



PRIWDEN: Universally Hardening SGX Programs via Load-Time Synthesis

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
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Motivation

Side-channel Attacks against SGX

- Shared resources as side channels
 - Page table [SP'15, Security'17]
 - Cache [WOOT'17, ATC'17, CHES'17]
 - Branch predictor [Security'17, ASPLOS'18]
 - TLB [CCS'17]
 - Spectre[Securty'18]


→ Break the security guarantees of SGX



Statically Enforced Defenses

- Multiple side channels can co-exist
- Naively composite mitigations:
 - Undeployable:** unavailable features
 - Redundant:** over-protection
 - Incompatible:** conflicting mitigations

→ Problems with scheme composition




PRIDWEN Framework

A framework that uses *load-time synthesis* to *dynamically* harden SGX programs by *selectively applying* different mitigation techniques according to the *configurations on the target execution platform*.

Goals of PRIDWEN:

- Adaptivity:** select mitigation techniques that confirm to the capabilities of the target platform
 - Attestability:** support remote attestation of the dynamically generated binary
 - Extensibility:** support legacy and future mitigation techniques and platforms
- Universally hardening SGX programs




Evaluation

Prototype implementation

- Fine-grained ASLR
- T-SGX
- Varys
- QSpecure


Evaluation metrics:

- Security analysis
 - Correctness
 - Performance of PRIDWEN
 - Performance of synthesized binaries
- Poses moderate performance overhead
- Retains faithfulness of execution semantics



The performance of Lighthouse; QS: QSpecure.

Base: **1.5x**
T-SGX: **1.9x**
Varys: **2.6x**
Multiple: **4.6x**



The performance of libjpeg and SQLite.

Base: **1.2-1.7x**
HW-assisted: **1.9x**
SW-only: **3.4x**

