Visible to the public Investigating and securing communications in the Controller Area Network (CAN)

TitleInvestigating and securing communications in the Controller Area Network (CAN)
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2017
AuthorsKing, Z., Yu, Shucheng
Conference Name2017 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC)
Keywordsauthentication, automobile, automobiles, broadcast communication, broadcast communications network, CAN, CAN bus nodes, CAN protocol security features, CAN-related systems, communication security, computer network security, Conferences, controller area network, controller area network security, controller area networks, denial-of-service attacks, DoS attacks, field buses, light emitting diodes, message authentication, Network, Protocols, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, security, standard communication network, telecommunication computing, telecommunication networks
AbstractThe Controller Area Network (CAN) is a broadcast communications network invented by Robert Bosch GmbH in 1986. CAN is the standard communication network found in automobiles, industry equipment, and many space applications. To be used in these environments, CAN is designed for efficiency and reliability, rather than security. This research paper closely examines the security risks within the CAN protocol and proposes a feasible solution. In this research, we investigate the problems with implementing certain security features in the CAN protocol, such as message authentication and protections against replay and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. We identify the restrictions of the CAN bus, and we demonstrate how our proposed implementation meets these restrictions. Many previously proposed solutions lack security, feasibility, and/or efficiency; however, a solution must not drastically hinder the real-time operation speed of the network. The solution proposed in this research is tested with a simulative CAN environment. This paper proposes an alteration to the standard CAN bus nodes and the CAN protocol to better protect automobiles and other CAN-related systems from attacks.
Citation Keyking_investigating_2017