Economics and CPS Seminar mini-course: Exploring Non-Coasian World: From Non-cooperative Bargaining to Property Rights
Date: Apr 24, 2015 12:00 pm – Apr 25, 2015 1:00 am
April 24, 2015
Exploring Non-Coasian World: From Non-cooperative Bargaining to Property Rights
I will review non-cooperative bargaining (Stahl-Rubinstein). Then, we will consider a familiar public good: temperature in a room that has two (or more) occupants with non-identical tastes. I will borrow Farrell (1987) highly stylized minimalist setup of public good environment with hidden information to demonstrate how hidden information (ii) inhibits truthful preference revelation and (i) reduces welfare. I will use Farrell (1987) to illustrate contract theory and mechanism design approaches, and highlight a central role of property rights allocation for efficiency. (Slides are for this talk as well as the following week.)
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A. Rubinstein, 1982. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50-1, 97 - 109.
M. Yildiz, 2011, Nash meets Rubinstein in final-offer arbitration, Economics Letters, 110- 3, 226-230
J. Farrell, 1987. Information and the Coase Theorem, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 - 2, 113-129
In addition, I use (and will use) the following:
P.~Bolton and M.~Dewatripont, 2005. Contract Theory. The MIT Press
D.~ Fudenberg and J.~Tirole, 1991. Game Theory. The MIT Press.
M.~Osborne and A.~Rubinstein, 1994. A Course in Game Theory. The MIT Press.
M.~Osborne and A.~Rubinstein, 1990. Bargaining and markets Academic Press.
Submitted by Carolyn Winter
on
April 24, 2015
Exploring Non-Coasian World: From Non-cooperative Bargaining to Property Rights
I will review non-cooperative bargaining (Stahl-Rubinstein). Then, we will consider a familiar public good: temperature in a room that has two (or more) occupants with non-identical tastes. I will borrow Farrell (1987) highly stylized minimalist setup of public good environment with hidden information to demonstrate how hidden information (ii) inhibits truthful preference revelation and (i) reduces welfare. I will use Farrell (1987) to illustrate contract theory and mechanism design approaches, and highlight a central role of property rights allocation for efficiency. (Slides are for this talk as well as the following week.)
=============
A. Rubinstein, 1982. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50-1, 97 - 109.
M. Yildiz, 2011, Nash meets Rubinstein in final-offer arbitration, Economics Letters, 110- 3, 226-230
J. Farrell, 1987. Information and the Coase Theorem, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 - 2, 113-129
In addition, I use (and will use) the following:
P.~Bolton and M.~Dewatripont, 2005. Contract Theory. The MIT Press
D.~ Fudenberg and J.~Tirole, 1991. Game Theory. The MIT Press.
M.~Osborne and A.~Rubinstein, 1994. A Course in Game Theory. The MIT Press.
M.~Osborne and A.~Rubinstein, 1990. Bargaining and markets Academic Press.