


CPS: Small: Data-driven Real-time Data Authentication in Wide-Area Energy Infrastructure Sensor Networks

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Challenge:

Measurements in wide-area energy infrastructure sensor networks are vulnerable to attacks from malicious cyber hackers.



Spoofing data and detection

Sensor deployment locations

Scientific Impact:


- A new spatial signature extraction method to authenticate sensor data sources.
- A time-frequency-based cyber security defense framework is proposed to detect the cyber spoofing of wide-area sensor data in fast frequency reserve control systems.
- These methods have been validated using actual sensor data collected by FNET/GridEye ([link](#)) in U.S. power grids.

Broader Impact:

Impact on society: Add an addition level of security beyond purely cyber or physical methods.

Education and outreach: Provide power grid and CPS security education and training resources, including seminars, course projects, lab tours, and demos to high-school, pre-college, REU, and graduate students.

Quantified potential impact: The detection rate for data spoofing attacks in CPS > 90%



Cyber security defense framework