Anomaly Detection and Risk assessment in Power Grids under Data Measurement Threats


https://seftekha.expressions.syr.edu/research-projects/

Sara Eftekharnejad, Syracuse University; Brian Johnson, James Alves-Foss, University of Idaho

Project Objective: Investigating the impact of false-data injection attacks on PMUbased power system state estimation; quantifying the cyber-physical risks of PMU measurement attacks; developing methods to detect these attacks before they result in cascading failures; proposing methods to prevent wide-spread blackouts.

Challenges

- Existing means for real-time power system monitoring are vulnerable to various types of cyber-attacks. However, the extent of the impact of cyber-attacks on power systems are unknown.
- Malicious PMU false data injections can be formulated to be undetectable by existing bad data detection methodologies.



 The existing grid mitigation solutions do not take dependencies between the cyber and physical layers into consideration.

Technical Approach:

- 1. Estimate the impact severity of cyber-attack on PMU devices on power systems (challenge 1)
- 2. Classify real-time event in power systems based on time-series PMU data and identify fake events from real event (challenge 2)
- 3. Identify critical PMUs that are best candidates for measurement redundancies (challenge 3)
- Introduce a comprehensive framework for effective mitigation against cyberattacks on PMU systems (challenge 3)

Key Innovations:


- 1. Development of a new cascading failure model for power systems based on real-time operating conditions
- 2. Power system islanding methodology under measurement uncertainties
- 3. Methodology to secure RAS schemes against data injection attacks

Scientific Impact

- Quantification of the false data injection impacts in terms of causing cascading failures
- Developing new anomaly detection techniques using time-series data
- Developing new methodologies to predict the failure probability of each power system component under real-time operating conditions
- Developing possible countermeasures to mitigate successful cyber attacks on PMU measurements and prevent cascading blackouts

New Contributions

- Development of new risk
 Quantification metrics of coordinated
 cyber-physical attacks against power
 systems and PMU devices
- Development of a new event detection



Impacts on Society:

This work enhances the reliability and resiliency of the power grids against cyber attacks, and leads to a more secure electricity delivery infrastructure.

Education and Outreach:

- This study has been integrated into courses at both institutions.
- Broad participation of undergraduate students in research.

Impact Quantification:

- The results of this project have been disseminated in multiple conferences and peer-reviewed journals.
- The project directly engaged a diverse team of students in research including six graduate students, five undergraduate students, and two high school students.

methodology based on large scale realtime data. Using machine learning algorithms, the developed method compresses data and extracts features for accurate event classification.

- Attack Modelling: 1. RAS Disable 2. Coordinated Attacks Impact Assessment Uncontrolled Islanding 1. Loss of Load 2. Loss of Observability 2. Loss of Observability 1. Loss of Observability 2. Recoverability
- A methodology to identify critical PMU measurements for ensuring grid reliability
- Introduction of a new decentralized control strategy to ensure system reliability under evolving cascades
- Modifications to the existing grid islanding techniques to consider measurement uncertainties and implementing dynamic islanding
- Development of scheme to detect and mitigate false data injection attacks against remedial action schemes

The 4th NSF Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace Principal Investigator Meeting

October 28-29, 2019 | Alexandria, Virginia