transfer over the duration of the attack resulting in errors in contiguous bits, known as burst errors. Therefore, we use a burst error correction code to monitor the rate of burst errors received over the wireless medium and deploy a Machine Learning (ML) classifier to detect the persistent jamming attack and distinguish it from random burst errors. In the event of jamming attack, alternate routing strategies are proposed to avoid the DoS attack over the wireless medium, so that a secure data transfer can be sustained even in the presence of jamming. We evaluate the proposed technique on a secure WiNoC in the presence of DoS attacks. It has been observed that with the proposed defense mechanisms, WiNoC can outperform a wired NoC even in presence of attacks in terms of performance and security. On an average, 99.87% attack detection was achieved with the chosen ML Classifiers. A bandwidth degradation of \textbackslashtextless;3% is experienced in the event of internal attack, while the wireless interconnects are disabled in the presence of an external attacker.
Kenarangi, Farid, Partin-Vaisband, Inna.  2019.  Security Network On-Chip for Mitigating Side-Channel Attacks. 2019 ACM/IEEE International Workshop on System Level Interconnect Prediction (SLIP). :1–6.
Hardware security is a critical concern in design and fabrication of integrated circuits (ICs). Contemporary hardware threats comprise tens of advance invasive and non-invasive attacks for compromising security of modern ICs. Numerous attack-specific countermeasures against the individual threats have been proposed, trading power, area, speed, and design complexity of a system for security. These typical overheads combined with strict performance requirements in advanced technology nodes and high complexity of modern ICs often make the codesign of multiple countermeasures impractical. In this paper, on-chip distribution networks are exploited for detecting those hardware security threats that require non-invasive, yet physical interaction with an operating device-under-attack (e.g., measuring equipment for collecting sensitive information in side-channel attacks). With the proposed approach, the effect of the malicious physical interference with the device-under-attack is captured in the form of on-chip voltage variations and utilized for detecting malicious activity in the compromised device. A machine learning (ML) security IC is trained to predict system security based on sensed variations of signals within on-chip distribution networks. The trained ML ICs are distributed on-chip, yielding a robust and high-confidence security network on-chip. To halt an active attack, a variety of desired counteractions can be executed in a cost-effective manner upon the attack detection. The applicability and effectiveness of these security networks is demonstrated in this paper with respect to power, timing, and electromagnetic analysis attacks.
Portolan, Michele, Savino, Alessandro, Leveugle, Regis, Di Carlo, Stefano, Bosio, Alberto, Di Natale, Giorgio.  2019.  Alternatives to Fault Injections for Early Safety/Security Evaluations. 2019 IEEE European Test Symposium (ETS). :1–10.
Functional Safety standards like ISO 26262 require a detailed analysis of the dependability of components subjected to perturbations. Radiation testing or even much more abstract RTL fault injection campaigns are costly and complex to set up especially for SoCs and Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) comprising intertwined hardware and software. Moreover, some approaches are only applicable at the very end of the development cycle, making potential iterations difficult when market pressure and cost reduction are paramount. In this tutorial, we present a summary of classical state-of-the-art approaches, then alternative approaches for the dependability analysis that can give an early yet accurate estimation of the safety or security characteristics of HW-SW systems. Designers can rely on these tools to identify issues in their design to be addressed by protection mechanisms, ensuring that system dependability constraints are met with limited risk when subjected later to usual fault injections and to e.g., radiation testing or laser attacks for certification.
Nejat, Arash, Kazemi, Zahra, Beroulle, Vincent, Hely, David, Fazeli, Mahdi.  2019.  Restricting Switching Activity Using Logic Locking to Improve Power Analysis-Based Trojan Detection. 2019 IEEE 4th International Verification and Security Workshop (IVSW). :49–54.

Nowadays due to economic reasons most of the semiconductor companies prefer to outsource the manufacturing part of their designs to third fabrication foundries, the so-called fabs. Untrustworthy fabs can extract circuit blocks, the called intellectual properties (IPs), from the layouts and then pirate them. Such fabs are suspected of hardware Trojan (HT) threat in which malicious circuits are added to the layouts for sabotage objectives. HTs lead up to increase power consumption in HT-infected circuits. However, due to process variations, the power of HTs including few gates in million-gate circuits is not detectable in power consumption analysis (PCA). Thus, such circuits should be considered as a collection of small sub-circuits, and PCA must be individually performed for each one of them. In this article, we introduce an approach facilitating PCA-based HT detection methods. Concerning this approach, we propose a new logic locking method and algorithm. Logic locking methods and algorithm are usually employed against IP piracy. They modify circuits such that they do not correctly work without applying a correct key to. Our experiments at the gate level and post-synthesis show that the proposed locking method and algorithm increase the proportion of HT activity and consequently HT power to circuit power.

De, Asmit, Basu, Aditya, Ghosh, Swaroop, Jaeger, Trent.  2019.  FIXER: Flow Integrity Extensions for Embedded RISC-V. 2019 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE). :348–353.
With the recent proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) and embedded devices, there is a growing need to develop a security framework to protect such devices. RISC-V is a promising open source architecture that targets low-power embedded devices and SoCs. However, there is a dearth of practical and low-overhead security solutions in the RISC-V architecture. Programs compiled using RISC-V toolchains are still vulnerable to code injection and code reuse attacks such as buffer overflow and return-oriented programming (ROP). In this paper, we propose FIXER, a hardware implemented security extension to RISC-V that provides a defense mechanism against such attacks. FIXER enforces fine-grained control-flow integrity (CFI) of running programs on backward edges (returns) and forward edges (calls) without requiring any architectural modifications to the RISC-V processor core. We implement FIXER on RocketChip, a RISC-V SoC platform, by leveraging the integrated Rocket Custom Coprocessor (RoCC) to detect and prevent attacks. Compared to existing software based solutions, FIXER reduces energy overhead by 60% at minimal execution time (1.5%) and area (2.9%) overheads.