Visible to the public Variation-Aware Hardware Trojan Detection through Power Side-Channel

TitleVariation-Aware Hardware Trojan Detection through Power Side-Channel
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsHossain, F. S., Shintani, M., Inoue, M., Orailoglu, A.
Conference Name2018 IEEE International Test Conference (ITC)
Date Publishedoct
ISBN Number978-1-5386-8382-8
KeywordsClock-tree Partition, Clocks, cryptography, Detectability, Detection sensitivity, Equal-power Partition, fine-grain circuit partitioning, Hardware, hardware trojan, HT activation chances, HT detection sensitivity, integrated circuit testing, integrated circuits, integrated logic circuits, invasive software, logic design, outsourcing, Power demand, power side-channel, process variation, pubcrawl, Sensitivity, side-channel analysis, trojan horse detection, Trojan horses, Trojan-to-circuit power consumption, variation-aware hardware Trojan detection

A hardware Trojan (HT) denotes the malicious addition or modification of circuit elements. The purpose of this work is to improve the HT detection sensitivity in ICs using power side-channel analysis. This paper presents three detection techniques in power based side-channel analysis by increasing Trojan-to-circuit power consumption and reducing the variation effect in the detection threshold. Incorporating the three proposed methods has demonstrated that a realistic fine-grain circuit partitioning and an improved pattern set to increase HT activation chances can magnify Trojan detectability.

Citation Keyhossain_variation-aware_2018