Visible to the public Tor Browser Forensics in Exploring Invisible Evidence

TitleTor Browser Forensics in Exploring Invisible Evidence
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsHuang, M. Chiu, Wan, Y., Chiang, C., Wang, S.
Conference Name2018 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC)
Keywordsbrowser security, Browsers, compositionality, Computer crime, cryptography, DH-HEMTs, digital evidence, digital forensics, endeavors, Facebook, Forensics, Human Behavior, incognito, information security incidents, information security offenses, Internet, Internet crimes, invisible evidence, Metrics, onion router, onion routing, online front-ends, perpetrators, pubcrawl, Relays, resilience, Resiliency, Tools, Tor, Tor browser forensics
AbstractGiven the high frequency of information security incidents, feeling that we may soon become innocent victims of these events may be justified. Perpetrators of information security offenses take advantage of several methods to leave no evidence of their crimes, and this pattern of hiding tracks has caused difficulties for investigators searching for digital evidence. Use of the onion router (Tor) is a common way for criminals to conceal their identities and tracks. This paper aims to explain the composition and operation of onion routing; we conduct a forensic experiment to detect the use of the Tor browser and compare several browser modes, including incognito and normal. Through the experimental method described in this paper, investigators can learn to identify perpetrators of Internet crimes, which will be helpful in future endeavors in digital forensics.
Citation Keyhuang_tor_2018