Visible to the public Data Injection Attack Against Electronic Devices With Locally Weakened Immunity Using a Hardware Trojan

TitleData Injection Attack Against Electronic Devices With Locally Weakened Immunity Using a Hardware Trojan
Publication TypeJournal Article
Year of Publication2019
AuthorsKaji, Shugo, Kinugawa, Masahiro, Fujimoto, Daisuke, Hayashi, Yu-ichi
JournalIEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility
Keywordsattack targets, command injection attacks, communication channel, Communication channels, composability, data injection attack, device availability reduction, device immunity, electrical signal, electromagnetic changes, electromagnetic interference, Electromagnetic scattering, electromagnetic waves, Electromagnetics, electronic devices, fault injection, Hardware, hardware trojan, high-power electromagnetic environments, IEMI, Immunity testing, information and communication devices, integrated circuit reliability, integrated circuits, intentional electromagnetic interference, local immunity, locally weakened immunity, low-tolerance IC, low-tolerance integrated circuits, Metrics, pubcrawl, resilience, Resiliency, security of data, serial communication systems, telecommunication channels, telecommunication security
AbstractIntentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) of information and communication devices is based on high-power electromagnetic environments far exceeding the device immunity to electromagnetic interference. IEMI dramatically alters the electromagnetic environment throughout the device by interfering with the electromagnetic waves inside the device and destroying low-tolerance integrated circuits (ICs) and other elements, thereby reducing the availability of the device. In contrast, in this study, by using a hardware Trojan (HT) that is quickly mountable by physically accessing the devices, to locally weaken the immunity of devices, and then irradiating electromagnetic waves of a specific frequency, only the attack targets are intentionally altered electromagnetically. Therefore, we propose a method that uses these electromagnetic changes to rewrite or generate data and commands handled within devices. Specifically, targeting serial communication systems used inside and outside the devices, the installation of an HT on the communication channel weakens local immunity. This shows that it is possible to generate an electrical signal representing arbitrary data on the communication channel by applying electromagnetic waves of sufficiently small output compared with the conventional IEMI and letting the IC process the data. In addition, we explore methods for countering such attacks.
Citation Keykaji_data_2019