Visible to the public Survey on Cryptanalysis of Code-Based Cryptography: From Theoretical to Physical Attacks

TitleSurvey on Cryptanalysis of Code-Based Cryptography: From Theoretical to Physical Attacks
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsDr\u agoi, V., Richmond, T., Bucerzan, D., Legay, A.
Conference Name2018 7th International Conference on Computers Communications and Control (ICCCC)
Keywordsadequate post-quantum cryptographic schemes, code-based cryptography, coding theory, composability, compositionality, Computers, Decoding, discrete logarithm, elliptic curve, Encryption, linear codes, McEliece scheme, NIST's announcement, number theory, number theory problems, oldest quantum-resistant proposition, physical attacks, polynomial time, polynomials, Post-quantum cryptography, post-quantum standardization, pubcrawl, public key cryptography, public-key cryptography, public-key cryptosystem, quantum computer, quantum cryptography, side-channel analysis, side-channel attacks, strong mathematical background, structural attacks, theoretical cryptography
AbstractNowadays public-key cryptography is based on number theory problems, such as computing the discrete logarithm on an elliptic curve or factoring big integers. Even though these problems are considered difficult to solve with the help of a classical computer, they can be solved in polynomial time on a quantum computer. Which is why the research community proposed alternative solutions that are quantum-resistant. The process of finding adequate post-quantum cryptographic schemes has moved to the next level, right after NIST's announcement for post-quantum standardization. One of the oldest quantum-resistant proposition goes back to McEliece in 1978, who proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on coding theory. It benefits of really efficient algorithms as well as a strong mathematical background. Nonetheless, its security has been challenged many times and several variants were cryptanalyzed. However, some versions remain unbroken. In this paper, we propose to give some background on coding theory in order to present some of the main flawless in the protocols. We analyze the existing side-channel attacks and give some recommendations on how to securely implement the most suitable variants. We also detail some structural attacks and potential drawbacks for new variants.
Citation Keydragoi_survey_2018