Visible to the public A Strategic Analysis of Attacker-Defender Repeated Game in Smart Grid Security

TitleA Strategic Analysis of Attacker-Defender Repeated Game in Smart Grid Security
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsPaul, Shuva, Ni, Zhen
Conference Name2019 IEEE Power Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT)
Keywordsand budget limitation, attack-defense budget, attacker-defender game, attacker-defender interaction, attacker-defender repeated game, attacker-defender strategic interaction, cyber control, cyber-physical attacks, Cyber-physical systems, game payoffs calculation, game theoretic approach, game theoretic security, game theory, Games, generation power, human factors, IEEE 39 bus benchmark system, Mathematical model, Metrics, Monitoring, Monitoring tools, optimal strategic behavior, power engineering computing, power grid security schemes, power system, power system security, power transmission lines, Predictive Metrics, privacy, pubcrawl, Repeated game, Resiliency, Scalability, security, security of data, smart grid security, Smart grids, smart power grid, smart power grids, strategic analysis

Traditional power grid security schemes are being replaced by highly advanced and efficient smart security schemes due to the advancement in grid structure and inclusion of cyber control and monitoring tools. Smart attackers create physical, cyber, or cyber-physical attacks to gain the access of the power system and manipulate/override system status, measurements and commands. In this paper, we formulate the environment for the attacker-defender interaction in the smart power grid. We provide a strategic analysis of the attacker-defender strategic interaction using a game theoretic approach. We apply repeated game to formulate the problem, implement it in the power system, and investigate for optimal strategic behavior in terms of mixed strategies of the players. In order to define the utility or cost function for the game payoffs calculation, generation power is used. Attack-defense budget is also incorporated with the attacker-defender repeated game to reflect a more realistic scenario. The proposed game model is validated using IEEE 39 bus benchmark system. A comparison between the proposed game model and the all monitoring model is provided to validate the observations.

Citation Keypaul_strategic_2019