System-Level Design Under Confidentiality and Integrity Constraints

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Content

1. **Goals**
2. Theory: Decentralized Label Model
   - Security types
   - Formal Framework
3. Validation
   - CVRIA – Connected Vehicle Pilot
   - Analysis Architecture
4. Next Steps

What Is Our Goal?

* **The system-level synthesis problem for the "cyber" side of CPS:**
  - Derive specification for the behavior of the system components that will be implemented using networked computing
  - Derive a functional model for the information architecture and componentize the system
  - Select computing/networking platform
  - Derive deployment model assigning components of the information architecture to processing and communication platforms
  - Generate code for software components and derive WCET and WCCT
  - Perform timing analysis
* **Making security part of system-level co-design (correct-by-construction)**
  - Co-design of functionality, performance, timing and security
  - Our goal is to address security requirements as part of the design trades embedded in the system-level design process

Typical System-level Synthesis Steps of Information Architecture



Design Architectures with ideal comp. dynamics

Design Architectures with **deployed comp. dynamics**



- CAN Bus
- TT bus

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

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

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Synthesis Problem

* How to map a logical Information Architecture (components + information flows) on a physical Platform Architecture such that
  - Functional requirements (the information architecture)
  - Performance requirements (timing)
  - Security requirements (confidentiality and integrity)

  are satisfied simultaneously?

Challenges

* Modeling language suite ✓
  (behavior, information flows, SW components, architecture, timing, platform, deployment) - reuse previous work as example
* Security Requirement Modeling ✓
  (need to be composable with other modeling aspects)
* Common Semantic Domain and Formal Framework ✓
  (functional, performance and security models need to be anchored to a semantic domain suitable for synthesis)
* Synthesis Framework and Co-design flow ✓
  (mapping system-level synthesis problem on the formal framework and tools)
* **Integrated Tool Suite and Validation**
  (target domain rich enough for testing the co-design tool suite)

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Security Concerns Addressed

* **Integrity attacks**
  - Manipulate data (value, timestamp, source identity,..)

* **Confidentiality attack**
  - Leak critical data to unauthorized persons/systems

* **Integrity and confidentiality restrictions impose constraints on information flows.**
  - How to model these restrictions?
  - How to integrate these restrictions with others (functional and timing) and formulate a co-design problem?

Decentralized Label Model (DLM) for Information Flow Control

* Myers, Liskov (1997): Introduced **security-typed languages** by labeling variables with information flow security policies
* Method was developed for programming languages, the result is *Jif, a security-typed version of Java.*
* DLM provides mechanism for static/dynamic type checking of security labels in information flows to detect policy violations.
* Example: *Jif,* a security-typed version of Java
* **Introduce security-types in modeling languages**

DLM Concepts

* New semantic concepts introduced:
  - *Principles* that represent authority entities.
  - *Labels expressing* security classes encountered in most information flow models.
  - *Policies* that are elementary security primitives used in *labels.*
  - *Labeled entities* that have attached labels, such as *values, slots (variables, objects, i/o channels).* Copies of *values* can be relabeled, *slots* cannot.
  - *Operators* that can *relabel* or *declassify* values in information flows.
* The model can be naturally applied to system-level information flow modeling languages by assigning security types to input/output ports

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Working With Security Labels

* *Labels* contain a set of *policies*. Each *policy* includes an *owner* and a set of *readers* allowed by the *owner*. The *effective reader set* for a *label* is the intersection of every *reader set* in it.
  $L = \{o_1: r_1, r_2; o_2: r_2, r_3\}$
* *Processing blocks* running under the authority of an *owner* can *declassify* the *owner's policy* by adding *readers*.



$L_1 = \{o_1: r_1, r_2; o_2: r_2, r_3\}$ $L_2 = \{o_1: r_1, r_2, r_3, ; o_2: r_2, r_3\}$

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Information Flows in an Information Architecture



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Security Type Propagation Rules

* *Propagation rule-1 (restriction):*



$owners(L_1) \subseteq owners(L_2)$

$\forall o \in owners(L_1), readers(L_1, o) \supseteq readers(L_2, o)$

(L_1 has more readers and fewer owners than L_2)

* *Propagation rule-2 (join):*



L_3 is the *join* of L_1 and L_2

$L_3 = L_1 \sqcup L_2$

$owners(L_1 \sqcup L_2) = owners(L_1) \cup owners(L_2)$

$readers(L_1 \sqcup L_2, o) = readers(L_1, o) \cap readers(L_2, o)$

(*join* L_1 and L_2 is the least restrictive label that maintains all the flow restrictions specified by L_1 and L_2)

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Information Architecture Deployed on a Physical Platform



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FORMULA

* Ethan Jackson (ISIS grad student 2004-2008; MSR 2009 – Present)
* Algebraic Data Types (ADT), Open World Logic Programs (OLP) provide common semantic domain for DSMLs and model transformations.
* Constraint Logic Programming provides execution semantics for model transformations.
* Z3 backend for model finding.

Policies and Labels

A policy consists of an owner principal and a set of allowed reader principals:

owner: reader1 reader2

A label is a (possibly empty) set of policies:

L = { policy1; policy2; ...}

Our encoding views a label as a tree where the label's identifier is the root, the policy owners make up the second level, and the corresponding readers make up the third level :

```
Label  ::= new (name:String).
Policy ::= new (lbl:Label, owner:Principal).
Reader ::= new (pl:Policy, reader:Principal).
```

Propagation Rules Examples

We can compute the effective readers set for each label:

```
EffReader(lbl, reader) :-
  lbl is Label, reader is Principal, no CantRead(lbl, reader).
CantRead(pl.lbl, r) :-
  pl is Policy, r is Principal,
  no { r' | ActsForTR(r, r'), Reader(pl, r') }.
```

We can compare the restrictiveness of labels based on their effective reader sets:

```
AtLeastAsRestrictive(lbl1, lbl2) :-
  lbl1 is Label, lbl2 is Label,
  no { x | EffReader(lbl1, x), CantRead(lbl2, x) }.
```

We can also “propagate” policies by computing the join ($\bigsqcup$) of two labels: the least restrictive label that is at least as restrictive as both labels.

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Validation Is Hard

- Results from the theory so far
  - Extending information flow models with security types (DSML)
  - Type checking rules (propagation and transformation)
  - Formulation of system-level design problems (deployment synthesis, security controls)
  - Mapping to formal framework (FORMULA, Z3)
  - Demonstrating in small examples
- Validation
  - What are the policy/performance tradeoffs?
  - Is the method practical for real-life system-level design problems?
  - What is the feasibility of creating a useable tool chain?
  - Scaling limitations?
- Primary Challenge: Finding real-life use case with existing models

Validation of the System-level Design Workflow



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

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Views of CVRIA

Views	Applications
* **Enterprise** - Describes the relationships between organizations and the roles those organizations play within the connected vehicle environment	Principals, Labels, Policies
* **Functional** - Describes abstract functional elements (processes) and their logical interactions (data flows)that satisfy the system requirements	Components, Information flows Label assignments
* **Physical** - Describes physical objects (systems and devices) and their application objects as well as the high-level interfaces between those physical objects	Platform properties
* **Communications** - Describes the layered sets of communications protocols that are required to support communications among the physical objects that participate in the connected vehicle environment	Communication channel properties

http://www.iteris.com/cvria/

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Validation Using CVRIA Models

* It provides a large set of use cases and architecture models. In general the models contain:
  * Organizational, physical, functional, and communication models (e.g.: toll collection, vehicles, drivers, equipment)
  * Dataflows, information flows, data structures between components
  * Mappings across different layers
* Validation concept
  * Import relevant subset of CVRIA models into our formal modeling environment (FORMULA)
  * Integrate CVRIA DSMLs with security DSL constructs
  * Based on the security labels:
    * Perform type checking (using FORMULA constraint check)
    * Propagate security labels (using FORMULA)
    * Find deployment properties (using FORMULA Z3 solver)

Example Application: Electronic Toll Collection

* Collect tolls electronically
* Detect and process violations
* Fees may be adjusted to implement demand management strategies
* Communication between roadway equipment and the vehicle is required
* Fixed-Point to Fixed-Point interfaces between toll collection equipment and transportation authorities and financial infrastructure supporting fee collection
* Toll violations are identified and electronically posted

Enterprise View



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Traveler - Payment Institution Relationship





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Electronic Toll Collection: Functional View

Processes: 48

Level	Name	Type	Allocated to Application Object
5.4	Provide Law Enforcement Allocation	Collection	
5.4.2	Process Violations for Tolls	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
6.7	Provide Driver Personal Services	Collection	
6.7.1	Provide On-line Vehicle Guidance	Collection	
6.7.1.2	Provide Driver Guidance Interface	Pspec	
6.7.3	Provide Traveler Services in Vehicle	Collection	
6.7.3.3	Provide Driver Information Interface	Pspec	
7.1	Provide Electronic Toll Payment	Collection	
7.1.1	Process Electronic Toll Payment	Collection	
7.1.1.1	Read Vehicle Payment Data for Tolls	Pspec	
7.1.1.2	Calculate Vehicle Toll	Pspec	
7.1.1.3	Manage Bad Toll Payment Data	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.1.1.5	Bill Driver for Tolls	Pspec	
7.1.1.7	Update Toll Price Data	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.1.1.8	Register for Advanced Toll Payment	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.1.1.9	Manage Toll Processing	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.1.1.10	Determine Advanced Toll Bill	Pspec	
7.1.1.11	Manage Toll Archive Data	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.1.2	Produce Roadside Displays	Pspec	- Roadway Toll Collection Support
7.1.3	Obtain Toll Violator Image	Pspec	
7.1.4	Provide Driver Toll Payment Interface	Pspec	
7.1.7	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls	Pspec	- Vehicle Toll/Parking Payment
7.1.8	Exchange Data with Other Payment Administration	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.2	Provide Electronic Parking Payment	Collection	
7.2.7	Provide Payment Device Interface for Parking	Pspec	
7.4	Carry-out Centralized Payments Processing	Collection	
7.4.1	Collect Advanced Payments	Collection	
7.4.1.8	Process Electric Charging Payments	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.4.1.9	Process Roadside Electric Charging Payments	Pspec	
7.4.1.10	Process Vehicle Electric Charging Payments	Pspec	
7.5.1	Provide Vehicle Payment Device Interface	Pspec	
7.5.3	Provide Personal Payment Device Interface	Pspec	- Personal Interactive Traveler Information
7.6.1	Process VMT Payment	Collection	
7.6.1.1	Collect Road Use Charging Data	Pspec	
7.6.1.3	Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	Pspec	- RSE Toll Collection
7.6.1.4	Manage Road Use Charging Price Data	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.6.1.5	Manage Road Use Charges Processing	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.6.2	Support Road Use Charging	Pspec	
7.6.3	Provide Driver Road Use Charging Payment Interface	Pspec	
7.6.4	Provide Payment Device Interface for Road Use Charging	Pspec	

Dataflows: 85

Source Pspec	Data Flow	Destination Pspec
Administer Multimodal Payments	multimodal_payment_request_to_field	Bill Driver for Road Use Charges
Administer Multimodal Payments	multimodal_toll_payment_data	Manage Toll Processing
Administer Multimodal Payments	traveler_personal_multimodal_payment_request	Provide Personal Payment Device Interface
Administer Multimodal Payments	traveler_personal_multimodal_account_reports	Provide Personal Payment Device Interface
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	multimodal_payment_confirmation_from_field	Administer Multimodal Payments
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	current_toll_transactions_from_roadside	Bill Driver for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	road_use_payment_collected_from_field	Manage Road Use Charges Processing
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	road_use_payment_confirmation_from_field	Manage Road Use Charges Processing
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	road_use_cost_data_from_roadside	Provide Driver Road Use Charging Payment Interface
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	road_use_payment_request	Provide Payment Device Interface for Road Use Charging
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	road_use_vehicle_payment_data_clear	Provide Payment Device Interface for Road Use Charging
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_vehicle_payment_data_request	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_payment_debited	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_payment_request	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_vehicle_payment_data_clear	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_vehicle_payment_data_update	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_payments_from_roadside	Read Vehicle Payment Data for Tolls
Bill Driver for Tolls	toll_roadside_payment_billing	Bill Driver for Road Use Charges
Bill Driver for Tolls	toll_bad_payment_check_request	Manage Bad Toll Payment Data

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Processes: 48

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6.7.1.2	Provide Driver Guidance Interface	Pspec	
6.7.3	Provide Traveler Services in Vehicle	Collection	
6.7.3.3	Provide Driver Information Interface	Pspec	
7.1	Provide Electronic Toll Payment	Collection	
7.1.1	Process Electronic Toll Payment	Collection	
7.4.1.2	Process Travel Services Provider Payments		
7.4.1.3	Process Driver Map Update Payments		
7.4.1.4	Process Traveler Map Update Payments		
7.4.1.5	Process Traveler Other Services Payments		
7.4.1.6	Process Traveler Trip and Other Services Payments		
7.1.4	Provide Driver Toll Payment Interface	Pspec	
7.1.7	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls	Pspec	- Vehicle Toll/Parking Payment
7.1.8	Exchange Data with Other Payment Administration	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.2	Provide Electronic Parking Payment	Collection	
7.2.7	Provide Payment Device Interface for Parking	Pspec	
7.4	Carry-out Centralized Payments Processing	Collection	
7.4.1	Collect Advanced Payments	Collection	
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7.5.3	Provide Personal Payment Device Interface	Pspec	- Personal Interactive Traveler Information
7.6.1	Process VMT Payment	Collection	
7.6.1.1	Collect Road Use Charging Data	Pspec	
7.6.1.3	Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	Pspec	- RSE Toll Collection
7.6.1.4	Manage Road Use Charging Price Data	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.6.1.5	Manage Road Use Charges Processing	Pspec	- PAC Payment Administration
7.6.2	Support Road Use Charging	Pspec	
7.6.3	Provide Driver Road Use Charging Payment Interface	Pspec	
7.6.4	Provide Payment Device Interface for Road Use Charging	Pspec	

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Administer Multimodal Payments	traveler_personal_multimodal_payment_request	Provide Personal Payment Device Interface
Administer Multimodal Payments	traveler_personal_multimodal_account_reports	Provide Personal Payment Device Interface
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	multimodal_payment_confirmation_from_field	Administer Multimodal Payments
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	current_toll_transactions_from_roadside	Bill Driver for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	road_use_payment_collected_from_field	Manage Road Use Charges Processing
Administer Multimodal Payments	multimodal_payment_request_to_field	Bill Driver for Road Use Charges
Administer Multimodal Payments	multimodal_toll_payment_data	Manage Toll Processing
Administer Multimodal Payments	traveler_personal_multimodal_payment_request	Provide Personal Payment Device Interface
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_vehicle_payment_data_request	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_payment_debited	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_payment_request	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_vehicle_payment_data_clear	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_vehicle_payment_data_update	Provide Payment Device Interface for Tolls
Bill Driver for Road Use Charges	toll_payments_from_roadside	Read Vehicle Payment Data for Tolls
Bill Driver for Tolls	toll_roadside_payment_billing	Bill Driver for Road Use Charges
Bill Driver for Tolls	toll_bad_payment_check_request	Manage Bad Toll Payment Data

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Electronic Toll Collection – Functional View Processing Structure

Electronic Toll Collection Processing structure (processes and dataflows)

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Electronic Toll Collection – Communication View

Communications Diagram(s)	Source	Destination	Information Flow
	DMV	Payment Administration Center	registration
None: Human interface	Driver	Vehicle OBE	driver input
	Financial Center	Payment Administration Center	transaction status
	ITS Roadway Payment Equipment	Roadside Equipment	payment instructions
None: Human interface	ITS Roadway Payment Equipment	Driver	payment transaction status
	ITS Roadway Payment Equipment	Payment Administration Center	payment transactions
	ITS Roadway Payment Equipment	Roadside Equipment	vehicle entries and exits
	Other Payment Administration	Payment Administration Center	payment coordination
	Payment Administration Center	DMV	license request
	Payment Administration Center	Other Payment Administration	payment coordination
None: Human interface	Payment Administration Center	Payment Administrator	payment information presentation

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Electronic Toll Collection – Communication View Security



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Electronic Toll Collection: Physical View Platform Architecture



http://www.iteris.com/cvria/html/applications/app109.html#tab-3

Electronic Tolling			
1	Physical	Jun 10, 2015	NAT

Dataflow Example



Electronic Tolling			
1	Physical	Jun 10, 2015	NAT

FOUNDATIONS OF RESILIENT CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS

Electronic Toll Collection – A Glimps of Functional to Physical Deployment Mappings







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Scaling

Applications	Applications	101	E.g.: Electronic Toll Collection
	Application objects	245	RSE Toll Collection, PAC Payment Administration,..
	Information flows	436	Driver Input, Payment Coordination,..
Physical View	Physical objects	112	Payment Device, Payment Administrator,..
	Information flows	1076	Payment Device Update, Payment Transactions,…
Functional View	Processes	609	Calculate Vehicle Toll, Collect Advanced Payments,..
	Dataflows (flattened)	8556	Toll Payment Debited, Toll Payment Request,..

Validation Workflow for System-level Design Using CVRIA



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Next Steps

* Completion of 2 CVRIA application examples, one of them is time sensitive
* Completion of the synthesis tasks
* Running performance evaluations (how security policies influence timing properties of application execution)