Visible to the public Hardware-Oriented Algebraic Fault Attack Framework with Multiple Fault Injection Support

TitleHardware-Oriented Algebraic Fault Attack Framework with Multiple Fault Injection Support
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsGay, Maël, Paxian, Tobias, Upadhyaya, Devanshi, Becker, Bernd, Polian, Ilia
Conference Name2019 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)
Keywordsactual implementation, algebra, algebraic equations, algebraic fault attack tool, Analytical models, Cipher, cipher implementations, Ciphers, Circuit faults, conjunctive normal form clauses, cryptography, Fault injction attack, fault injector, field programmable gate arrays, field-programmable gate array platform, Framework, Hardware, hardware-oriented algebraic fault attack framework, hardware-oriented framework, hardware-oriented structural cipher descriptions, idealized fault models, Integrated circuit modeling, lightweight block ciphers, Lightweight Ciphers, Mathematical model, multiple fault injection support, Post /Pre silicon analysis, pubcrawl, Resiliency, Scalability, security-critical hardware implementations, Tools

The evaluation of fault attacks on security-critical hardware implementations of cryptographic primitives is an important concern. In such regards, we have created a framework for automated construction of fault attacks on hardware realization of ciphers. The framework can be used to quickly evaluate any cipher implementations, including any optimisations. It takes the circuit description of the cipher and the fault model as input. The output of the framework is a set of algebraic equations, such as conjunctive normal form (CNF) clauses, which is then fed to a SAT solver. We consider both attacking an actual implementation of a cipher on an field-programmable gate array (FPGA) platform using a fault injector and the evaluation of an early design of the cipher using idealized fault models. We report the successful application of our hardware-oriented framework to a collection of ciphers, including the advanced encryption standard (AES), and the lightweight block ciphers LED and PRESENT. The corresponding results and a discussion of the impact to different fault models on our framework are shown. Moreover, we report significant improvements compared to similar frameworks, such as speedups or more advanced features. Our framework is the first algebraic fault attack (AFA) tool to evaluate the state-of-the art cipher LED-64, PRESENT and full-scale AES using only hardware-oriented structural cipher descriptions.

Citation Keygay_hardware-oriented_2019