



A Dynamic Control Scheme for the Secure Operation of Cyber-physical Systems

Erik Miehling — miehling@umich.edu


Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

NSF Review Meeting, Arlington, VA — Jan 25-26, 2017



By JAIME HOLGUIN / CBS/AP / August 15, 2003, 7:20 AM

Biggest blackout in U.S. history



The dark Manhattan skyline, seen from Queens, is silhouetted against a pre-dawn sky Aug. 15, 2003. A widespread power outage hit most of northeastern United States Aug. 14, leaving the city in the dark. / AP

Comment / f Share / Tweet / Stumble / @ Email

Power is coming back to some of the 50 million people affected by the blackout which hit Thursday, continued into Friday, and is the biggest power outage in U.S. history.

The outage affected a wide swath of territory in the U.S. and Canada - including New York City, Albany, Hartford, Toronto, Ottawa, Detroit, Cleveland and Ontario

From 60 Minutes



Obama and the 2008 general election



A president and a journalist: 17 interviews



When 60 Minutes first met Barack Obama



Obama and the Democratic 2008 primaries



An Obama family flashback on 60 Minutes

HOUSE DEMOCRATS BOYCOTTING INAUGURATION

play VIDEO

Trump inauguration boycott

By JAIME HOLGUIN

Bigg histo



The dark Manhattan power outage hit m

Comment / f

Power is comi which hit Thu history.

The outage af New York City

NEWS

AUG 8 2016, 5:41 PM ET

Delta Warns of Chaos After Power Outage, Worldwide System Failure

by ALASTAIR JAMIESON, SHAMAR WALTERS, KURT CHIRBAS and GABE GUTIERREZ

SHARE

f Share

t Tweet

g+ Share

e Email

p Print

o Comment



▶ Delta flights grounded worldwide due to computer outage 1:26

Tens of thousands of Delta passengers around the world were stranded Monday after a power outage at its Atlanta headquarters caused a global computer failure that halted all flights.

Check-in systems, airport screens and even the airline's website and smartphone apps were affected by the meltdown, which began at 2:38 a.m. ET and lasted six hours.

The airline suspended departures, with airport agents writing out boarding passes by hand. "Our systems are down everywhere," it told customers on Twitter.

Related: [After the Glitch: What to Do if You're Flying Delta This Week](#)

The outage ended at about 8:30 a.m. ET, with "limited" resumption of flights. By 1:30 p.m. ET, some 451 flights had been canceled and less than 1,700 of its 6,000 scheduled flights were in operation, the airline said.

CBS News / CBS Evening News / CBS This Morning

CBS

By JAIME HOLLOWAY

Biggest history

The dark Manhattan power outage hit millions of people on Friday.

Power is coming back on which hit Thursday.

The outage affected New York City

Comment / f

NBC NEWS

BUSINESS > TRAVEL

NEWS
AUG 8 2016, 5:41 PM ET

SHARE

- f Share
- Twitter
- g+ Share
- Email
- Print
- Comment

TV RADIO NEWS SPORTS MUSIC LIFE ARTS LOCAL MORE WATCH LISTEN LOG IN

CBCnews | Technology & Science

Home Opinion World Canada Politics Business Health Entertainment Technology & Science Video

Technology & Science Quirks & Quarks Blog Spark Photo Galleries

Hackers used 'internet of things' devices to cause Friday's massive DDoS cyberattack

Hackers say the attacks, which affected major sites like Twitter, Netflix and PayPal, were just a dry run

The Associated Press Posted: Oct 22, 2016 3:52 PM ET | Last Updated: Oct 22, 2016 4:15 PM ET

Friday's DDoS attackers now have a secret weapon in the increasing array of internet-enabled household devices they can subvert and use to wreak havoc. (Kacper Pempel/Reuters)

Could millions of connected cameras, thermostats and kids' toys bring the internet to its knees? It's beginning to look that way.

On Friday, epic cyberattacks crippled a major internet firm, repeatedly disrupting the availability of popular websites across North America and Europe such as Twitter, Netflix and PayPal.

Stay Connected with CBC News

- Mobile
- Facebook
- Podcasts
- Twitter
- Alerts
- Newsletter

Top News Headlines

- Porter Airlines grounds all flights, citing system outage
- In facing the public, will Trudeau go beyond talking points?: Aaron Wherry 906
- Here's what really happens to all those gifts you return to the store 277
- Jennifer Holliday latest to pull out of Trump inauguration amid overwhelming backlash
- 'Apartheid system' of reserves to blame for Innu suicides: Quebec coroner

Latest Technology & Science News Headlines

- Scientists call for tri-national conservation

CBS News / CBS Evening News / CBS This Morning

CBS

By JAIME HOLLGREN

Biggest historical

The dark Manhattan power outage hit millions of New Yorkers last week.

Comment / Facebook

Power is coming back on which hit Thursday's history.

The outage affected New York City

NBC NEWS

BUSINESS > TRAVEL

NEWS
AUG 8 2016, 5:41 PM ET

SHARE

- Share
- Tweet
- Share
- Email
- Print
- Comment

CBCnews


Home | Opinion

Technology & Science

Hacker: massive

Hackers say they can subvert and

The Associated Press



Friday's DDoS attack they can subvert and


- Facebook
- Twitter
- Reddit

WIRED Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine's Power Grid SUBSCRIBE

BUSINESS | CULTURE | DESIGN | GEAR | SCIENCE | SECURITY | TRANSPORTATION

KIM ZETTER SECURITY 03.03.16 7:00 AM

INSIDE THE CUNNING, UNPRECEDENTED HACK OF UKRAINE'S POWER GRID



JOSE A. BERNAT BACET/GETTY IMAGES

IT WAS 3:30 p.m. last December 23, and residents of the Ivano-Frankivsk region of Western Ukraine were preparing to end their workday and head home through the cold winter streets. Inside the Prykarpattyaoblenergo control center, which distributes power to the region's residents, operators too were nearing the end of their shift. But just as one worker was organizing papers at his

SHARE

- SHARE 1232
- TWEET
- PIN 2
- COMMENT 97
- EMAIL

GET WIRED
Don't Let The Future Leave You Behind. Get 6 Issues For Just \$5.
SUBSCRIBE NOW

MOST POPULAR


- ARCHITECTURE**
What Happens When Algorithms Design a Concert Hall? The...
2 DAYS
- GAMING**
Nintendo's Boss Promises the Switch Won't Have the NES Classic's Supply...
22 HOURS
- WIRED OPINION**
How America Can Beat Russia in Cyber War, Despite Trump
11 HOURS

[MORE STORIES](#)

Objective

- ❖ We propose a model for the *graceful degradation* of **cyber-physical systems** while subject to persistent attacks from an adversary

We are interested in modeling, and defending against, **cyber attacks that trigger physical contingencies.**



Cyber-physical Systems

1. Cyber network


- ❖ Forms the computational, comm., and control structure of the system

2. Physical infrastructure

- ❖ Represents the physical network of connections, switches, and sensors
- ❖ Dynamics of the (continuous) **physical state** x_t are dictated by laws of nature

*tightly
integrated
at all time-scales
and levels*

Cyber Layer




- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
- ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
- ❖ **Edges:** exploits

Cyber Layer

precondition(s) postcondition(s)


$$e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$$



- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
- ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
- ❖ **Edges:** exploits

Cyber Layer


precondition(s) \rightarrow $e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$ \leftarrow postcondition(s)



- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
- ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
- ❖ **Edges:** exploits

Cyber Layer


precondition(s) \rightarrow $e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$ \leftarrow postcondition(s)



- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
- ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
- ❖ **Edges:** exploits

Cyber Layer


precondition(s) \rightarrow $e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$ \leftarrow postcondition(s)



- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
- ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
- ❖ **Edges:** exploits

Cyber Layer


precondition(s) \rightarrow $e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$ \leftarrow postcondition(s)



- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
 - ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
 - ❖ **Edges:** exploits
- ❖ Successive exploits allow the attacker to progress through the network, captured by the **security state, s_t**

Cyber Layer


precondition(s) \rightarrow $e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$ \leftarrow postcondition(s)



- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
 - ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
 - ❖ **Edges:** exploits
- ❖ Successive exploits allow the attacker to progress through the network, captured by the **security state, s_t**

Cyber Layer


precondition(s) \rightarrow $e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$ \leftarrow postcondition(s)



- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
 - ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
 - ❖ **Edges:** exploits
- ❖ Successive exploits allow the attacker to progress through the network, captured by the **security state, s_t**

Cyber Layer

precondition(s) \rightarrow $e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$ \leftarrow postcondition(s)




- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
 - ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
 - ❖ **Edges:** exploits
- ❖ Successive exploits allow the attacker to progress through the network, captured by the **security state, s_t**

Cyber Layer

precondition(s) postcondition(s)


$$e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$$



- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
 - ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
 - ❖ **Edges:** exploits
- ❖ Successive exploits allow the attacker to progress through the network, captured by the **security state, s_t**

Cyber Layer


precondition(s) \rightarrow $e_1 = (\{1, 2\}, \{5\})$ \leftarrow postcondition(s)



- ❖ Attacks are modeled using a dependency graph
 - ❖ **Nodes:** attacker capabilities
 - ❖ **Edges:** exploits
- ❖ Successive exploits allow the attacker to progress through the network, captured by the **security state, s_t**

Defender's Information

- ❖ The defender does not know the **security state**, s_t , with certainty




- ❖ Furthermore, the defender must estimate the **physical state**, x_t , using data from sensors

Goal Nodes


- ❖ Enabled goal conditions give the attacker **physical capabilities**

\mathcal{P}_i : physical elements that the attacker can influence from i



Goal Nodes

- ❖ Enabled goal conditions give the attacker **physical capabilities**
- \mathcal{P}_i : physical elements that the attacker can influence from i
- ❖ Attacker can then trigger **physical failures**
- ❖ Severity is dependent upon the current **physical state**, x_t



Operating Modes

- ❖ The defender wishes to continue to operate the system, at reduced performance, while it is under attack
- ❖ Define set of **operating modes**, \mathcal{M} ,
- ❖ Each operating mode $m \in \mathcal{M}$ defines a structure for:

cyber network

- port connectivity, active services, trust relationships

vulnerability



dependency graph


physical network

- status of relays, breakers, sensors, valves




physical network topology

Operating Modes



Operating Modes




- ❖ **Defense Problem:** The defender uses its belief of (s_t, x_t) to **control** the transitions between **operating modes**
- ❖ The defender is attempting to maximally interfere with the progression of the attacker while maintaining functionality of the network

Ongoing Work

- ❖ Past work on the **defense of cyber networks**

-  *E. Miehling, M. Rasouli, and D. Teneketzis. Optimal Defense Policies for Partially Observable Spreading Processes on Bayesian Attack Graphs (MTD Workshop — CCS 2015)*

-  *E. Miehling, M. Rasouli, and D. Teneketzis. A POMDP Approach to Autonomic, Dynamic Defense of Large-Scale Cyber Networks (to be submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security)*

- ❖ Current work is focused on **integrating the physical system**

Summary

- ❖ The model allows us to relate attacker capabilities to spatial regions of the physical infrastructure
- ❖ The **security state** tells us likely physical contingencies and, coupled with the **physical state**, the severity of the potential damage
- ❖ Controlling the **operating mode** decreases the chances that the attack will succeed *and* ensures that the system is prepared for any contingencies

Acknowledgments

- ❖ Special thanks to the following funding sources



- ❖ **NSF** — Foundations Of Resilient CybEr-physical Systems (FORCES)





Grant: [CNS-1238962](#)



- ❖ **ARO MURI** — Adversarial and Uncertain Reasoning for Adaptive Cyber Defense: Building the Scientific Foundations

Grant: [W911NF-13-1-0421](#)





Tim Meko, "Six maps that show the anatomy of America's vast infrastructure," The Washington Post, 2017