Hash functions: Properties, an Attack, and an Application

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A cryptographic hash function, h, takes an input message of arbitrary length and produces as an output a message digest, also referred to as a hash of fixed length [1]. Key Properties:

- One-way: Given a value y, it is computationally infeasible to find a value x such that h(x) = y [2].
- **Preimage resistance:** It must be infeasible to invert a hash or message digest [1].
- Weak collision resistance: Given x and h(x), it is infeasible to find any x', where x ≠ x' and h(x) = h(x') [1, 2].
 - It must be impossible to modify a message without changing its message digest.
- Strong collision resistance: It is infeasible to find any x

Sponge Construction:

- Sponge construction constructs a function SPONGE[*f*, *pad*, *r*].
 - *f* is a fixed-length transformation
 - *pad* is a padding rule
 - *r* is the bitrate
- The process of producing a hash occurs in three steps:

1. The state bits are initialized to zero.

- The *absorbing* phase: The *r-b* input message blocks are XORed into the outer part of the state and treated with *f* [4].
- 3. The *squeezing* phase: the outer part of the state is iteratively returned as an output blocks,

and y such that $x \neq y$ and h(x) = h(y) [2].

• There are no two inputs that hash to the same output. **SHA-3 (Keccak):**

- Keccak-function consists of 24 rounds of 5 sequential steps.
- The output of each round is:

Output = $\iota \circ \chi \circ \pi \circ \rho \circ \theta$ (Input), where ι, χ, π, ρ , and θ are sub rounds [3].






Figure 1. Hash Function Operation



after being treated by *f* [4].



sponge

Figure 4. Sponge Construction

Baseline▼=0 ■Cursor-Baseline▼=190ns		Baseline = 0
Narie 🔷 🗸	Cursor 🛛 🗢 🔻	0 100ns
🔁 🔽 CLK_HALF_PERIOD	'd 1	1
🖻 🗖 CLK_PERIOD	'd 2	2
🛱 📧 DEBUG	'd 0	0
😐 🐜 cycle_ctr[31:0]	'h xoooooox	20000000
🖻 🐨 error_ctr[31:0]	'h 00000000	00000000
⊞\$ tb_block[511:0]	'h 6162636≯	€1626380_00000000_0000000_00000000_00000000_0000
🔤 tb_clk	0	
⊞‱ tb_digest[159:0]	'h 6745230⊁	67452301_EFCIAB89_98BADCFE_10325476_C3D2E1F0
tb_digest_valid	0	Λ
tb_init	0	
tb_next	0	
tb_ready	0	
tb_reset_n	1	
	'h 00000002	00000001

Figure 5. Waveform Depicting SHA-1 in Verilog

Future Work:




Figure 3. A Second Preimage Attack

Differential Fault Analysis:

- DFA utilizes the dependency of output faults on internal intermediate variables to recover messages, then a limited observable digest is used to recover part of the input of the last round χ operation to launch an attack [5].
- DFA is a powerful and efficient attack method, and has been used to break various cryptographic algorithms [5].

1. Produce waveforms of an executed hash in SHA-3

2. Implement SHA-3 on an FPGA

3. Launch a DFA attack

Broader Impact of Project:

• The ultimate goal of this project is to apply the SHA-3 as a security measure in a sensor network.

Citations:

[1]W. Trappe and L.C. Washington, *Introduction to Cryptography with Coding Theory*. Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2006. P. 218-239.
[2]Stamp, M. (2011). *Information Security Principles and Practice*. 2nd ed. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, pp.125-153.
[3]M. Taha and P. Schaumont, "Differential Power Analysis of MAC-Keccak at Any Key-Length", *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol. 8231, pp. 68-82, 2013. Available: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-41383-4_5. [Accessed 12 June 2019].
[4]G. Bertoni, J. Daemen, M. Peeters and G. Van Assche, "Cryptographic sponge functions", 2011. [Online]. Available: https://keccak.team/files/CSF-0.1.pdf. [Accessed: 21 Aug 2019].
[5]P. Luo, Y. Fei, L. Zhang and A. Ding, "Differential Fault Analysis of SHA3-224 and SHA-256", *Eprint.iacr.org*, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7774477. [Accessed: 24-Oct 2019].

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