

Visualization for Secure Coding in C James Walker, Jean Mayo, Ching-Kuang Shene (Michigan Tech) Steve Carr (Western Michigan University)

### Self paced

### Visualization is driven by events generated through static and dynamic program analysis. Students control the pace at which the events are played. They may also step, rewind, and fast forward through the event queue.

### **Multiple Learning Levels**

Four experience levels determine the set of visualizations shown by default and the details that appear in the Program Address Space visualization. Designed for beginning C programmers through graduate students.

## More than Security

Visualization of the program address space, call graph, and basic kernel file handling structures can be useful in many courses, including C programming, Systems Programming, and Operating Systems.

P	rogra	am	Address Space		Sensitive Data Handling						
		SecureCvis	SecureCvisual								
File View Help			File View Help			SecureCvisual + ×					
			Program Address Space Call Graph File Operations Sensitive Data Source Code			File Options Help					
Program Address Space	Call Graph	File Ope	Stack Oxffffd018: main		0001 #include <stdio.h></stdio.h>	Program Address Space Call Graph File Operations Secure Variables					

		Address	Name	l ype	Size	Points Io	Value
1 #include <string.h></string.h>		0xffffd024	argv	pointer	<address width=""></address>	0xffffd0b4	<pointer></pointer>
2		0xffffd020	argc	int	4		2
- 3 void func(char *cntr){		0xffffd01c	Return Addr				0xf7e242c3
		0xffffd018	Dynamic Link				0x0000000
4 inti;	C	xffffd00c: fu	nc				
5 char buf[8];		Address	Name	Туре	Size	Points To	Value
6 int i		0xffffd014	cptr	pointer	<address width=""></address>	0xffffd280	"ABCDEFG12345678"
		0xffffd010	Return Addr				0x0804844b
		0xffffd00c	Dynamic Link				0xffffd018
8 i=7:		0xffffd008	i	int	4		7
9 i - 11		0xffffd004	j	int	4		11
		Oxffffcffc	buf	char	1		"\x10\x83\x04\b"
10 strcpy(buf,cptr);	<	loan					
11 i=0;		0,1110010					0.00000000
12 i = 0.2		Dxffffd00c: fu	inc				
12 )=0,		Address	Name	Type	Size	Points To	Value
13 }		0xffffd014	cptr	pointer	<address width=""></address>	0xffffd280	"ABCDEFG12345678"
14 int main(int argc, char *argv[]){		0xffffd010	Return Addr				0x0804844b
15 $func(argv[1])$		0xffffd00c	Dynamic Link				0xffffd018
		0xffffd008	i	int	4		3684150
ן סו		0xffffd004	j	int	4		892613426
		Oxffffcffc	buf	char	1		"ABCDEFG12345678"

- Shows address space, registers, and code in C and assembly.
- Choose among multiple levels of detail.
- Easily demonstrate heap and stack overflows

## **Integer Coercion**

/ariable Representation

0002	#include <stdlib.h></stdlib.h>			
0003	<pre>#include <string.h></string.h></pre>	track	inconuro	Flow Chart
0004	<pre>#include <cstring></cstring></pre>	Udck	insecure	How Chart
0005	<pre>#include <sys mman.h=""></sys></pre>			
0006	<pre>#include <sys resource.h=""></sys></pre>	Core size zeroed		Core Zeroed
0007				
0008	VACCSSensitiveAnnotate,main,track	Declared		Mem Locked
0009	VACCSSensitiveAnnotate,main,insecure			
0010		Locked		Value Set
0011	int main() {			
0012		Cleared		Value Cleared
0013	struct rlimit rlpDefine;	Cicarea		Value cleared
0014	<pre>rlpDefine.rlim_max = 0;</pre>			
0015	<pre>setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &amp;rlpDefine);</pre>	Set		Mem Unlocked
0016				
0017	char* track = (char*) malloc(15);	Cleared		
0018	mlack/track_15);			
0019	milock(lfack, 15);	Unlocked		
0020	stropy(track "HELLO");			
0021	memset(track A 15);	Cleared		
0022	memset(track, 0, 15),			
0023	<pre>munlock(track, 15):</pre>		Declared	
0025	marroock(crack, 15/)		Decialed	
0026	int insecure:			
			Set W/O IDCK	
0027	insecure = 5:			
0028				
0029	}			
0025	1			

- Students formally identify sensitive variables.
- Visualization identifies if data properly protected: locked in memory & core size set to zero before use; data cleared before unlocked

# File Operations\*



- Shows students basic kernel file handling data. Works across fork. Shows per-process and global structures.
- Each open depicted and effect of parameters explained.
- Helps students understand shared descriptors and to apply principle of least privilege in file operations.

# **Future Work**

- Eclipse plug-in under development. Planned features include:
  - Static and dynamic analysis
  - Real-time syntax highlighting
    - Attack surface, malloc, free, open,

### etc.

- Tutorials on fundamental concepts like attack surface and buffer overflows, etc.
- Planned support for dynamic taint analysis

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\* Under development