Side-Channel Analysis and Resiliency Targeting Accelerators

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

Introduction

- GPUs have been used to accelerate general-purpose applications in a range of fields to deliver high throughput
- We see an increasing number of accelerated cryptographic applications
- The question is: "***Does a GPU provide a secure and reliable architecture for cryptographic processing***?"



Side channel Attack (SCA)

Exploit physical implementation of an algorithm, rather than inherent theoretical weaknesses of the encryption algorithm



Impacts



Execution time of a load is linearly dependent on the # of unique memory requests



Execution time of a load is linearly dependent on the # of shared memory bank conflicts

Shared Memory Banks via Timing Differential Attack





Memory Coalescing Unit via Correlation Timing Attack

Timing Attack

AES last T-table is rotated dynamically to destroy rotation pattern



GIPSim: Designing protection against power SCA



- Half warp runs AES, rest add noise
- Performance penalty = 50%



For same success rate, no. of traces is now 2X

Fault-based Attack



- Change operating voltage and frequency
- Observe effect on kernel's functional behavior

Impacts – Who cares?

- Many safety-critical systems, such as UAVs, smart grids are equipped with GPUs to provide high throughput to run in real-time
- Attacks on such critical and dynamic information can lead to severe impact on resources
- The cryptographic algorithms running on GPUs can be exploited – we need to build a first line of defense, providing sufficient protection on these devices from various attacks

Impacts – Education and Outreach

- Detailed analysis of side channel leakage and acquisition on a range accelerating devices, discrete GPUs, mobile GPUs
- Develops and demonstrates timing/power/EM/fault attacks and obfuscations on GPUs
- Delivers GPU Instruction-level Power Simulator (GIPSim) to design customized obfuscation

Impacts – Quantification

- To launch the same power based SCA, kernels with obfuscation suggested by GIPSim requires 2x number of traces and overall SNR is reduced to half
- To obfuscate the memory timing side channel, the effort to launch a successful attack is increased by 81X × 68X, using our hardware and software approaches, while also improving encryption/decryption performance by 7% on average

NSF Award Number: SaTC STARSS 1618379 and SRC T3S Task 2687.001