Search Projects: Group Project, 28 May 2018

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Visible to the public CT-M: Hardware Containers for Software Components - Detection and Recovery at the Hardware/Software Interface

This project focuses on hardware features to improve the security of software systems. By refining the coarse-grained protections available in today's architectures, the project will aim to protect the integrity of individual software objects or components. The hardware mechanisms force tight controls on the execution of software components, which programmers can define to be as large as entire applications or as small as individual objects. The goal is to rapidly detect and also recover from attacks that improperly access memory or take over the CPU.

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Visible to the public CT-M: Collaborative Research: A Resilient Real-Time System for a Secure and Reconfigurable Power Grid

Energy infrastructure is a critical underpinning of modern society that any compromise or sabotage of its secure and reliable operation will have a prominent impact on people's daily lives and the national economy. Past failures such as the massive northeastern power blackout in August 2003 and the recent Florida blackout in February 2008 have revealed serious defects in both system-level management and device-level designs.

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Visible to the public CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Router Models and Downscaling Tools for Scalable Security Experiments

It is critical to protect the Internet from attacks such as denial of service, and attacks on inter-domain routing. Although several defenses have been proposed, actual deployments have been limited. A primary reason for this lack of deployment is that most defenses have not been validated under realistic conditions, or at sufficiently large scales. Many attacks also have second-order effects that are not well understood. This is because it is difficult to incorporate all the protocols involved at any reasonable scale in analytical, simulation, or emulation models or testbeds.

group_project

Visible to the public CT-ISG: Collaborative Research: Router Models and Downscaling Tools

It is critical to protect the Internet from attacks such as denial of service, and attacks on inter-domain routing. Although several defenses have been proposed, actual deployments have been limited. A primary reason for this lack of deployment is that most defenses have not been validated under realistic conditions, or at sufficiently large scales. Many attacks also have second-order effects that are not well understood. This is because it is difficult to incorporate all the protocols involved at any reasonable scale in analytical, simulation, or emulation models or testbeds.

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Visible to the public CT-ISG: The Origin of the Code: Automated Identification of Common Characteristics in Malware

Software is a common target of attacks on the current computing / communications infrastructure. Software continues to be vulnerable to attacks that exploit obscure or misunderstood language and program features. Detection of these software exploits (also called "malware") will therefore be needed for the forseeable future as one part of an effective defense. Virus checkers detect many known exploits, and are now widely used, but attackers have adapted by obfuscating and mutating their code to evade virus checkers.

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Visible to the public CT-ISG Collaborative Research: Tamper Proofing Cryptographic Operations

This research project focuses on the development of cryptographic mathematical models and constructions that address realistic security requirements at the implementation level. This is a fundamental problem as cryptographic security formalisms are often criticized for lack of relevance given the wide range of attacks available at the implementation level.

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Visible to the public CT-ISG: New Foundations for Quantitative Information Flow

Protecting the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information is central to trustworthy computing. This project focuses on one aspect of the problem, namely, the difficulty of developing software that satisfies critical information flow properties. The approach of secure information flow analysis is to do a static analysis, usually in the form of a type system, on a program prior to executing it, with the goal of proving that it does not leak any information from its high inputs to its low outputs; this is formalized as a property called noninterference.

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Visible to the public Collaborative Research: CT-M: Privacy, Compliance and Information Risk in Complex Organizational Processes

Modern organizations, such as businesses, non-profits, government agencies, and universities, collect and use personal information from a range of sources, shared with specific expectations about how it will be managed and used. Accordingly, they must find ways to comply with expectations, which may be complex and varied, as well as with relevant privacy laws and regulations, while they minimize operational risk and carry out core functions of the organization efficiently and effectively.

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Visible to the public Collaborative Research; CT-M: Computer Systems Vulnerabilities and the Efficacy of Defensive Mechanisms

Longitudinal studies of network systems are very difficult to conduct when systems are large, heterogeneous, highly interconnected, and open; yet, the importance of these studies cannot be underestimated. This project focuses on an 18-month longitudinal study on server-side vulnerabilities in the campus network of the University of California at San Diego and on client-side vulnerabilities the University of California at Davis.

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Visible to the public Collaborative Research: CT-M: Understanding and Exploiting Economic Incentives in Internet-based Scams

Computer security is a field in which defenses are pitted against adversaries. Thus, it is critical to understand the capabilities and motivations of the adversary if one is to plan effective defenses. However, modern Internet-based attacks are largely driven by economic factors that are only understood in the abstract. While we know that it is sufficiently cheap to compromise Internet hosts that large-scale botnets have become a compelling platform for launching attacks, we simply do not understand the scale of the revenue that that such activities bring in.