




Risk-Limiting Dynamic Contracts for Direct Load Control

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


Time Line of Electricity Market Operation and Financial Risk



- ▶ Day-ahead market: market-clearing prices & unit commitments
 - ▶ Supply = Forecasted demand
- ▶ Real-time market (RM): balancing instantaneous demand
 - ▶ higher penetration of customers' solar & wind
 - ⇒ higher imbalance fee

Risk-Limiting Dynamic Contracts: Towards Financial Risk-Sharing on Demand Side



- ▶ Key Idea: Direct load control + Contract

Contributions and Features of This Work

- ▶ Contributions:
 - ▶ **Financial risk management** solutions for electricity markets using direct load control
 - ▶ Dynamic contracts with **risk-limiting** capability
 - ▶ Solution method for **mean-variance** constrained-stochastic optimal control via dynamic programming
- ▶ Features:
 - ▶ Risk-limiting capability
 - ▶ Scalability: decoupled optimal contract design
 - ▶ Decentralized control + central monitoring

Risk-Limiting Dynamic Contracts

- ▶ Contract: $(C^i, \{u_t^i\}_{0 \leq t \leq T})$ (Note: they are **schemes!**)
- ▶ For customer i (Payoff: $J_i^A[C^i, u^i]$)
 - ▶ Participation payoff condition:

$$\mathbb{E}[J_i^A[C^i, u^i]] \geq b_i$$

- ▶ **Risk-limiting** condition (risk measure - variance):

$$\text{Var}[J_i^A[C^i, u^i]] \leq S_i$$

- ▶ Mean and Variance can be independently adjusted!

Risk-Limiting Dynamic Contracts (continued)

- ▶ For utility (Payoff: $J^P[C, u]$)

- ▶ Risk-sensitive control

$$\max_{C, u} -\frac{1}{\theta} \log \mathbb{E} [\exp(-\theta J^P[C, u])]$$

$$\text{subject to } dx_t^i = f_i(x_t^i, u_t^i) dt \quad - \text{load dynamics}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[J_i^A[C^i, u^i]] \geq b_i$$

$$\text{Var}[J_i^A[C^i, u^i]] \leq S_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, n$$

- ▶ Penalization of risk ($\theta > 0$: risk-averse decision making)

$$-\frac{1}{\theta} \log \mathbb{E} [\exp(-\theta J^P[C, u])] = \mathbb{E}[J^P[C, u]] - \frac{\theta}{2} \text{Var}[J^P[C, u]] + O(\theta^2)$$

High-Level Description of Proposed Solution Method

- ▶ The risk-limiting condition
= Conditions on the compensation and a new control variable γ_t^i
- ▶ Reformulation of the participation payoff condition:
Introducing a new state y_t^i
(customer's future expected payoff with a modified volatility)
- ▶ Reformulation of the risk-limiting condition:
Introducing a new state z_t^i
(remaining amount of risk that customer i can bear)
- ▶ Dynamic programming
 $\implies n$ decoupled three dimensional Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations

Risk-Limiting Compensation

Theorem (Construction of compensation)

Fix $u^i \in \mathbb{U}^i$ and $\gamma^i \in \Gamma^i$ such that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\int_0^T (\gamma_t^i)^2 dt \right] \leq S_i.$$

The risk-limiting condition holds if and only if the end-time compensation, $C^i \in \mathbb{C}^i$, satisfies

$$C^i = \mathbb{E}[J_i^A[C^i, u^i]] - \int_0^T r_i^A(u_t^i, x_t^i) dt + \int_0^T \gamma_t^i dW_t^i.$$

Risk-Limiting Dynamic Contract Design

► Reformulation:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{u, \gamma, \zeta} \quad & -\frac{1}{\theta} \log \mathbb{E} \left[\exp(-\theta \bar{J}^P[u, \gamma, \zeta]) \right] \\ \text{subject to} \quad & dx_t^i = f_i(x_t^i, u_t^i) dt \\ & dy_t^i = -r_i^A(u_t^i, x_t^i) dt + (\gamma_t^i - \sigma_i^A(t) - \sigma_i(t)) dW_t^i \\ & y_0^i = b_i \\ & dz_t^i = -(\gamma_t^i)^2 dt + \zeta_t^i dW_t^i \\ & z_0^i = S_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, n \end{aligned}$$

- y_t^i : customer's future expected payoff with a modified volatility
- z_t^i : remaining amount of risk that agent can bear

Risk-Limiting Dynamic Contract Design (continued)

Theorem (Optimality)

Let (u^*, γ^*, ζ^*) be the solution to the reformulated problem. Define

$$C^{*i} := y_T^{*i} + \int_0^T \sigma_i(t) dW_t^i,$$

where W^i is the Brownian motion in the agent i 's energy consumption model. If for $i = 1, \dots, n$


$$z_T^{*i} \geq 0,$$

then (C^*, u^*) is an optimal risk-limiting dynamic contract.

Remark:

- ▶ The problem can be decoupled for each agent: [Scalability](#)
- ▶ Solution method: dynamic programming

Practical Implementation: Decentralized Control + Central Monitoring




Minimum infrastructure required for TCL case:

- ▶ Smart meter (\$120)
- ▶ Thermostat (installed in TCL or \$25)
- ▶ Low-latency one-way data connection (Internet)
- ▶ Local controller in which the optimal control scheme in the contract is programmed



Effect of the uncertainty (forecast inaccuracy)

- ▶ Set the participation payoff as customer's optimal value in the case without a contract.
- ▶ R : customer's nominal risk (no contract case)
- ▶ Variance of utility's payoff vs volatility σ



Effect of the uncertainty (forecast inaccuracy)

- ▶ R : customer's nominal risk (no contract case)
- ▶ Variance of utility's payoff vs volatility σ





- ▶ $S \uparrow \implies$ Risk management effectiveness \uparrow

Ongoing & Future Research Directions

- ▶ Risk management solutions for electricity markets
 - ▶ Risk-limiting dynamic contracts for indirect load control
 - ▶ Risk-limiting dispatch + Risk-limiting dynamic contracts
⇒ Ultimate risk management solution for electric grid
- ▶ Scalable combinatorial optimization for control of interacting loads
(with Sam Burden, Ram Rajagopal, Shankar Sastry, Claire Tomlin)
 - ▶ Guaranteed suboptimality bound
 - ▶ Noncooperative aggregators
- ▶ Scalability of implicit sampling in stochastic optimal control
(with Matthias Morzfeld, Claire Tomlin, Alexandre Chorin)

Effect of the uncertainty (forecast inaccuracy)

► Risk-sensitive function of utility's payoff vs volatility σ



- $S \uparrow \implies$ Risk sensitive function of utility's payoff \uparrow
- Very effective under high penetration of renewables