CPS: Medium: Collaborative Research: Security vs. Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems AWARD #s 1929410 & 1837517

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
WIRED \equiv

MEWS GPS FAIL!

VOMAN DRIVES INTO LAKE

An Artist Used 99 Phones to Fake a **Google Maps Traffic Jam**

With his "Google Maps Hack," artist Simon Weckert draws attention to the systems we take for granted—and how we let them shape us.



Waze Data Poisoning

Blog

Blog >

People who don't want Waze routing cars through their neighborhoods are feeding it false data.



Murat Kantarcioglu Mestan Celiktug



Utility

Security vs.

Security


Utility














This work

Ford Exec: 'We Know Everyone Who Breaks The Law' Thanks To Our GPS In Your Car

Jim Edwards Jan 8, 2014, 5:16 PM



UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

If you use Waze, hackers can stalk you

Kashmir Hill 4/26/16 2:40pm · Filed to: REAL FUTURE >

0 2 :



New Adversary Model: Consumer Data Protected by Differential Privacy •Classical DP adversary is curious -Our adversary hides poisoning attacks in DP

Classical DP

 $\bar{\boldsymbol{Y}} \leftarrow \mathcal{M}(D)$

 $ar{m{Y}} \sim f_0$

Attack

 Y^a instead of $ar{Y}$

Optimal Attacks and Defenses:

•Variational methods are a useful tool to find the shape of functions


2021 NSF CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS' MEETING


Attack Goals: Multi-criteria Optimization $\max E[\mathbf{Y}^a]$ Ja s.t.


 $D_{KL}(f_a \| f_0) \le \gamma$ $f_a \in \mathcal{F}$

User ID	Data
User 1	0.5
User 2	0.3
User 3	0.7
User 4	1

Database












Traffic Estimation Example




Recent Publications:

- Giraldo, Cardenas, Adversarial Classification Under Differential Privacy. NDSS 2020
- Ozdayi, Kantarcioglu, Gel. <u>Defending Against</u> **Backdoors in Federated Learning with Robust** Learning Rate. AAAI 2021





 $\hat{y}_i(k+1) = \hat{y}_i(k) + \frac{\mathcal{T}}{l_i} \left(\frac{l_{i-1}}{l_i} F_i^{in}(k)\right)$ $-F_i^{out}(k)ig)+Q_i(y_i(k)-\hat{y}_i(k))$



Optimal Defense:

Kantarcioglu, Katz.








Without DP the attack is limited

With DP, the attacker can lie more without detection



With classical defense • With our defense

Ongoing Work: Secure computation for attack-detection in control systems