


SaTC: CORE: Medium: Hidden Rules in Neural Networks as Attacks and Adversarial Defenses

PI: Ben Y. Zhao co-PIs: Pedro Lopes, Heather Zheng

Technical Challenges:

- Backdoor attacks train hidden rules into neural network models
- A significant threat against neural network models
- Hard to detect due to inherent “diversity” of backdoor triggers in the physical world



Scientific Impact:

- Demonstrates *physical backdoors* as a real-world threat, especially since they break key assumptions made in SOTA backdoor defenses (designed/tested on digital triggers)
- “Backdoor as a defense” is a new concept for protecting DNN models and user privacy
- Demonstrating similar concepts / mechanisms in voice


Technical Contributions:

Study *physical backdoors* (physical object as triggers) [1]

1. Highly effective attacks
2. Break assumptions made by existing defenses
3. Clear need for stronger defenses

Using hidden behavior as defenses

1. As honeypot to detect inference time attacks [2]
2. Invisible perturbations to prevent photos from being used in facial recognition models [3]



Broader Impact:

- Fawkes featured in NYTimes, global media, binary downloads > 841K
- Support student training that combines ML and security, integrated research projects in multiple courses
- Recruited 7 female UG researchers and 1 female HS student

Selected Publications

[1] Backdoor Attacks Against Deep Learning Systems in the Physical World, CVPR 2021

[3] Fawkes: Protecting Personal Privacy against Unauthorized Deep Learning Models, USENIX Security 2020

[5] “Hello, It’s Me”: Deep Learning-based Speech Synthesis Attacks in the Real World, CCS 2021

[2] Gotta Catch ‘Em All: Using Honeypots to Catch Adversarial Attacks on Neural Networks, CCS 2020

[4] Blacklight: Scalable Defense for Neural Networks against Query-Based Black-Box Attacks, USENIX Security 2022