Visible to the public Fault Tolerance and Security in Forwarding Packets Using Game Theory

TitleFault Tolerance and Security in Forwarding Packets Using Game Theory
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2009
AuthorsChen, Jing, Du, Ruiying
Conference Name2009 International Conference on Multimedia Information Networking and Security
KeywordsAd hoc networks, cooperation stimulation, cooperation strategy, Fault tolerance, forwarding packet fault tolerance, forwarding packet security, game theoretic security, game theory, human factors, Mesh networks, Nash equilibrium, Predictive Metrics, price of anarchy, pubcrawl, radio networks, Relays, Scalability, security, self organized wireless network, telecommunication network reliability, telecommunication security, Waste materials, wireless mesh networks, wireless networks, Wireless sensor networks
AbstractIn self-organized wireless network, such as ad hoc network, sensor network or mesh network, nodes are independent individuals which have different benefit; Therefore, selfish nodes refuse to forward packets for other nodes in order to save energy which causes the network fault. At the same time, some nodes may be malicious, whose aim is to damage the network. In this paper, we analyze the cooperation stimulation and security in self-organized wireless networks under a game theoretic framework. We first analyze a four node wireless network in which nodes share the channel by relaying for others during its idle periods in order to help the other nodes, each node has to use a part of its available channel capacity. And then, the fault tolerance and security problem is modeled as a non-cooperative game in which each player maximizes its own utility function. The goal of the game is to maximize the utility function in the giving condition in order to get better network efficiency. At last, for characterizing the efficiency of Nash equilibria, we analyze the so called price of anarchy, as the ratio between the objective function at the worst Nash equilibrium and the optimal objective function. Our results show that the players can get the biggest payoff if they obey cooperation strategy.
Citation Keychen_fault_2009