




# SaTC: Core: Medium: Protecting Confidentiality and Integrity of Deep Neural Networks against Side-channel and Fault Attacks



## Challenge:

- Security implication of DNN: IP confidentiality and integrity/availability
- Diverse models, platforms, and applications for DNNs
- Optimization of DNNs and transfer learning



Overview of *SpyNet*

	Model Information	HW Implementation	SW Implementation
Structure characteristics	# layers	power SPA	
	type of layer, activation	memory access	$\mu$ architecture (IS, PMC)
	connection/ layers	power SPA, timing	
Hyperparameters	# neurons in FC	power SPA	$\mu$ architecture (IS, PMC)
	# of kernels in CONV	power SPA, memory access	IS, DS, PMC, constraints
	size of kernel in CONV/POOL	memory access	IS, DS, PMC, constraints
Parameters	weights in FC	power DPA, bus snoop	FP
	kernel values in CONV	power DPA, bus snoop	timing $\mu$ architecture, FP

## Scientific Impact:

- Investigate a new attack surface of DNN inference
- Systematically protect confidentiality and integrity of DNNs
- Deepen understanding of inherent information leakage and fault tolerance of DNN models

## Solution:

- *SpyNet*: leverage different side-channels for recovering DNN structure and parameters on diverse platforms
- *DisruptNet*: manipulate DNN operations via practical hardware and software fault injections
- *SecureNet*: network obfuscation against side-channel attacks, detection of integrity violation of DNNs, and hardening techniques for fault resistance

Overview of *DisruptNet*

		HW implementation		SW implementation	
		Resource	Fault Type	Resource/Stage	Fault Type
Computation	reuse	datapath PE control logic	output: stuck-at, random control flow	instruction execution	skip/control/data flow
		buffer	set/reset, random		
Data	temporary	registers	set/reset, random (DVFS)	registers	set/reset, random (DVFS)

## Broader Impact:

- Facilitate wide adoption of DNN in security-critical applications
- Advance the state-of-the-art DNN implementations, computer architecture, hardware security, formal methods and verification
- Technology transfer with company partners through a new NSF IUCRC center

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