Visible to the public Adversary Model for Attacks Against IEC 61850 Real-Time Communication Protocols

TitleAdversary Model for Attacks Against IEC 61850 Real-Time Communication Protocols
Publication TypeConference Paper
Year of Publication2020
AuthorsNweke, L. O., Weldehawaryat, G. Kahsay, Wolthusen, S. D.
Conference Name2020 16th International Conference on the Design of Reliable Communication Networks DRCN 2020
Date PublishedMarch 2020
ISBN Number978-1-7281-6300-0
Keywordsadversary model, Adversary Models, Calculus, Communication networks, computer network security, cryptographic protocols, distributed processing, generic object oriented substation events and sampled value protocols, GOOSE/SV protocols, Human Behavior, IEC 61850, IEC 61850 real-time communication protocols, IEC standards, IEEE/IEC 61850 standard, Metrics, Network topology, Object oriented modeling, pi calculus, power engineering computing, Power system protection, power utility automation, Protocols, pubcrawl, QoS, quality of service, quality of services, Real-time communication protocols, Real-time Systems, resilience, Resiliency, Scalability, security, substation automation, telecommunication network topology, π-calculus process algebraic formalism

Adversarial models are well-established for cryptographic protocols, but distributed real-time protocols have requirements that these abstractions are not intended to cover. The IEEE/IEC 61850 standard for communication networks and systems for power utility automation in particular not only requires distributed processing, but in case of the generic object oriented substation events and sampled value (GOOSE/SV) protocols also hard real-time characteristics. This motivates the desire to include both quality of service (QoS) and explicit network topology in an adversary model based on a p-calculus process algebraic formalism based on earlier work. This allows reasoning over process states, placement of adversarial entities and communication behaviour. We demonstrate the use of our model for the simple case of a replay attack against the publish/subscribe GOOSE/SV subprotocol, showing bounds for non-detectability of such an attack.

Citation Keynweke_adversary_2020