# Foundations Of Resilient CybEr-physical Systems (FORCES)

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# Motivation: Resilient CPS

## Attributes

- 1 Functional correctness by design
- 2 Robustness to reliability failures (faults)
- **3** Survivability against security failures (attacks)

## Tools [Traditionally disjoint]

- Resilient Control (RC) over sensor-actuator networks
- Economic Incentives (EI) to influence strategic interaction of individuals within systemic societal institutions

CPS integrated with human decision makers [Tightly coupled RC & EI]

- Spatio-temporal and hybrid dynamics
- Large number of strategic interactions with network interdependencies
- Inherent uncertainties, both public and private

## Towards a theory of Resilient CPS

## Resilient Control (RC)

- Threat assessment & detection
- Fault-tolerant networked control
- Real-time / predictive response
- Fundamental limits of defenses

## Economic Incentives (EI)

- Incentive Theory for resilience
- Mechanisms to align Nash allocations with socially optima
- Interdependent risk assessment
- Insurance & risk redistribution



# El-aware RC design

## Attack model

- Learn CPS parameters
- Unauthorized access
- DoS / Deception
- Max damage / gain yet evade detection

## RC design problem

Max performance subject to

- Security levels & control modalities
- CPS dynamics
- Safety constraints
- Attack / fault hypotheses



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# RC-aware El design

## El for CPS security & reliability

- Network externalities
- Mechanisms design: implement in NE/BNE the social welfare maximizing correspondences





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# RC+EI: Multi-layer integrated design

Network Games: externalities, investment incentives, residual risk

- Players: Attacker(s), Defenders (CPS owners / Government)
- Failure models: Random, Strategic, Correlated, Byzantine
- Network topologies: Transportation, Electricity T&D, Buildings

Stochastic Control: learning, minimax control, performance benchmark

- Players: Regulators, System operators, CPS managers
- Public uncertainties: Joint distribution of reliability failures (natural events) and security failures (strategic network attacks)
- Control design: Anomaly / intrusion detection, Safety-preserving (switching) control, Supervisory response (reconfiguration / rerouting)

Incentive theory: Mechanism design, mean-field games (static & dynamic)

- Players: Distributors, Large population of travelers / consumers
- Private uncertainties: Individual utilities, asymmetric information
- Mechanisms: Public good provision, Demand response / Pricing

## Validation approach



# CPS control-security co-experimentation & co-design

#### Co-experimentation



#### Co-design



# Electricity Transmission and Distribution (T&D)

## Wide-area control & Demand response (DR)

- Data: NASPInet (PMUs), NESCOR, IEC & IEEE models, power system simulators
- RC tools: distributed load control, load aggregation (mean-field), balancing (esp. renewables), PHEV charging
- El tools: DR pricing schemes, T&D regulation, ↓ (non-)technical losses



Regulated electricity distribution



#### Distributed load control

## Smart meters and utility networks

Building energy management & DR incentives

- Data: Utility pricing, building operations and loads, consumption patterns
- RC tools: Data fusion, model estimation, integrating occupancy, price, & weather predictions, model-predictive control
- El tools: Residential DR, AMI security & privacy, ↓ electricity theft/non-payment





#### Attacks to AMIs 04/12/2013 FORCES Kickoff

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# Road Traffic Operations

## Mobile Millennium System

- Industry grade platform
- 60 million data points/day
- Tools: Data fusion & consistency, privacy preserving sampling, nowcast, routing, operational control, traveler incentive design
- Real security & reliability scenarios



#### Traffic data sources



# Air Traffic Operations

National Airspace System

- Data: Airport operations, aircraft trajectories, aviation weather
- Airport: Algorithms for ATC choice modeling, scheduling, congestion control, and resource re-allocation
- Airspace: Methods for surveillance (conformance monitoring, threat detection), sectorization, re-routing

NextGen security & reliability

Centralized

Control

Centralized

Communication



Varying degrees of EI+RC integration for air traffic control and comm. systems

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Airport

## Integration among individual researchers



## Choice of Projects and Coordination

- Monthly Coordination Telcons:
  - RC + El integration for power systems (GS and IM), visitor Catherine Rosenberg (Waterloo), air transportation Systems (HB) so far
  - Game Theory advances (SA) so far
  - CPS VO and inter-agency coordination (XK, JS, SS)
- Exchange of Students and Research Staff
  - Student of HB from MIT have spent time at Berkeley
  - GS has spent time at MIT with AO and SA
- HiCONS and RCSS Conferences
  - LR and Linda Bushnell (Washington) co-PC chairs for HiCONS, CPS Week, Philadelphia 2013, XK for 2014?
  - LR will host RCSS in August 2013 in San Francisco
- Industry Coordination

JS and SS will work with industry partners (UTRC, Honeywell, GE) to develop FORCES industrial advisory board.