

# PriSTE: Protecting Spatiotemporal Event Privacy in Continuous LBS



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## Motivation

- When a user's perturbed locations are released **continuously**, existing LPPMs may not protect users' **secrets about spatiotemporal activities**.
- The secrets could be "visited hospital in the last week" or "regularly commuting between Address 1 and Address 2 every morning and afternoon" (it is easy to infer that Addresses 1 and 2 may be home and office), which we call it **spatiotemporal event**.

Spatial dimension	Temporal dimension	Spatial and Temporal
$u^1$ $u^2$ $s_1$ $\bullet$ $\circ$ $s_2$ $\bullet$ $\circ$ AND	$u^1$ $u^2$ $s_1$ $\bullet$ AND $\bullet$ $s_2$ $\circ$ $\circ$	$u^1$ $u^2$ $s_1$ $\circ$ AND $\circ$ $s_2$ $\circ$ AND $\circ$ (e) $((u^1 = s_1) \vee (u^1 = s_2)) \wedge ((u^2 = s_1) \vee (u^2 = s_2))$
$u^1$ $u^2$ $s_1$ $\bullet$ $\circ$ $s_2$ $\bullet$ $\circ$ OR	$u^1$ $u^2$ $s_1$ $\bullet$ OR $\bullet$ $s_2$ $\circ$ $\circ$	$u^1$ $u^2$ $s_1$ $\circ$ OR $\circ$ $s_2$ $\circ$ OR $\circ$ (f) $((u^1 = s_1) \vee (u^1 = s_2)) \vee ((u^2 = s_1) \vee (u^2 = s_2))$

Fig. 1: Six examples of spatiotemporal events.

Event (a) is always false.

Event (b) indicates a sensitive *region*.

Event (c) represents a sensitive *trajectory*.

Event (d) represents the *presence or not* in a sensitive location.

Event (e) indicates a *mobility pattern* passing through sensitive regions.

Event (f) indicates the *presence or not* in a sensitive region.

## Spatiotemporal Event Privacy vs. Location Privacy

- Although the definition of spatiotemporal event is more general than a single location or a trajectory, the privacy metrics between spatiotemporal event privacy and location privacy can be **orthogonal**.




Fig.3 Illustration of indistinguishability-based privacy metrics.

- Given any Event(s) :  
 $\epsilon$ -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy  $\not\Rightarrow$   $\epsilon$ -Geo-Indistinguishability  
 $\epsilon$ -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy  $\not\Leftarrow$   $\epsilon$ -Geo-Indistinguishability
- The best of two worlds :  
 \* Location privacy = **general protection** against unknown risks when sharing location with the third parties,  
 \* spatiotemporal event privacy = **flexible and customizable protection** which may prevent against profiling attacks.

## Formalize Spatiotemporal Event Privacy

### Define Spatiotemporal Event

- We call  $u^t = s_i$  **location-time predicate**, whose value can be *true* or *false* depending on the ground truth of  $u^t$ .
- A **spatiotemporal event** is defined as a Boolean expression of the location-time predicates using the AND, OR, NOT operators, denoted by  $\wedge$ ,  $\vee$ ,  $\neg$ , respectively.

Spatiotemporal Event	Boolean Expression
single location event	$u^t = s_i$
PRESENCE at a single location	$(u^1 = s_i) \vee (u^2 = s_i) \vee \dots \vee (u^T = s_i)$
region event	$(u^t = s_i) \vee (u^t = s_j) \vee \dots \vee (u^t = s_k)$
single trajectory event	$(u^1 = s_i) \wedge (u^2 = s_j) \wedge \dots \wedge (u^n = s_k)$
PATTERN of trajectories	$((u^1 = s_i) \vee (u^1 = s_j) \vee \dots \vee (u^1 = s_k)) \wedge \dots \wedge ((u^n = s_l) \vee (u^n = s_m) \vee \dots \vee (u^n = s_n))$

Fig. 2: Examples of Spatiotemporal Events.

### $\epsilon$ -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy


- A mechanism preserves  $\epsilon$ -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy for a spatiotemporal event if at any timestamp  $t$  in  $\{1, \dots, T\}$  given any observations  $\{o_1, \dots, o_t\}$

$$\Pr(o_1, \dots, o_t | Event) \leq e^\epsilon \Pr(o_1, \dots, o_t | \neg Event)$$

where *Event* is a logic variable about the user-specified spatiotemporal event and  $\neg Event$  denotes its negation.

## PriSTE framework

- PriSTE (PriSTE Event)
  - \* employ existing LPPM (e.g., Planar Laplace M. for Geo-I)
  - \* quantification algorithms
  - \* calibrate  $\epsilon$  of PLM for  $\epsilon$ -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy.



## Experiments

- A **stricter LPPM** satisfies a certain level of spatiotemporal event privacy without any change.
- a **more loose LPPM** may need to reduce its privacy budget significantly for protecting the same event..




Fig.4 PRESENCE( $S = \{1 : 10\}$ ,  $T = \{16 : 20\}$ )

See more details in a long version of our paper: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.09152>