




Distorting an Adversary's View in Cyber-Physical Systems

Christina Fragouli, Suhas Diggavi, Paulo Tabuada

University of California, Los Angeles

Labs: Algorithmic Research in Networked Information Flow (ARNI), Laboratory of Information Theory and Communication Systems (LICOS), The Cyber-Physical Systems Laboratory (CyPhyLab)

Wireless Networked Cyber Physical Systems and Security



Information Security

- Asymmetric cryptography: large overhead
- Maximizes entropy of the message given eavesdropper information
- Perfect secrecy: Unbreakable, Large keys
- Partial secrecy: Smaller keys, targeted

Randomness in Local Differential Privacy Mechanisms

Raw Data

Alice Bob Eve

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions to Design ${oldsymbol{Q}}$

- The number of keys must be at least the same as the output size that must be at least the same as the input size: $|U| \ge |Y| \ge |X|$
- The entropy of the private key must satisfy: $H(U) \ge H(U_{min}^s)$

$$U_{min}^{s} \sim q_{min}^{s} = \left[\frac{e^{\epsilon}}{s(e^{\epsilon}-1)+k}, \cdots, \frac{1}{s(e^{\epsilon}-1)+k}\right]$$

• The entropy of this key is less than what is required for one-time pad

Privacy in Control over the Cloud [3]



$(\epsilon, R) - LDP$ Mechanism

- Raw data $X \in \{1, \dots, k\}$
- Q is $(\epsilon, R) LDP$ if for every $X, X \in \{1, \dots, k\}$, we have

$$\sup \frac{Q(Y = y | X)}{Q(Y = y | \hat{X})} \le e^{\epsilon}$$
$$H(U) \le R$$

• For small privacy level ϵ , observing Y does not reveal whether the raw data was X or \acute{X}

Secure Time-Series Communication [1]

Dynamical Control System

$$\begin{aligned} X_{t+1} &= A X_t + B U_t + w_t \\ Y_t &= C X_t + v_t \end{aligned}$$

- We define two distortion measures for sequential data i.e., state transitions of a control system:
 - Expected Distortion: $D_E = \frac{1}{T} \sum_t (X_t \hat{X}_t)^2$
 - Worst Case Distortion: $D_W = \min_t \min_{\tau_t(X_t,K)} (X_t \hat{X}_t)^2$


Goal:

- Maximize Distortion by designing encoding functions τ_t

For Average Case:

- Mirror across hyperplanes for certain symmetric distributions
- Hyperplane can be picked with just one bit of key

Multi-Level Privacy [2]



Motivation

- Control input can be calculated by minimizing an objective function (e.g., model predictive control)
- Control over the cloud requires communication of *private data* vulnerable to *eavesdropping* attacks

Results

- Created a lightweight encoding scheme using isomorphisms of control systems
- Cloud is unable to learn the state, the dynamics, or the objective
- Proposed a measure of privacy (in terms of the dimension of uncertainty set)
- Quantified privacy loss with side knowledge

 $\{\psi_*\Sigma,\psi_*J\}$

Minimize $\psi_* J$ w.r.t dynamics $\psi_* \Sigma$ Cloud \tilde{u}_k

Plant

Dynamics Σ

Objective J


Secret key: ψ

Algorithm

- **1) Handshaking**: Plant encodes Σ and J with ψ , and sends them to the cloud
- 2) Plant operation:
- \tilde{y}_k Encoding: Measure y_k and send encoded $\tilde{y}_k = \psi_* y_k$ to the cloud
 - **Optimization:** Cloud uses \tilde{y}_k to find input \tilde{u}_k minimizing $\psi_* \Sigma$ w.r.t dynamics $\psi_* J$, send \tilde{u}_k
 - **Decoding:** Decode $u_k = \psi_*^{-1} \tilde{u}_k$ and apply it to the actuators

References

[1] G. Agarwal, M. Karmoose, S. Diggavi, C. Fragouli, P. Tabuada. "Distorting an adversary's view in cyber-physical systems", CDC 2018, arXiv 2019
[2] A.M. Girgis, D. Data, K. Chaudhuri, C. Fragouli, S. Diggavi. "Privacy-Utility-Randomness Trade-offs in Local Differential Privacy", arXiv 2019
[3] A. Sultangazin, P. Tabuada. "Symmetries and Privacy in Control Over the Cloud: Uncertainty Sets and Side Knowledge", CDC 2019



Model:

• *n* users, each has a sample $X_i \sim p$

 U_1

- *d* analysts want to estimate *p*
- Each user i has a random key U_i

Goal:

- Design DP-mechanisms $\{Q_i: i \in [n]\}: Q_i = f(X_i, U_i)$
- To preserve privacy of each user
- To minimize the risk minimization of each analyst

 $r_{\epsilon,R,n,k}^{\ell} = \inf_{\widehat{p}} \inf_{Q_i} \sup_{p} E[\ell(\widehat{p}(Y^n), p)]$

Project Directions

- Distorting security for passive attacks in CPS dynamical systems
- Secure state estimation with actuator and sensor attacks
- Privacy with input-distortion metrics
- Privacy in control over the cloud
- Privacy of networked control over the cloud
- Privacy with coded wireless broadcasting
- Secure lightweight entity authentication
- Publication output: The work during the reporting period resulted in 12 publications and 3 in submission.
- **REU achievement:** We supported two students for REU during June-August 2019 including a female student with whom two papers are in submission. The students worked on implementing drone localization through beaconing, which we will use for privacy.