Search Projects: Group Project, May, 2018

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Visible to the public CT-M: Realizing Verifiable Security Properties on Untrusted Computing Platforms

This project is motivated by the fundamental question of whether it is possible to achieve verifiable end-to-end security properties by adding suitable security mechanisms on top of commercially available applications executing on an untrusted computing platform. A concrete example of such a scenario is provided by a user interacting with a bank's web server using a web browser running SSL.

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Visible to the public CT-ISG: An Architecture and Policies for Secure Network-facing Applications

The near ubiquity of Internet access has put a wealth of information and ever-increasing opportunities for social interaction at the fingertips of users. Driving this revolution is the modern web browser, which has evolved from a relatively simple client application designed to display static data into a complex networked operating system tasked with managing many facets of a users online experience. Support for dynamic content, multimedia data, and third-party plug-ins has greatly enriched users experiences at the cost of increasing the complexity of the browser itself.

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Visible to the public CT-T: Proactive Techniques for Preserving System Integrity: A Basis for Robust Defense Against Malware

Cyber threats have escalated rapidly over the past decade. "Zero-day attacks" have become significant, delivered increasingly through seemingly innocuous means such as web pages, images, and documents. Malware is rampant, being installed surreptitiously on millions of computers around the world using a combination of spam, phishing, malicious shareware and freeware. Today's defenses use techniques such as signature-based scanning and file integrity monitoring to detect the presence of malware, and then remove them.

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Visible to the public CT-ISG: Usable Cyber Trust Indicators

When systems rely on a "human in the loop" to carry out a security-critical function, cyber trust indicators are often employed to communicate when and how to perform that function. Indicators typically serve as warnings or status indicators that communicate information, remind users of information previously communicated, and influence behavior. They include a variety of security- and privacy-related symbols in the operating system status bar or browser chrome, pop-up alerts, security control panels, or symbols embedded in web content.

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Visible to the public CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Router Models and Downscaling Tools for Scalable Security Experiments

It is critical to protect the Internet from attacks such as denial of service, and attacks on inter-domain routing. Although several defenses have been proposed, actual deployments have been limited. A primary reason for this lack of deployment is that most defenses have not been validated under realistic conditions, or at sufficiently large scales. Many attacks also have second-order effects that are not well understood. This is because it is difficult to incorporate all the protocols involved at any reasonable scale in analytical, simulation, or emulation models or testbeds.

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Visible to the public CT-ISG: New Security Properties for Hash and Trapdoor Functions

The project aims at studying properties of hash and trapdoor functions that are motivated by practical applications and are implicitly held by the random oracles or easy to realize in the idealistic random oracle model. But, are not well-defined and/or not known to be realizable in the standard model. In particular, the research studies non-malleable hash functions and (possibly trapdoor) functions that hide partial information. The project investigates the new appropriate notions of security for these primitives and seeks constructions that probably meet the security definitions.

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Visible to the public CT-M: Hardware Containers for Software Components - Detection and Recovery at the Hardware/Software Interface

This project focuses on hardware features to improve the security of software systems. By refining the coarse-grained protections available in today's architectures, the project will aim to protect the integrity of individual software objects or components. The hardware mechanisms force tight controls on the execution of software components, which programmers can define to be as large as entire applications or as small as individual objects. The goal is to rapidly detect and also recover from attacks that improperly access memory or take over the CPU.

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Visible to the public CT-M: Collaborative Research: A Resilient Real-Time System for a Secure and Reconfigurable Power Grid

Energy infrastructure is a critical underpinning of modern society that any compromise or sabotage of its secure and reliable operation will have a prominent impact on people's daily lives and the national economy. Past failures such as the massive northeastern power blackout in August 2003 and the recent Florida blackout in February 2008 have revealed serious defects in both system-level management and device-level designs.

group_project

Visible to the public CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Router Models and Downscaling Tools for Scalable Security Experiments

It is critical to protect the Internet from attacks such as denial of service, and attacks on inter-domain routing. Although several defenses have been proposed, actual deployments have been limited. A primary reason for this lack of deployment is that most defenses have not been validated under realistic conditions, or at sufficiently large scales. Many attacks also have second-order effects that are not well understood. This is because it is difficult to incorporate all the protocols involved at any reasonable scale in analytical, simulation, or emulation models or testbeds.

group_project

Visible to the public CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Router Models and Downscaling Tools

It is critical to protect the Internet from attacks such as denial of service, and attacks on inter-domain routing. Although several defenses have been proposed, actual deployments have been limited. A primary reason for this lack of deployment is that most defenses have not been validated under realistic conditions, or at sufficiently large scales. Many attacks also have second-order effects that are not well understood. This is because it is difficult to incorporate all the protocols involved at any reasonable scale in analytical, simulation, or emulation models or testbeds.