Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Robucci, Ryan  [Clear All Filters]
2018
Shey, James, Karimi, Naghmeh, Robucci, Ryan, Patel, Chintan.  2018.  Design-Based Fingerprinting Using Side-Channel Power Analysis for Protection Against IC Piracy. 2018 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). :614—619.

Intellectual property (IP) and integrated circuit (IC) piracy are of increasing concern to IP/IC providers because of the globalization of IC design flow and supply chains. Such globalization is driven by the cost associated with the design, fabrication, and testing of integrated circuits and allows avenues for piracy. To protect the designs against IC piracy, we propose a fingerprinting scheme based on side-channel power analysis and machine learning methods. The proposed method distinguishes the ICs which realize a modified netlist, yet same functionality. Our method doesn't imply any hardware overhead. We specifically focus on the ability to detect minimal design variations, as quantified by the number of logic gates changed. Accuracy of the proposed scheme is greater than 96 percent, and typically 99 percent in detecting one or more gate-level netlist changes. Additionally, the effect of temperature has been investigated as part of this work. Results depict 95.4 percent accuracy in detecting the exact number of gate changes when data and classifier use the same temperature, while training with different temperatures results in 33.6 percent accuracy. This shows the effectiveness of building temperature-dependent classifiers from simulations at known operating temperatures.

Broström, Tom, Zhu, John, Robucci, Ryan, Younis, Mohamed.  2018.  IoT Boot Integrity Measuring and Reporting. SIGBED Rev.. 15:14–21.
The current era can be characterized by the massive reliance on computing platforms in almost all domains, such as manufacturing, defense, healthcare, government. However, with the increased productivity, flexibility, and effectiveness that computers provide, comes the vulnerability to cyber-attacks where software, or even firmware, gets subtly modified by a hacker. The integration of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) opts to tackle this issue by aiding in the detection of unauthorized modifications so that devices get remediation as needed. Nonetheless, the use of a TPM is impractical for resource-constrained devices due to power, space and cost limitations. With the recent proliferation of miniaturized devices along with the push towards the Internet-of Things (IoT) there is a need for a lightweight and practical alternative to the TPM. This paper proposes a cost-effective solution that incorporates modest amounts of integrated roots-of-trust logic and supports attestation of the integrity of the device's boot-up state. Our solution leverages crypto-acceleration modules found on many microprocessor and microcontroller based IoT devices nowadays, and introduces little additional overhead. The basic concepts have been validated through implementation on an SoC with an FPGA and a hard microcontroller. We report the validation results and highlight the involved tradeoffs.