ABSTRACT

Strategic information operations (e.g. disinformation, political propaganda, and other forms of online manipulation) are a critical concern for democratic societies—as they destabilize the “common ground” that we need to stand upon to govern ourselves. In this talk, I argue that defending against strategic information operations will require a more nuanced understanding of the problem. In particular, we will need to move beyond focusing on “bots” and “trolls” to looking at the collaborative nature of disinformation campaigns that target, infiltrate, shape, and leverage online communities. Drawing from three distinct case studies, I describe how orchestrated campaigns can become deeply entangled within “organic” online crowds and I highlight a persistent challenge for researchers, platform designers, and policy makers—distinguishing between orchestrated, explicitly-coordinated information operations and the emergent, organic behaviors of an online crowd.

BIOGRAPHY

Ben Fuller is an assistant professor of computer science and engineering at the University of Connecticut. Ben is a member of the Connecticut Cybersecurity Center.  Prior to joining UConn, Ben was a cryptographic researcher building secure systems at MIT Lincoln Laboratory from 2007-2016 in the Secure, Resilient Systems and Technology Group. Ben completed my Ph.D. at Boston University. Ben's primary research area is cryptography spanning from complexity/reduction-based cryptography, information theory, and applied cryptography necessary to deploy systems. Ideally, Ben takes a real problem, develop a theoretically sound approach, and work with others to implement a proof of concept.