Visible to the public Incentive Contract for Cybersecurity Information Sharing Considering Monitoring Signals

TitleIncentive Contract for Cybersecurity Information Sharing Considering Monitoring Signals
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsYang, Yunxue, Ji, Guohua, Yang, Zhenqi, Xue, Shengjun
Conference Name2019 International Conference on Internet of Things (iThings) and IEEE Green Computing and Communications (GreenCom) and IEEE Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom) and IEEE Smart Data (SmartData)
Date Publishedjul
KeywordsCollaboration, composability, computer security, contracts, cyber insurance, cyber risk transfer, cybersecurity information haring, cybersecurity information sharing, Environment monitoring, Ethics, Human Behavior, incentive contract, incentive mechanism, Incentive Model, Information management, information sharing output, Insurance, Metrics, Monitoring, monitoring signals, moral hazard, Policy-Governed Secure Collaboration, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, risk management, Scalability, science of security, security of data
AbstractCyber insurance is a viable method for cyber risk transfer. However, the cyber insurance faces critical challenges, the most important of which is lack of statistical data. In this paper, we proposed an incentive model considering monitoring signals for cybersecurity information haring based on the principal-agent theory. We studied the effect of monitoring signals on increasing the rationality of the incentive contract and reducing moral hazard in the process of cybersecurity information sharing, and analyzed factors influencing the effectiveness of the incentive contract. We show that by introducing monitoring signals, the insurer can collect more information about the effort level of the insured, and encourage the insured to share cybersecurity information based on the information sharing output and monitoring signals of the effort level, which can not only reduce the blindness of incentive to the insured in the process of cybersecurity information sharing, but also reduce moral hazard.
Citation Keyyang_incentive_2019