Visible to the public Side Channels in Deduplication: Trade-offs Between Leakage and Efficiency

TitleSide Channels in Deduplication: Trade-offs Between Leakage and Efficiency
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2017
AuthorsArmknecht, Frederik, Boyd, Colin, Davies, Gareth T., Gjøsteen, Kristian, Toorani, Mohsen
Conference NameProceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Conference LocationNew York, NY, USA
ISBN Number978-1-4503-4944-4
Keywordscloud storage, composability, Data Sanitization, Deduplication, Human Behavior, human factors, privacy, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, side-channel analysis
AbstractDeduplication removes redundant copies of files or data blocks stored on the cloud. Client-side deduplication, where the client only uploads the file upon the request of the server, provides major storage and bandwidth savings, but introduces a number of security concerns. Harnik et al. (2010) showed how cross-user client-side deduplication inherently gives the adversary access to a (noisy) side-channel that may divulge whether or not a particular file is stored on the server, leading to leakage of user information. We provide formal definitions for deduplication strategies and their security in terms of adversarial advantage. Using these definitions, we provide a criterion for designing good strategies and then prove a bound characterizing the necessary trade-off between security and efficiency.
Citation Keyarmknecht_side_2017