Visible to the public FPGA-oriented moving target defense against security threats from malicious FPGA tools

TitleFPGA-oriented moving target defense against security threats from malicious FPGA tools
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2018
AuthorsZhang, Z., Yu, Q., Njilla, L., Kamhoua, C.
Conference Name2018 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)
KeywordsBenchmark testing, defense lines, field programmable gate arrays, FOMTD, FPGA, FPGA configuration, FPGA design suite, FPGA emulation results, FPGA hardware-software providers, FPGA security, FPGA users, FPGA-oriented MTD method, Hardware, hardware security, hardware trojan, malicious FPGA tools, moving target defense, moving target defense principle, Predictive Metrics, pubcrawl, Resiliency, reverse engineering, Scalability, security, security of data, security threats, Table lookup, target defense, Trojan horses, Xilinx
AbstractThe imbalance relationship between FPGA hardware/software providers and FPGA users challenges the assurance of secure design on FPGAs. Existing efforts on FPGA security primarily focus on reverse engineering the downloaded FPGA configuration, retrieving the authentication code or crypto key stored on the embedded memory in FPGAs, and countermeasures for the security threats above. In this work, we investigate new security threats from malicious FPGA tools, and identify stealthy attacks that could occur during FPGA deployment. To address those attacks, we exploit the principles of moving target defense (MTD) and propose a FPGA-oriented MTD (FOMTD) method. Our method is composed of three defense lines, which are formed by an improved user constraint file, random selection of design replicas, and runtime submodule assembling, respectively. The FPGA emulation results show that the proposed FOMTD method reduces the hardware Trojan hit rate by 60% over the baseline, at the cost of 10.76% more power consumption.
Citation Keyzhang_fpga-oriented_2018