Visible to the public Variation-Aware Hardware Trojan Detection through Power Side-Channel

TitleVariation-Aware Hardware Trojan Detection through Power Side-Channel
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsHossain, F. S., Shintani, M., Inoue, M., Orailoglu, A.
Conference Name2018 IEEE International Test Conference (ITC)
Date Publishedoct
KeywordsClock-tree Partition, Clocks, cryptography, Detectability, Detection sensitivity, Equal-power Partition, fine-grain circuit partitioning, Hardware, hardware trojan, HT activation chances, HT detection sensitivity, integrated circuit testing, integrated circuits, integrated logic circuits, invasive software, logic design, outsourcing, Power demand, power side-channel, process variation, pubcrawl, Sensitivity, side-channel analysis, trojan horse detection, Trojan horses, Trojan-to-circuit power consumption, variation-aware hardware Trojan detection
AbstractA hardware Trojan (HT) denotes the malicious addition or modification of circuit elements. The purpose of this work is to improve the HT detection sensitivity in ICs using power side-channel analysis. This paper presents three detection techniques in power based side-channel analysis by increasing Trojan-to-circuit power consumption and reducing the variation effect in the detection threshold. Incorporating the three proposed methods has demonstrated that a realistic fine-grain circuit partitioning and an improved pattern set to increase HT activation chances can magnify Trojan detectability.
DOI10.1109/TEST.2018.8624866
Citation Keyhossain_variation-aware_2018