

# Usable Key Management and Forward Secrecy for Secure Email

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[https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD\\_ID=1816929](https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1816929)



## Why don't more people use secure email?

Stakeholder approach shows conflicting goals, resulting in fragmented solutions

Stakeholder	Security	Utility	Deploy.	Usab.
Enforcement	High priority for no support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support
Email Service Providers	High priority for full support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support
Typical Users	High priority for full support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support
Enterprise Organizations	High priority for full support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support
Secure Mailbox Providers	High priority for full support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support
Privacy Enthusiasts	High priority for full support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support
Vulnerable Users	High priority for full support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support	High priority for partial support

■ high priority for full support    ■ high priority for partial support  
 ▨ low priority    □ blank means a non-priority or not applicable  
 ✕ there is disagreement within the stakeholder group about the priority of this property  
 ☠ high priority for no support

"SoK: Securing Email—A Stakeholder-Based Analysis." International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2021

## Challenge: Can we make secure user authentication easy to use and easy to deploy?

Tackle a wider range of applications to increase impact

### Scientific Impact

Authenticating users is applicable to a wide range of problems in security. Our work demonstrates how a focus on usability leads to automating key management and simplifying user interactions.

### Web Authentication


Challenge: Replace passwords with a system that provides greater security while maintaining high usability

Approach: Automated and centralized management of keys and certificates with Let's Authenticator

### Secure Messaging



Challenge: A malicious key server could provide fake public keys for users, leading to a man-in-the-middle attack

Approach #1: Improve the usability of the authentication ceremony



"Something isn't secure, but I'm not sure how that translates into a problem": Promoting autonomy by designing for understanding in Signal, SOUPS, August 2019.

Approach #2: Detect fake key attacks using key transparency and anonymous client auditing



- no trusted third party and no need to carry hardware tokens
- simple account recovery when users lose a device
- portability among multiple authenticators

Let's Authenticator: Automated Certificates for User Authentication, NDSS 2022

**Other Authentication Research**  
 2FA Usability Studies (SOUPS 2019, EuroUSEC 2019)  
 Scalable Certificate Revocation (NDSS 2020, ACSAC 2019)

### Broader Impacts

- Billions of users of secure messaging applications can use automated detection of attacks.
- Vulnerable users have clear methods to manually check fingerprints of public keys to guarantee their safety.



### Broader Impacts

- Users will have an easy-to-use method of authenticating to websites and applications that is more secure than passwords.
- Eliminates password breaches and phishing