Visible to the public CPS: Synergy: Collaborative Research: Cyber-Physical Approaches to Advanced Manufacturing SecurityConflict Detection Enabled

Project Details
Lead PI:Jaime Camelio
Co-PI(s):Christopher Williams
Lee Wells
Performance Period:06/15/15 - 05/31/19
Institution(s):Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Sponsor(s):National Science Foundation
Award Number:1446804
476 Reads. Placed 252 out of 803 NSF CPS Projects based on total reads on all related artifacts.
Abstract: The evolution of manufacturing systems from loose collections of cyber and physical components into true cyber-physical systems has expanded the opportunities for cyber-attacks against manufacturing. To ensure the continued production of high-quality parts in this new environment requires the development of novel security tools that transcend both the cyber and physical worlds. Potential cyber-attacks can cause undetectable changes in a manufacturing system that can adversely affect the product's design intent, performance, quality, or perceived quality. The result of this could be financially devastating by delaying a product's launch, ruining equipment, increasing warranty costs, or losing customer trust. More importantly, these attacks pose a risk to human safety, as operators and consumers could be using faulty equipment/products. New methods for detecting and diagnosing cyber-physical attacks will be studied and evaluated through our established industrial partners. The expected results of this project will contribute significantly in further securing our nation's manufacturing infrastructure. This project establishes a new vision for manufacturing cyber-security based upon modeling and understanding the correlation between cyber events that occur in a product/process development-cycle and the physical data generated during manufacturing. Specifically, the proposed research will take advantage of this correlation to characterize the relationships between cyber-attacks, process data, product quality observations, and side-channel impacts for the purpose of attack detection and diagnosis. These process characterizations will be coupled with new manufacturing specific cyber-attack taxonomies to provide a comprehensive understanding of attack surfaces for advanced manufacturing systems and their cyber-physical manifestations in manufacturing processes. This is a fundamental missing element in the manufacturing cyber-security body of knowledge. Finally, new forensic techniques, based on constraint optimization and machine learning, will be researched to differentiate process changes indicative of cyber-attacks from common variations in manufacturing due to inherent system variability.