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
## **FDA SIR: Architecturally-Integrated Hazard Analyses** for Medical Application Platforms (NSF CNS-1565544) **CPS PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR MEETING**

PI: John Hatcliff (KSU – <u>hatcliff@ksu.edu</u>)


#### Lack of "System of Systems" Support


#### What Could be Achieved with System of Systems (SoS)?


#### **Safety Interlocks**




#### **Closed Loop Control**







procedures they may impact/distort readings data from multiple devices is not combined to produce more meaningful information to clinicians actions of multiple devices cannot be automatically coordinated to achieve greater safety and efficiency




There is no means to integrate devices and information systems and coordinate their actions as a cyber-physical system of systems

# Medical Application Platforms (MAPs)


#### The Medical Device Coordination Framework (MDCF)


- Our project builds on an open source *Medical Device Coordination Framework* – a *medical application platform (MAP)* for integrating medical devices into systems
- The MDCF provides...
  - Publish-subscribe real-time middleware for integrating devices
  - A component-based application (app) environment for developing and running algorithms that coordinate the device data flows and actions
- Together the platform, app, and connected devices form a Virtual Medical Device – a composite system device composed of individual devices




# **Component-based Development for Coordination Apps**

Apps are developed in a model-based development environment based on the industry standard Architecture and Analysis Definition Language (AADL)








#### **Component-wise Hazard Analysis and Risk Management**

#### Automated Analysis & Query Capabilities

Current risk management activities are highly manual and not well-integrated with formal development artifacts. Our development environment provides integrated automated formal support for risk management activities.




 AADL includes an Error Modeling language dedicated to modeling errors and propagation leading to hazards

Provides the core of formal architecture-integrated risk management activities from which steps in common hazard analysis such as FEMA, FTA, can be automatically derived. Allows engineers to


compositionally model aspects of system as it is experiencing faults ailures.

Our novel approach involves integrating Leveson's STPA Hazard Analysis with formal architecture models in AADL. Due to our auto code generational from models, hazard analysis is directly traceable to source code and architecture infrastructure components.



eport indicates analysis


#### Analysis Tools automatically generate a dependence graph (behind the scenes) that can be used different queries related to reachability and causality of error propagations





Adventium

LABS





Hazard => PCA Shuto

How would the message be unsafe?

t safety constraint would be violat

ow can this occurrence be compensated for

How would the message be unsafe

hat constraint would be violated

hat would cause this to occur

hat should the occurrence be name

v can this occurrence be compensated for

/hat hazard would be caused

nat hazard would be caused?

at would cause this to occur

	all_hazardous_situation_overdose	* -> Patient.Vein{Error.TooMuchAnalgesic}
	Cap_to_Pump	Capnography.ETCO2 -> PCA.infuse
	Cap_to_pump_hazard_1	Capnography.RespiratoryRate{Error.RespirationRateHigh} -> PCA.infuse{Error.TooMuchAnalgesic}
	Cap_to_pump_hazard_2	Capnography.ETCO2{Error.ETCO2Early} -> PCA.infuse{Error.TooMuchAnalgesic}
	PulseOx_to_pump_check	PulseOx.SpO2{Error.NoSpO2} -> *

# Industry Collaboration Standards & Regulatory Policy

# **Educational Material**

Lectures on safety-critical

system development –

assurance cases, etc.

requirements, hazard analysis,



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- John Hatcliff Robby
  - Brian Larson Hariharan Thiagaragan

Venkatesh Ranganath





Todd Carpenter

Rand Whillock

FDA & Underwriters Lab

Paul L. Jones (FDA) Sandy Weininger (FDA) Yi Zhang (FDA) Anura Fernando (UL)

PIs are members of the AAMI / UL 2800 standard committee tasked with writing a family of standards for safety/security of medical device interoperability

- Safety/security requirements of architectures for Medical Application Platforms (MAPs)
- Framework for compositional certifications of MAPs
- Guidelines for evaluating compliance to requirements
- Safety evaluation eco-system for medical device interoperability platforms
- Example hazard analyses, mock 510(k) regulatory submissions for apps and other MDCF components • Guidelines for development of

We are actively engaged with FDA

regulatory policy for interoperable

engineers to develop science-


based inputs for forming

medical systems

third-party certification regime

The Open PCA Pump provides open source development artifacts for a realistic medical device – developed collaboratively with industry and FDA engineers

- User need documents and background resources for PCA Pumps
- 80+ page requirements document Architecture models in AADL
- Assurance case in NOR-STA commercial assurance case tool
- Suggested student projects



SOSCELES-based Medical Devices