TWC: Medium: Understanding and Illuminating Non-Public Data Flows:

Evaluating Anti-Fingerprinting Privacy Enhancing Technologies

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Browser Fingerprinting

Collect unique information about the user's browsing platform, including

- Hardware: audio, graphic rendering, screen resolution, touch support
- Operating system: language, time zone, supported fonts
- The browser itself: its version, plugins installed, other HTTP headers


Problem


Anti-Fingerprinting Privacy Enhancing Technologies (AFPETs) aim to protect consumers against fingerprinting by masking, or *spoofing*, attributes.

- Are AFPETs really doing what they've claimed?
- Can we quantify and compare their effects on privacy?


Our Hybrid Solution

A new framework that combines experimental and observational methods





Interesting Findings




 \boxplus + + + ×

Undocumented behaviors and inconsistencies in some AFPETs

indicates AFPET's documentation purports that the attribute is masked. + indicates observed masking, × indicates no masking found even when it is likely to detect it, and · indicates inconclusive results. For the results that we manually double checked, we include the outcome of that check as a superscript. Here, × denotes that the PET really does not mask the attribute, + that it does, ×/+ that it is not masked by default but can be with configuration, and ? that the manual analysis was inconclusive.

Large difference in entropy




Broader Impacts

Reported issues:





Effectiveness of p



And more

Trained a grad student and an undergrad (now a Ph.D. student)

Appeared at WWW 2019

touch.event

touch.start

touch.max points

webGL.Data Hash

webGL.Renderer

webGL.Vendor

 \times \times \times \times \times

 \times \times + \times \times \times \square \times