Visible to the public A Cooperative Game for Online Cloud Federation Formation Based on Security Risk Assessment

TitleA Cooperative Game for Online Cloud Federation Formation Based on Security Risk Assessment
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsHalabi, T., Bellaiche, M., Abusitta, A.
Conference Name2018 5th IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud)/2018 4th IEEE International Conference on Edge Computing and Scalable Cloud (EdgeCom)
Keywordscloud computing, cloud environments, cloud federation, Cloud federation formation model, Cloud federation formation process, Cloud federations, Cloud Security, cloud service providers, coalitional game, Computational modeling, cooperative game, federated Cloud service, federation formation algorithm, game theoretic security, game theory, Games, hedonic coalitional game, human factors, insecure CSPs, Metrics, online Cloud federation formation, pubcrawl, quality of service, risk management, Scalability, security, security of data, security risk assessment, security risk avoidance, security risk levels, undesirable CSPs

Cloud federations allow Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) to deliver more efficient service performance by interconnecting their Cloud environments and sharing their resources. However, the security of the federated Cloud service could be compromised if the resources are shared with relatively insecure and unreliable CSPs. In this paper, we propose a Cloud federation formation model that considers the security risk levels of CSPs. We start by quantifying the security risk of CSPs according to well defined evaluation criteria related to security risk avoidance and mitigation, then we model the Cloud federation formation process as a hedonic coalitional game with a preference relation that is based on the security risk levels and reputations of CSPs. We propose a federation formation algorithm that enables CSPs to cooperate while considering the security risk introduced to their infrastructures, and refrain from cooperating with undesirable CSPs. According to the stability-based solution concepts that we use to evaluate the game, the model shows that CSPs will be able to form acceptable federations on the fly to service incoming resource provisioning requests whenever required.

Citation Keyhalabi_cooperative_2018