


ABSTRACT

Intellectual property (IP) is currently embedded in both software and hardware that are used in almost every area of society today. As companies can typically have billions of dollars invested in such IP, the theft of IP has become a major concern for tech companies and countries around the world. This research concerns efficient algorithms for generating polymorphic variants of programs represented as Boolean logic circuits, which can serve as a defense against adversarial reverse engineering and, ultimately, IP theft.

MOTIVATION

An **iterative selection/replacement (ISR)** algorithm [1,2] selects small parts of a circuit (a selection of gates or *sub-circuit*) and then replaces those gates with a functionally equivalent sub-circuit. Doing this repetitively induces overlapping structural changes until some desired level of overhead/cost or security is reached.

Replacement can be accomplished using pre-generated static libraries, but it requires **factorial** generation time and storage: this limits ISR to only small selections. Our research proposes a **linear** time, dynamic algorithm using Boolean logic representation.



RANDOM BOOLEAN LOGIC EXPANSION


BENCH Netlist

INPUT (1)
INPUT (2)
INPUT (3)
INPUT (6)
INPUT (7)

OUTPUT (22)
OUTPUT (23)

10 = NAND (1, 3)
11 = AND (3, 6)
16 = OR (2, 11)
19 = NOR (11, 7)
22 = XOR (10, 16)
23 = NXOR (16, 19)

Circuit Schematic



Boolean Expression


$o24 = ((i1 * i3)' ^ (i2 + (i3 * i6)))$
 $o25 = ((i2 + (i3 * i6)) ^ ((i3 * i6) + i7))'$

Circuit Representation

Given a sub-circuit, we represent the structure as a Boolean expression. Boolean laws of logic reduction can be applied in reverse to expand the Boolean expression: we call this **Random Boolean Logic Expansion (RBLE)**. RBLE randomly selects a sub-expression and applies a random (if more than one exists) expansion from the set of Logic Expansion Rules.

Example Expansion with Boolean Expression and Circuit Form

$o1 = (i0 * i1)$ size(C)=1
1: $((i0+i0) * i1)$ rule 8, size(C')=2
2: $((i0+i0)+0) * i1$ rule 11, size(C')=6
3: $((i0 + i0)+(i1*0)) * i1$ rule 1, size(C')=7
4: $((i0 + i0)+(i1*(i0^i0)) * i1)$ rule 3, size(C')=5
5: $((i0+i0)+(i1*(i0^i0)) * (i1*i1))$ rule 7, size(C')=6
 $o1 = ((i0+i0)+(i1*(i0^i0)) * (i1*i1))$ size(C')=6



Size:	1	2	6	7	5	6
Expansion:	1	2	3	4	5	

#	Original	Expansion	Law	Relative Gates
1	0	$A * 0$	Annihilation	CONST0
2	0	$A * A'$	Complementation	CONST0
3	0	$A * A$	Annihilation	CONST0
4	1	$A + 1$	Annihilation	CONST1
5	1	$A + A'$	Complementation	CONST1
6	1	$A + A$	Annihilation	CONST1
7	A	$A * A$	Idempotence	AND
8	A	$A + A$	Idempotence	OR
9	A	$A * (A + B)$	Absorption	AND,OR
10	A	$A + (A * B)$	Absorption	OR,AND
11	A	$A + 0$	Identity	OR,CONST0
12	A	$A * 0$	Identity	XOR,CONST0
13	A	$A * 1$	Identity	AND,CONST1
14	A	$(A)'$	Involution	NOT
15	A	$(A * B)' + (A * B)$	Annihilation	AND,OR,NOT
16	A	$(A + B)' * (A + B)$	Annihilation	AND,OR,NOT
17	A'	$A * 1$	Negation	XOR,CONST1
18	A'	$(A * B)' + (A * B)$	Negation	AND,OR,NOT
19	A'	$(A' * B)' * (A' * B)$	Negation	AND,OR,NOT
20	$(A + B)'$	$A' * B'$	De Morgan's	NOR
21	$(A * B)'$	$A' + B'$	De Morgan's	NAND
22	$A * B$	$(A + B) * (A' + B')$	Derivation	XOR
23	$A * B$	$(A' + B) + (A * B')$	Derivation	XOR
24	$(A * B)'$	$(A + B)' + (A * B)$	Negation	NXOR
25	$A * (B + C)$	$(A * B) + (A * C)$	Distributivity	AND,OR
26	$A + (B * C)$	$(A + B) * (A + C)$	Distributivity	OR,AND
27	$(A * B) * C$	$A * (B * C)$	Associativity	AND
28	$(A + B) + C$	$A + (B + C)$	Associativity	OR

Logic Expansion Rules

ALGORITHM AND METHODOLOGY

```

input : C, P, n
output: C', where  $\forall x: C(x) = C'(x)$ 
1 BE ← convert(C); done ← false;
2 fixed ← 0; attempts ← 0; numexp ← 0;
3 while not done do
4   expansions ← profile(BE);
5   expansion ← select(expansions);
6   BE ← apply(BE, expansion);
7   Ĉ ← realize(BE);
8   if P == FIXED then
9     fixed ← fixed + 1;
10    if fixed = n then
11      C' ← Ĉ; done ← true;
12    end
13  else
14    if (P == STRICTSIZE and size(Ĉ) = n) then
15      C' ← Ĉ; done ← true;
16    else if (P == TARGETSIZE and size(Ĉ) >= n) then
17      C' ← Ĉ; done ← true;
18    else
19      numexp ← numexp + 1;
20      if numexp > MAXEXPANSIONS then
21        BE ← convert(C); z ← 0;
22        attempts ← attempts + 1;
23        if attempts > MAXATTEMPTS then
24          C' ← null; done ← true;
25        end
26      end
27    end
28  end
29 end
30 return C';

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
C: Circuit
P: Expansion Policy
n: Policy Value
C': Circuit Variant

Expansion Policies:

- Fixed
n is # of expansions
- Strict Size
n is = # of gates
- Target Size
n is >= # of gates

Experiments:

- Compare circuits **chosen** from static libraries vs circuits **expanded** by RBLE
- Determine if RBLE produces **uniform distribution** of random variants






ANALYSIS AND SAMPLE RESULTS

We generate and analyze replacement circuits by choosing from pre-generated static libraries and RBLE expansion. The goal is to determine whether RBLE creates circuit distributions consistent with static choices, which are uniformly random. Generated/studied 13,360,000 circuit variants as semantically equivalent replacements for simple δ_{2-1-1} and δ_{2-1-3} circuits

Key Results:

- RBLE exhibited instances of **uniformity** under **strict size** expansion policy
- RBLE can only reach a **small % of comparable circuits** uniformly vs. chosen static library selection under **fixed** expansion policy



REFERENCES

- J. McDonald, Yong Kim, and Daniel Koranek. 2011. Deterministic circuit variation for anti-tamper applications. *Proceedings of the Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop (CSIRW '11)*, October 12-14, 2011, Oak Ridge, TN, USA. DOI: 10.1145/2179298. 2179376.
- J. McDonald and Yong C. Kim. 2011. Examining Tradeoffs for Hardware-Based Intellectual Property Protection. 2012. *Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information Warfare (ICIW-2012)*, March 22-23, 2012, University of Washington, Seattle, USA.

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