Visible to the public Cyber Attacks in Cyber-Physical Power Systems: A Case Study with GPRS-Based SCADA Systems

TitleCyber Attacks in Cyber-Physical Power Systems: A Case Study with GPRS-Based SCADA Systems
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2017
AuthorsZhang, T., Wang, Y., Liang, X., Zhuang, Z., Xu, W.
Conference Name2017 29th Chinese Control And Decision Conference (CCDC)
ISBN Number978-1-5090-4657-7
Keywordsauthentication, Base stations, Cascading Failures, cellular radio, complex CPPS, complex cyber physical power system, composability, compositionality, Cyber Attacks, cyber-attacks, Cyber-physical power system (CPPS), DoS attacks, DTU, general packet radio service, GPRS, GPRS-based SCADA systems, Ground penetrating radar, IEEE 9-node system, Internet, message spoofing attacks, Metrics, packet radio networks, power engineering computing, power grid efficiency, power grid system, power grid vulnerability analysis, power grids, power system faults, power system reliability, power system security, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, SCADA, SCADA systems, security of data

With the integration of computing, communication, and physical processes, the modern power grid is becoming a large and complex cyber physical power system (CPPS). This trend is intended to modernize and improve the efficiency of the power grid, yet it makes the CPPS vulnerable to potential cascading failures caused by cyber-attacks, e.g., the attacks that are originated by the cyber network of CPPS. To prevent these risks, it is essential to analyze how cyber-attacks can be conducted against the CPPS and how they can affect the power systems. In light of that General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) has been widely used in CPPS, this paper provides a case study by examining possible cyber-attacks against the cyber-physical power systems with GPRS-based SCADA system. We analyze the vulnerabilities of GPRS-based SCADA systems and focus on DoS attacks and message spoofing attacks. Furthermore, we show the consequence of these attacks against power systems by a simulation using the IEEE 9-node system, and the results show the validity of cascading failures propagated through the systems under our proposed attacks.

Citation Keyzhang_cyber_2017